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ARTICLE
TOWARD MORE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE:
THE TENNESSEE EXPERIENCE
“With your help we will make Tennessee a model for the
rest of the country.” - Janice Holder, Chief Justice of the
Tennessee Supreme Court, announcing access to justice as
the court’s number one strategic priority, December 2008.
By: Douglas A. Blaze* and R. Brad Morgan**
I. Introduction
Courts, bar associations, and other professional
leaders over the past several years have focused renewed
attention on the need for greater access to justice for a
larger number of Americans. The need has never been
greater. Over sixty million Americans—one in five—
qualify for federally funded legal assistance.1 Studies show
that those sixty million people by household average of 1.3
to 3.0 legal problems each year.2 Many more low-income
*Dean and Elvin E. Overton and Art Stolnitz Distinguished Professor
of
Law,
University
of
Tennessee
College
of
Law.
**Associate Director, Institute for Professional Leadership, University
of
Tennessee
College
of
Law.
***The authors would like to thank and acknowledge the exceptional
and patient work of Christy Woods in researching, editing, and
preparing
this
article.
1
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., BUDGET REQUEST FISCAL YEAR 2014 1, 8
(2014), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/defa
ult/files/LSC/fy2014budgetrequest.pdf.
2
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA:
THE CURRENT STATE OF UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS
15
(2009),
available
at
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justic
e_gap_in_america_2009.pdf.
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people who fail to qualify for legal assistance are still
unable to afford a lawyer.
Led by newly created access to justice commissions
and task forces at the state and federal level, a number of
innovative programs and initiatives have been deployed.
Almost uniformly those efforts have focused on four
strategies: 1) increased funding for existing legal services
programs; 2) increased pro bono work by lawyers; 3)
reducing justice system barriers for self-represented
litigants; and, 4) leveraging emerging technologies to
achieve the other three.3
II. Initial Tennessee Initiative
Tennessee joined the effort in 2008 as a result of a
confluence of initiatives of the Tennessee Bar Association
(“TBA”) and the Tennessee Supreme Court. Under the
leadership of then-TBA president, George “Buck” Lewis,
the “4ALL” Campaign made access to justice programming
the number one priority.4 In December 2008, a unanimous
Tennessee Supreme Court announced that access to justice

3

See generally Resource Center for Access to Justice Initiatives, AM.
BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/gr
oups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/resource_center_for_acc
ess_to_justice.html (providing an overview of key issues in the ATJ
initiative).
4
Johana Burkett, George T. “Buck” Lewis Receives ABA Presidential
Citation, COM. APPEAL, Sept. 4, 2013,
available at
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/local-news/george-t-bucklewis-receives-aba-presidential, (The “Justice 4ALL” campaign was a
collaborative effort initiated by the TBA to educate attorneys and other
legal professionals across the state about the unmet legal needs of
disadvantaged Tennesseans, and to encourage those professionals to
support and participate in the effort to close the justice gap); see also
Tenn. Supreme Court, About the Tennessee Supreme Court’s Access to
Justice Initiative, http://www.justiceforalltn.com/content/about (last
visited Apr. 13, 2015) (explaining priority).

12

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 165
was the court’s number one priority.5 During early 2009,
the court held a series of public meetings, each chaired by a
justice, in public libraries across the state.6 The meetings
engaged a broad range of stakeholders, policy makers, and
members of the public in discussions of the needed work
and creative solutions necessary to close some of the legal
needs gap.7 As a result, the meetings fostered an improved
understanding of the varied and complex nature of unmet
legal needs in different areas of Tennessee.8
A. The Tennessee Supreme Court Access to Justice
Commission
Following the public meetings, in April 2009 the
court created the Tennessee Supreme Court Access to
Justice Commission governed by simultaneously enacted
Supreme Court Rule 50.9 Under Rule 50, the Commission
was charged with developing an initial strategic plan
consistent with the directives of the rule. Specifically, the
court assigned the following responsibilities to the
Commission:
• Encourage state and local bar associations,
access to justice organizations, pro bono programs, judges,
and court clerks across the state to promote and to
recognize pro bono service by lawyers across the state;
• Encourage state and local bar associations,
access to justice organizations, pro bono programs, judges,

5

TENN. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, 2010 STRATEGIC PLAN 1 (2010),
available at http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/final_atj_commission_plan__appendices_2010.pdf.
6
Id. at 2.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 50.
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and court clerks across the state to encourage full and
limited scope legal representation at reduced fees;
• Encourage the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Commission and other groups to provide pro bono and
reduced-rate mediation services to self-represented litigants
and to litigants who, although represented, have modest
means or who are pro bono clients;
• Address existing and proposed laws, rules,
procedures, and polices that are barriers to access to justice
for low income Tennesseans and to consider the role of
community education and increased availability of
technology in reducing these barriers;
• Develop and recommend initiatives and
systemic changes to reduce barriers to access to justice and
to meet the legal needs of 1) people who do not qualify for
existing assistance programs but still cannot afford legal
assistance, 2) people with disabilities that restrict access to
courts and legal services, 3) members of language
minorities, and (4) people whose legal needs may not met
due to restrictions on representation by legal aid programs;
• Promote increased understanding of the
importance of access to justice and of the barriers faced by
many Tennesseans in gaining effective access to the civil
justice system; and,
• Study and recommend strategies to increase
resources and funding for access to justice in civil matters
in Tennessee.10
B. Unique Attributes of the Commission
The approach adopted by the Tennessee Supreme
Court was unique in several respects. First, in contrast to
most commissions across the county, the Tennessee

10

Id. at § 2.04.

14

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 167
Commission consisted of only ten members.11 Second, the
composition of the Commission was exceptionally diverse
in terms of background. 12 The court designed the
Commission to provide new perspectives and involve new
constituencies in the access to justice effort. The appointed
commissioners included business leaders, general counsel
of large corporations, religious leaders, bar leaders from
both large and small firms, and law teachers. Third, the
court provided financial support for the work by hiring a
legally-trained Access to Justice Coordinator to provide
staff support to the work of the Commission.13
Though the formal Commission was relatively
small in size, the Commission decided at the outset to
engage a large number of other people and organizations in
the work of the Commission. 14 For example, the initial
strategic planning process was organized around eight
committees, each chaired by a member of the Commission.
The committees’ membership, however, included a broad
coalition of individuals and organizational representatives
involved in access to justice in the broadest sense.
Representatives of the legal service providers, bar
associations, rural and urban lawyers from various practice
settings, court clerks, judges, social service providers, and
representatives from public libraries, served on the
committees and numerous subcommittees of those
committees.15

11

TENN. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N (2010), supra note 5, at 4.
Id. at app. C (roster of inaugural Commission).
13
Id. at 1.
14
The commission’s approach was encouraged by TENN. SUP. CT. R.
50, § 2.03.
15
TENN. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N (2010), supra note 11, at 4-5,
app. E (roster of all advisory committees).
12
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These attributes, coupled with a receptive and
supportive profession, have led to the ongoing success of
the Commission and its partners.16
C. Strategic Planning
Strategic planning efforts have guided the work of
the Commission since its inception. The Commission has
structured that planning process to require ongoing review
of progress on action items adopted as part of the plan and
a revised plan and planning process every two years.17 As a
result, the focus and work of the Commission can be
divided into three phases to date, each phase defined by the
applicable plan adopted in 2010, 2012, and 2014.
III. Phase One – Low Hanging Fruit
A. Planning Process
To develop the initial strategic plan, at the outset the
Commission formed eight advisory committees, each
headed by a commissioner. The advisory committees were:
•
•
•
•
•

Community and Pro Bono Mediation;
Court System;
Education;
Pro Bono and Attorney Involvement;
Pro Se;

16

ABA RESOURCE CENTER FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE INITIATIVES
Hallmarks of Effective Access to Justice Commissions, ABA RESOURCE
CENTER FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE INITIATIVES (May 2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_
indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_atj_effective_atj_commissions_hallmark
s.authcheckdam.pdf (Explaining that many of the attributes are
recognized as essential to a truly effective commission).
17
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 50, § 2.01.
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•
•
•

Unmet Legal Needs Alternative Strategies;
Unmet Legal Needs Disability and Language
Barriers; and,
Resources and Technology.18

“The Advisory Committees were charged with
developing recommendations for the Commission's
strategic plan.”19 Many of the advisory committees formed
working groups. Approximately thirty such groups met
during the summer and fall of 2009.20 Many of those who
participated in the Supreme Court public access to justice
hearings, including a significant number of judges and
clerks, participated in this phase of the work as well.21 In
addition, the Commission held two meetings that
specifically focused on the resources and technology
available in Tennessee to address the civil legal needs
gap.22
The Commission also conducted a survey of court
clerks regarding how the civil needs crisis affects their
offices. 23 Another survey of legal service providers and
others in the access to justice community was conducted
prior to the annual statewide Tennessee Alliance for Legal
Services Equal Justice Conference in September 2009. This
survey asked for a description of the systemic barriers to
access to justice in Tennessee.24
“By December 2009, the Advisory Committees
submitted their recommendations to the Commission and
its staff.” 25 Due to the hard work of over one hundred
18

TENN. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N (2010), supra note 15, at 4.
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at app. H.
24
Id.
25
Id.
19
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advisory committee members, over seventy substantive
recommendations were submitted for the Commission's
review.26 Some of the recommendations from the advisory
committees were acted upon by the Commission and the
Supreme Court, before the preparation of the final strategic
plan.27 Most notably, the Commission recommended that
the court adopt a pro bono reporting rule and the court
adopted a voluntary reporting rule in November 2009.28
The Commission also recommended, with support from
two different advisory committees, that the court adopt a
new rule to create an emeritus licensure status to allow
attorneys to provide pro bono legal services in Tennessee
through an established not-for-profit bar association, pro
bono program, or legal services program.29
“The Commission held a strategic planning retreat
in January 2010.”30 The Commission worked to distill the
over seventy substantive recommendations from its
Advisory Committees into a more streamlined series of
recommendations to the Supreme Court and an outline for
future Commission activities.31
B. 2010 Strategic Plan
The final plan was submitted to the Court in April
2010 and released to the public in June 2010.32 The plan
outlined four overarching goals:

26

Id. at 5.
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 5-6.
30
Id. at 6.
31
Id.
32
TENN. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, 2012 STRATEGIC PLAN app. D
(2012), available at http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/
sites/default/files/docs/final_atjc_2012_strategic_plan.pdf.
27
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1. To involve more lawyers and law students in
meeting legal needs so that the public is better served;
2. To provide greater educational opportunities
and resources for policymakers, self-represented litigants,
the community, lawyers, court personnel, and others;
3. To make the justice system more user-friendly;
and,
4. To remove barriers to access to justice,
including but not limited to disability, language, literacy,
and geography.33
For each goal, the Commission outlined specific
objectives and actions to be taken over the two-year period
governed by the plan.34 For example, to increase pro bono
efforts, the plan called for the Supreme Court to convene a
pro bono summit of all the stakeholders to discuss and
develop strategies to achieve that goal. 35 The plan also
called for a comprehensive education campaign directed at
judges, lawyers, and clerks, to help foster more userfriendly courts.36 To accomplish the tasks and achieve the
goals of the ambitious plan, the Commission reorganized
its committee structure around the stated priorities.37

33

TENN. ST. CTS., Access to Justice, http://tncourts.gov/pro
grams/access-justice (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). (All information
regarding Tennessee Access to Justice was taken directly from
TNCOURTS.gov.)
34
TENN. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N (2012), supra note 32, at app. E.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 5 (the committees constituted to carry out the plan were
Disability and Language Barriers, Education/Public Awareness, FaithBased Initiatives, Pro Bono, Pro Se/Forms, Resources, and
Technology).
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C. Phase One Accomplishments
1. Pro Bono Summit
“The Supreme Court and the Commission
sponsored a Pro Bono Summit in Nashville” in January
2011.38 All five members of the Tennessee Supreme Court
spoke and participated in the Summit.39 “Bar association
officers, law firm managing partners, rural practitioners,
corporate counsel, deans of Tennessee law schools, law
students, legal service providers, representatives from the
state libraries, and other service providers” all participated
in the event.40
The Summit focused on increasing pro bono service
performed by Tennessee attorneys, and included a range of
panel discussions such as: 1) developing a pro bono clinic;
2) how to increase attorney pro bono at large law firms and
corporations; 3) pro bono issues in rural areas; 4) involving
law students in pro bono; and, 5) utilizing technology to
reach more indigent Tennesseans. 41 All sessions were
recorded and made available online.42
At the conclusion, all “[p]articipants completed
pledge cards stating how they planned to increase pro bono
in their practice.” 43 “New ideas and partnerships were
formed as a result of the Summit, including coordination
among law school pro bono programs” and proposals for
uses of technology in the rural communities.44

38

Id. at 2.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 2-3.
42
Id. at 3.
43
Id.
44
Id.
39
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2. Access to Justice Website
In November 2011, the Supreme Court and the
Commission launched www.JusticeForAllTN.com to
provide information both to the public and the bar.45 The
initial website included links for “legal help” to provide
“information on how to find a lawyer, a glossary of
common legal terms, links to court forms and plain
language information on a variety of legal issues, including
divorce, child support, housing information, healthcare,
immigration, and mediation.”46 One of the most popular
tools on the site proved to be an interactive map of
Tennessee’s 95 counties that directs users to countyspecific contact information for legal aid providers, social
service providers, governmental agencies and the court
system. 47 The website also provides information for
lawyers “ranging from how to volunteer with a legal aid
provider or a bar association to a step-by-step guide for
how to develop a pro bono clinic.”48
3. Rule Changes
While the Commission was engaged in strategic
planning, the Supreme Court was actively implementing a
number of significant rule changes to encourage pro bono
work and remove other barriers to greater access to
justice.49 The rules were supported and proposed by the
Commission, the Tennessee Bar Association, the Tennessee
Bar Foundation, the Tennessee Lawyers' Association for
Women, and the Tennessee Association. Specifically, the
court did the following:
45

Id.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
46

21

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 174
• Revised Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rules
of Professional Conduct 6.1 to add an aspirational goal of
50 pro bono hours per year for Tennessee lawyers;50
• Adopted a new Tennessee Supreme Court Rule
8, Rules of Professional Conduct 6.5 permitting lawyers to
provide limited scope advice;51
• Created new Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
23.08, which allows a court to distribute residual funds
remaining from class action suits to programs or funds
serving pro bono legal needs. The rule specifically
references that funds may be distributed to the Tennessee
Voluntary Fund for Indigent Civil Representation;52
• Revised Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 21,
Section 4.07(c) (Continuing Legal Education (CLE)) to
increase the number of hours of CLE credit that lawyers
may earn for the hours of pro bono legal representation
they perform from one hour of CLE credit for every eight
(8) hours to one hour of CLE credit for every five (5) hours
of pro bono work;53
• Revised Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 5 to
allow judicial research assistants to engage in some types
of pro bono work;54
• Revised Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 43 and
Rule 8, Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15 to make
participation in the Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts
(IOLTA) program mandatory and to require comparability
in rates paid on IOLTA accounts;55
• Amended the rules governing multi-jurisdictional
practice, Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 7, section 10.01
50

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8, RPC 6.1.
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8, RPC 6.5.
52
TENN. R. CIV. P. 23.08.
53
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 21, § 4.07.
54
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 5(c).
55
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8, RPC 1.15 & 43.
51
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(c) and Rule 8, Rules of Professional Conduct 5.5, to
permit lawyers admitted in another jurisdiction to provide
pro bono legal services in Tennessee following a major
disaster and to allow attorneys authorized to practice in
Tennessee as in-house counsel under Rule 5.5 to provide
pro bono legal services in Tennessee through an established
not-for-profit bar association, pro bono program, or legal
services program;56
• Revised Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9,
Section 20.11 to request that every attorney voluntarily file
a pro bono reporting statement annually with the Tennessee
Board of Professional Responsibility;57 and
• Published a new rule for comment, Supreme
Court Rule 50A, that would create an emeritus licensure
status to allow those attorneys who have let their licenses
become inactive to provide pro bono legal services in
Tennessee through an established not-for-profit bar
association, pro bono program, or legal services program.58
IV. Phase Two– Leveraging Technology
and Increasing Participation
A. Leveraging Technology

In its initial strategic plan, the Commission
recognized that “[t]he enhanced use of technology such as
websites, teleconferencing, email pro bono banks and
remote access to courts could greatly benefit underserved
populations, particularly in rural areas.”59 More specifically
the Commission articulated the needs to: (1) utilize
technology to educate legal professionals and the public
about existing resources; and, (2) leveraging technology to
56

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8, RPC 5.5 & 7, § 10.01(c).
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9, § 20.11.
58
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 50A.
59
TENN. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N (2012), supra note 34, at 10.
57
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further the four primary goals communicated by the
Commission in its Strategic Plan.60
In subsequent plans, the Commission—with the
benefit of the experiences of users of the early access to
justice technologies—created a “disciplined approach” to
“allow [the Commission] to place emphasis on the
programs that have been the most effective, to discontinue
spending resources on programs that have not been
effective, and to use new technologies and the new
information . . . gather[ed] to leverage existing programs
and launch new programs where the need is the greatest.”61
The evolution of the use of technology in access to justice
efforts is illustrative, and indicates the efficacy and
efficiency that technology can have in the access to justice
arena, particularly in geographic areas where needs and
resources do not always share the same zip code.
As mentioned above, www.JusticeForAllTN.com—
a user-friendly website—furthers the objectives described
above through an innovative and effective dual purpose of
providing information both to the public and the bar. 62
Viewers who click “legal help” can find information on
how to find a lawyer, a glossary of common legal terms,
links to court forms and plain language information on a
variety of legal issues, including divorce, child support,
housing information, healthcare, immigration, and
mediation.63 Over the years, www.JusticeForAllTN.com
has grown to include links and references to the other
technologies that are being created and utilized in
Tennessee. One such link is to OnlineTNJustice.org
(“OTJ”), a project of the Tennessee Alliance for Legal
60

See TENN. ST. CTS., supra note 33.
TENN. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, 2014 STRATEGIC PLAN 8 (2014),
available at https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/final_2014_strategic_plan_and_appendices.pdf.
62
TENN. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N (2012), supra note 59, at 3.
63
Id.
61
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Services (TALS), the TBA, the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
Access to Justice Commission and the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC.64
OTJ is a website that permits qualifying
Tennesseans to ask a lawyer for help with a legal issue.65
Qualifying users 66 can post civil legal questions on the
website and receive basic legal information and advice
from approved volunteer attorneys. Users answer questions
to determine their eligibility. Qualifying users then select
the legal category to which their question relates, list any
upcoming court date, and ask their civil legal question.
Questions are posted to the queue where registered
attorneys can review them. Users are notified by email
when their question is answered. Users who do not have an
email address are advised to log back into the site
periodically to check for a response. “OTJ addresses the
“connectivity” problem, which most states experience.
Clients in urban areas who cannot connect to legal clinics
because they lack transportation, have child care issues,
face conflicting work schedules, etc., need a way to be
served without having to be at a particular location at a set
time. There are also many clients in rural areas where there
are very few lawyers, clinics or other pro bono resources
available—OTJ addresses both problems.67
The OTJ program and associated technologies are
owned by the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman,
Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC.68 Its license is available for use
64

Volunteer with Online TN Justice, TENN. ALLIANCE FOR LEGAL
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by bar associations, Access to Justice Commissions or
other reputable pro bono organizations for free as long as
the entity uses its best efforts to serve the client population
in the area in which that entity operates.69 Several other
states have launched their own online justice site using the
OTJ technology, furthering the access to justice cause well
beyond the borders of Tennessee.70
In addition to the link to OTJ found at
JusticeForAllTN.com, links are provided to webinars
hosted on Youtube.com that are designed to address “hot
topic” areas of public interest law. These videos are
planned, filmed, and posted as part of a collaborative effort
between the Commission, the TBA, and the Tennessee Bar
Association Access to Justice Education subcommittee.71
There are two series of videos: one series intended for
public consumption, and a second series that is intended for
consumption by legal professionals.72 The video topics are
selected based upon information provided by the
Commission and the Tennessee Bar Association Access to
Justice Committee, which highlights the needs that are
recurring and/or emergent for Tennesseans.73
For example, it was determined that an introduction
to domestic violence law would be an important topic to
address in order to educate and empower legal
professionals to assist those that may be facing domestic
violence. To that end, a video was planned, filmed, and
posted online through the joint efforts of the above
described entities. This video has been viewed hundreds of
times.74
69
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An example of a video created for the public is
titled “Introduction to the Tennessee General Sessions
Court,” and provides information to self-represented
litigants about the Tennessee court system, what to expect
at General Sessions Court, and how it works.75 The video
also includes information about free legal resources that
may be available to unrepresented parties.76 Two of the
resources identified in this video—as well as on
JusticeForAllTN.com—are the phone number 1-888aLEGALz, and court approved pro se divorce forms.77
1-888-aLEGALz (“aLEGALz”) was created by a
coalition of Tennessee legal groups and Memphis-based
International Paper.78 Together, these entities have joined
forces to fund and operate a toll-free phone line offering
legal information and referrals to low-income
Tennesseans. 79 aLEGALz assists Tennesseans in finding
resources to deal with civil legal issues.80 Tennesseans are
able to call this number, leave a message, and then have
those messages returned by a licensed Tennessee lawyer.81
aLEGALz, much like OTJ, addresses the “connectivity”
issue by allowing Tennesseans in both urban and rural
75
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International Paper Company is a pulp and paper company, the
largest such company in the world. It has approximately 65,000
employees, and it is headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee. As stated
on its webpage, “What makes International Paper is our commitment to
do the right things, in the right way, for the right reasons.” IP Giving,
INT’L PULP & PAPER CO., http://www.international
paper.com/US/EN/Company/IPGiving/PF_SegmentPage_1_13989_13
989.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
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areas, who otherwise would not have the ability to attend a
legal clinic, to reach out and speak with an attorney, and
receive information and referrals.82
Finally, in 2011, the Tennessee Supreme Court
approved uniform pro se divorce forms.83 These forms are
available for use by individuals that are seeking a divorce
in Tennessee and meet certain qualifications. 84 These
qualifications require that the parties have no minor
children in the home, no real estate owned by either party,
no retirement account owned by either party, and have
already reduced to writing an agreement as to how any
tangible assets and debt will be divided between the
parties.85 These forms allow for individuals who otherwise
would not access the court system, or who would access the
court system by inefficient and, perhaps, improper
mechanisms to secure a divorce.86
A review of the number of users—both by the
public as well as by attorneys—of these technologies and
forms suggests that not only is there an existing need for
increased use of technology in support of closing the access
to justice gaps, but that there is an opportunity to do so. An
analysis of the number of users, by county, of both OTJ and
aLEGALz reveals, first, that the public is increasingly
using technology in an effort to meet legal needs, and
second, that the populations being served by such
technologies consists of, as expected and hoped, those that
otherwise would find accessing legal assistance to be
challenging.87 More specifically, the number of client users
of OTJ grew from 1,126 in 2011 to 5,445 as of the end of
82
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2013.88 It is important to note that not only did the number
of users of OTJ grow, but the data indicates that the most
significant growth of users came from counties in which
access to traditional legal clinics or legal service providers
is limited due to geography. 89 These data points are
replicated in users of aLEGALz.90 Not only did the number
of public users of OTJ and aLEGALz grow, so did the
number of attorney volunteers. 91 This indicates that
attorneys are amenable to the concept of providing legal
services to the underrepresented through technology, and
they actively seeking the opportunity to do so.
As seen above, the use of technology in addressing
the gaps in the judicial system is not only viable, but it is
worthy of serious consideration and deliberate
implementation. Doing so has not only assisted thousands
of Tennesseans, but has also engaged a portion of the
profession in access to justice issues that otherwise would
not be as engaged. The Commission’s “disciplined
approach” in focusing on the most effective and efficient
uses of such resources has been validated and should
remain a key component of any Commission’s strategic
planning.92
B. Increasing Pro Bono Participation to 50%

In drafting the 2012 strategic plan, the Commission
recognized that maintaining the status quo was not a viable
option, and thus focused on increasing the access of
Tennesseans to quality representation. 93 Although
88

Id.; see also TENN. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N (2014), supra note
61, at 22, app. I.
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increasing the educational resources available to selfrepresented persons through technology undoubtedly
provides a useful and necessary service, the Commission’s
findings underscored the importance of quality legal
representation. 94
Therefore,
providing
quality
representation to indigent Tennesseans and addressing
connectivity between potential indigent clients and lawyers
was the primary objective of the 2012 strategic plan.95
One driving factor behind the Commission’s goal of
increasing attorney participation in pro bono were from
2009, which indicated that only 18.26% of attorneys
licensed in Tennessee voluntarily reported pro bono service
with their Board of Professional Responsibility Annual
Registration Packet. 96 That year, the average attorney
reporting pro bono service donated seventy-nine hours per
year. 97 “[I]n 2010, 38.96% of all licensed attorneys
voluntarily reported pro bono service at an average of
seventy-four hours per year . . . which exceeds the
aspirational goal of 50 hours per year set forth in
Tenn[essee] S[upreme] C[our]t R[ule] 8, R[ule] of
]P[rofessional] C[onduct] 6.1.98 “With this information in
hand, the Commission set the goal that 50% of attorneys
residing in Tennessee will provide pro bono services as
defined by the Court on an average of 50 hours per year on
or before January 1, 2015.”99
In examining that goal, it is important to note that
the Tennessee Supreme Court defines “pro bono services”
as “services provided without a fee or expectation of a fee
to persons of limited means or organizations that primarily
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address the needs of persons of limited means.” 100 “Pro
bono service can also be the delivery of legal services at a
substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means . . .
[or] the provision of legal services at no fee or at a
substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups, or
organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights and
liberties, or charitable, religious, civic, community,
governmental and educational organizations in matters in
furtherance of their organizational purposes where payment
of standard legal fees would deplete the organization’s
resources or would be inappropriate.” 101 “Additionally,
participation in activities for improving the law, the legal
system, or the legal profession is deemed pro bono service
by the Court.”102
In pursuing this goal, the Commission articulated
four main steps that would move attorney participation in
pro bono closer to the 50% mark. These steps included,
attorney education, attorney recruitment, client education
and removal of barriers, and connecting lawyers with
potential clients.103 Each of these steps has been critical in
moving the number of attorneys reporting pro bono
involvement to 44.31% of all Tennessee attorneys, an
increase of 26.05% since 2010.104 The average amount of
hours performed by those attorneys is an astounding 74.13
hours per year, far greater than the national average.105
Although legal advice clinics are an important
aspect of pro bono, the Commission sought to educate
attorneys regarding the importance of a lawyer taking up
representation of an individual, even if the representation is

100
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limited in scope. 106 After graduating from law school,
practitioners quickly learn that their legal education does
not necessarily provide adequate preparation to
immediately handle many of the areas of the law that most
often affect indigent Tennesseans,107 which most often are
within the areas of family law, consumer/credit issues,
landlord/tenant, and benefits.108 The Commission deemed it
“vital and necessary” to provide lawyers with the necessary
information to handle these “high need” areas of the law.109
A particular emphasis of the Commission has been to focus
on preparing pro bono lawyers to take on the direct
representation of an individual, if an initial consultation
does not resolve the legal issue.110 In furtherance of this
objective, the Commission has:
1. Developed an online curriculum on “High
Need” areas of the law, beginning with family law and
debtor/creditor issues, to be available on Youtube.com, as
described above;
2. Established a marketing and public relations
campaign to communicate strategies and CLE opportunities
to lawyers;
3. Promoted to other cities the partnership model
established by Nashville law firms, the “Pillar Firm”
model, whereby firms with strong access to justice
commitments educate their attorneys on particular
106
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substantive areas of the law and then take more pro bono
cases in those areas;
4. Proposed to the Tennessee Supreme Court and
CLE Commission that excess CLE funds be designated by
the CLE Commission and the Supreme Court to provide for
the High Needs pro bono CLE training, the promotion
thereof, and other access to justice initiatives; and,
5. Implemented steps to measure and track
results of this initiative by tracking attendance
following up with attorneys who participated in
curriculum to determine if they subsequently took a
bono case.111

the
and
the
pro

Along with attorney education, in order to increase
participation such that 50% of lawyers residing in
Tennessee provide an average of 50 hours of pro bono per
year, the existing pool of attorneys engaged in pro bono
work must be increased. “The Commission recognized that
there is a wide spectrum of law practices in Tennessee,
ranging from solo practitioners to large law firms; that
lawyers practice in urban, suburban, and rural
communities; and that not every strategy is appropriate for
every attorney or community.” 112 Therefore, in light of
these circumstances, and in order to recruit more lawyers
providing pro bono, the Commission:
1. Promoted
www.JusticeForAllTN.com
and
www.onlineTNjustice.org to increase awareness of
alternative ways to participate in access to justice
initiatives;

111
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2. Provided attorneys in parts of the state that lack
an organized pro bono program with resources such as
“Attorney of the Day” materials to organize pro bono
efforts tailored to their community;
3. Identified firms without pro bono policies and
requested that those firms adopt such policies;
4. Combined efforts with the Tennessee Bar
Association to recruit law firms in other communities to
follow the partnership model established by Nashville law
firms, the “Pillar Firm” model;
5. Convenes an annual conference of law school
deans, law school pro bono directors, and students to create
ways to partner to increase pro bono participation;
6. Developed a proposal for recognition by the
Court of firms or legal departments with pro bono policies,
individual attorneys, and pro bono organizations with
exemplary pro bono participation; and,
7. Updates the Pro Bono Report annually to
capture pro bono work statewide and to measure success.113
These strategies have been employed in an
intentional and purposeful fashion in order to engage
attorneys where they are, and involve them in access to
justice initiatives in manners that are amenable to the
varied circumstances of Tennessee lawyers. As discussed
above, the technological tools that have been created and
employed in furtherance of this cause have been
particularly effective in reaching out to, and involving,
attorneys from across the state of Tennessee.
113
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Client education and removal of barriers has also
been a key focus of the Commission. Specifically, the
Commission found that “[p]roviding Tennesseans with an
understanding of how to access a lawyer is integral to
delivering access to justice. This requires a public
awareness effort to reach Tennesseans in need through
partnerships with places the public commonly goes to seek
help, such as libraries, faith based organizations,
courthouses and social service providers.”114 In pursuance
of these ideals, the Commission has worked to educate the
public on the availability of pro bono services and to
remove barriers to finding a pro bono lawyer by:
1. Promoting the available existing technology
such as Online Tennessee Justice, Tennessee Technology
Centers, and www.JusticeForAllTN.com;
2. Providing information and resources to intake
staff at legal service organizations through TALS, general
sessions courts, and court clerks’ offices, so that they can
direct the public to pro bono lawyers; and,
3. Making www.JusticeForAllTN.com available in
languages other than English.115
If the Commission’s efforts to educate attorneys,
recruit more attorney volunteers, and educate the public on
how to connect with attorneys enjoys even a modicum of
success—which these efforts have, in fact, enjoyed great
success—then it becomes important to examine how to
improve methods for connecting volunteer attorneys with
potential indigent clients.116
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The Commission identified
two primary ways that clients
are currently connected with
pro bono lawyers. One way is
through legal aid providers
federally funded by the Legal
Services Corporation (“LSC
providers”), and the second is
through non-LSC providers.
A
non-LSC
provider
describes any organization
that provides pro bono legal
help but that does not receive
federal funding from the
Legal Services Corporation.
The term includes state and
locally funded legal service
providers, bar associations,
and faith-based organizations
that provide legal advice and
assistance. The Commission
maintains
that
a
comprehensive pro bono
infrastructure must include
both LSC providers and nonLSC providers.117
In Tennessee, the most widespread pro bono system
available to the public consists of the pro bono programs of
the four regional LSC programs. Together, their territory
covers every county in the state and, even though
Tennessee’s LSC programs allocate more than the required
amount toward providing pro bono services, they remain
unable to provide pro bono services in every county.118 Add
117
118

Id. at 17.
Id.
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to this the fact that Congress continues to reduce federal
funding to LSC programs, and the result is added strain to
LSC programs in the face of growing demand for
services.119
“Many non-LSC organizations provide services to a
select population or a specific locality and serve client
populations that LSC providers cannot serve. One such
example is the plan adopted by the Tennessee and
Memphis Conferences of the United Methodist Church,
which uses the Church’s existing infrastructure and
commitment to social justice to partner with the
Commission to recruit member lawyers to provide pro bono
services.”120 As a portal for those in crisis, this faith-based
organization is able to work with its legal partners to
connect volunteer attorneys with those in need.121
Despite the superlative work performed each year
by both LSC and non-LSC entities, more work is needed to
address the burgeoning gaps in the legal system faced by
indigent individuals experiencing situations that implicate
the legal system.
In order to connect more lawyers with clients
through LSC and non-LSC providers, the Commission will
provide a foundation for a comprehensive system of
delivery of pro bono services across the state by:
1. Coordinating regular meetings with the
Executive Directors and Pro Bono Directors of each of the
four LSC providers and with non-LSC providers, the TBA,
and TALS;
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2. Developing resources for intake staff to assist in
making referrals and foster accountability when their
respective agencies cannot provide the client with legal
help; and,
3. Establishing a statewide toll free information
phone line in aLEGALz, which the lawyers staff, and
which the public can access to get information on available
resources throughout the state.122
As more lawyers have become, and will continue to
become, involved in pro bono work, the Tennessee
Supreme Court has worked to establish a mechanism to
recognize the efforts of these Tennessee “Volunteers.”
More specifically, the Court has established a program
entitled “Attorney for Justice,” whereby any Tennessee
lawyer that provides 50 or more hours of pro bono work
each year is recognized by the Tennessee Supreme Court at
a local ceremony, with a certificate, and inclusion on the
“Honor Roll” of “Attorneys for Justice.”123 As stated by the
Court “[in] an effort to increase the number of attorneys
and law offices providing pro bono services to those who
cannot afford legal costs, the Tennessee Supreme Court is
launching an extensive recognition program. The Court will
honor all attorneys providing at least 50 hours of service
annually, with a goal of increasing statewide pro bono work
to 50 percent participation.”124 In its inaugural year, the
Attorneys for Justice Program recognized close to 200
lawyers and law firms.125
122
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It is clear from the data and anecdotal evidence
described, attorney participation in access to justice
initiatives in Tennessee has increased since the formation
of the Commission and the implementation of the
Commission’s strategic plans. But the Commission, has
also worked purposefully to involve future attorneys in the
access to justice cause.
C. Engaging Law Students

In its first strategic plan, the Tennessee Access to
Justice Commission clearly indicated that law schools and
law students play significant roles in the pursuit of more
equal access to justice.126 In fact, the first goal enunciated in
the Commission’s strategic plan is “[t]o involve more
lawyers and law students in meeting legal needs so that the
public is better served.”127 By deliberately and purposefully
including law schools and law students in its strategic plan,
the Commission recognized that law school curricula and
programming related to access to justice issues can—
through planning, oversight, administration, and
evaluation—greatly impact both the present and future of
unmet legal needs by providing overlooked services,
instilling the ideals of public service in students and
practitioners alike, and engaging resources and individuals
that may otherwise remain on the sidelines.128
In its strategic planning, the Commission included a
specific provision for how the goal of involving more law
schools and law students would be pursued. Rather than
simply articulating the goal of involving more law students,
126

TENN. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N (2012), supra note 120, at 2.
Id.
128
Statistics of Law School Enrollment and Degrees Awarded, 2012
A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/cont
ent/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_b
ar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authce
ckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
127

39

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 192
the Commission’s strategic plan provides that, “Whenever
possible, the Commission will use law students to further
the projects outlined in this Plan.” 129 Inclusion of this
language has allowed the Commission, the committees, the
bar, the six Tennessee law schools, and the Tennessee
Supreme Court to be creative, flexible, and, importantly,
proactive in involving and encouraging law school and law
student involvement in Tennessee’s access to justice
initiatives.
For example, the Commission has encouraged law
schools to designate an individual or individuals within
each law school as main points of contact with regard to
pro bono initiatives taking place at each campus. Such
contacts include faculty sponsors, full time administrative
personnel responsible for pro bono programming, and/or
associate and assistant deans.130 Additionally, the Access to
Justice Committee of the Tennessee Bar Association has
representatives from each law school serving on the
Committee, whose members consist of not only pro bono
administrators, but also experiential and clinical faculty
from each law school.
Creating for a statewide
conversations to occur has greatly enhanced the ability of
law schools and law students to learn from one another in
areas including: needs throughout the state; sharing of
clinical, other experiential learning, and pro bono
programming best practices; opportunities to collaborate;
sharing of resources; and encouragement to remain
engaged in access to justice initiatives.131
Similar to the support the Commission expressed
for the adoption of law firm pro bono policies discussed
infra, the Commission encouraged each law school to
adopt—to an extent that did not previously exist—a pro
129
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bono policy for its students.132 Adoption of such a policy
signals to law students that access to justice is valued by
law school administration, faculty, and the profession as a
whole. Through law school pro bono programming,
students are inculcated that public service is an important
part of the legal profession; a proposition that has been
identified by several authors as being part of the “core
competencies” of successful lawyers. 133 Attorneys that
participated in pro bono projects as students, or early in
their careers, are more likely to continue rendering public
service throughout their careers. 134 Additionally,
participation in a law school pro bono program “helps
bridge the gap between theory and practice, and enriches
understanding of how law relates to life.”135 It is across this
“bridge”—in addition to other experiential learning
opportunities—that students are able to develop core
competencies such as interviewing, fact-finding, rapport
building, and teamwork.136
Since the adoption of the strategic plan, the
Tennessee Supreme Court, the Commission, Tennessee Bar
Association, and law schools have remained dedicated to
the goal of “involv[ing] more . . . law students in meeting
132
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legal needs so that the public is better served.”137 Another
mechanism that these Tennessee entities employ on an
annual basis in furtherance of this goal is the holding of an
annual law school pro bono and public interest law summit.
Each fall semester, one Tennessee law school hosts a twoday weekend retreat, during which students learn about and
discuss the challenges and benefits that come from “an
intentional commitment to pro bono and public interest
work.”138 These summits serve to remind students that they
possess both the power to change the world and the
responsibility to do so.139 Each year, at least one member of
the Tennessee Supreme Court will speak at the event, along
with members of the Commission and bar leaders. Learning
from and interacting with professionals in this setting not
only validates student interest in access to justice issues,
but also communicates that access to justice is important to
the profession. These summits serve not only as a superb
venue to learn and be inspired, but each year a portion of
the time is dedicated to brainstorming and planning of
methods in which the law schools can collaborate on access
to justice initiatives.
An example of such collaboration can be found in the
Immigration Alternative Spring Break Project cosponsored
by the University of Memphis, Belmont University School
of Law, and the University of Tennessee.140 Subsequent to
a summit planning session, these schools worked together
to place student volunteers in an office handling U-Visa
applications for victims of domestic and/or political
137
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violence.141 The students were supervised by Community
Law Office attorneys, and spent their spring breaks
learning substantive law related to immigration U-Visa
applications, as well as how to interact with clients and
other professionals.142 Through the efforts of these students,
the Community Law Office was able to serve more
individuals than it otherwise would be able to
accommodate. This program is possible, in large part, due
to the commitment of the participating law schools, the
cooperation of the supervising attorneys, and the dedication
of the students. The benefits to each participant are readily
discernible. Students build core competencies such as peer
and professional rapport building, interviewing skills, and
teamwork.143 The schools provide their students with an
opportunity to connect classroom instruction with practical
learning experience, and help to fulfill the schools’ mission
of service. Finally, the public is served because more
clients receive legal assistance for their particular
dilemmas, and through press releases the public at large
sees how law schools participate in “giving back,” thus
increasing the public’s perception of the profession as a
whole.
The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, was not
satisfied with simply encouraging the involvement of law
schools and law students. In fact, the Court adopted a
policy to recognize law students that have been involved in
pro bono initiatives during law school.144 Law students are
designated by the Court as “Law Students for Justice” if the
students “perform[] 50 or more hours of pro bono work
during their law school career. . . .”145 During 2014, 95 law
141
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students from across Tennessee were recognized by the
Court as “Law Students for Justice.”146
Through these initiatives, law schools and law
students have become more involved in access to justice
initiatives in Tennessee. The adoption of pro bono policies
by each law school, collaborative efforts through both
clinical course offerings and pro bono programming, as
well as encouragement from legal professionals, has
resulted in greater participation by the law schools and law
students not only in the access to justice conversation, but
also in actual work and service performed. 147 It is
anticipated that these initiatives will have a long-term
impact in addressing the gaps in the legal system as more
law students and young professionals become aware of, and
involved in, access to justice issues.148
V. Third Phase – Maintaining and Measuring
The focus of the Commission’s third planning
retreat, held in January 2014, was twofold. First and
foremost, the Commission wanted to ensure that it could
maintain the momentum achieved since 2009. The
Commission had almost achieved the 50% participation
rate for lawyers doing pro bono, instituted significant
technological initiatives, and made considerable progress
on court approved forms for use by self-represented
litigants and lawyers handling pro bono. But the
Commission deemed sustaining those efforts a critical
challenge. 149
Second, the Commission recognized it needed to
begin to measure the effectiveness of the efforts undertaken
under the first two plans. The Commission recognized, in
light of limited resources, the need to place emphasis on the
146
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programs that have been the most effective, to discontinue
spending resources on programs that have not been
effective; and to use new technologies and the new
information to leverage existing programs and launch new
programs where the need is the greatest.150
A. Maintaining Momentum
To maintain the successes of the first two phases,
the commission developed a series of recommendations to
support ongoing efforts and to address areas of ongoing
unmet need. First, the Commission recognized the
significant potential of partnerships with the faith-based
community to connect with low-income Tennesseans in
need of legal assistance. To that end, the 2014 plan includes
a goal of establishing 20 new faith-based programs across
the state and directs staff support to achieve that goal.151
The Commission also recognized the potential of law
school partnerships, and established a goal of holding an
annual summit of law school students and faculty to
encourage increased pro bono work by law students.152 The
Commission also developed a pro bono recognition
program for all lawyers and law firms meeting the
aspirational goal of fifty hours of pro bono annually.
Designated as “Attorneys for Justice” on an annual basis,
the qualifying attorneys are recognized at a public event
jointly sponsored by the Commission and the Supreme
Court.153
The Commission also recognized three areas of
need that had not been adequately addressed, and
developed initiatives to meet those needs. First, to meet the
ongoing need for family law assistance for low-income
150
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clients, the Commission set a goal of recruiting five large
law firms to commit to focusing their pro bono work
exclusively on family law matters.154 Second, to further
meet that need, the Commission reconstituted a mediation
committee to increase the availability of pro bono
mediation services, particularly in family law cases. Third,
to try to more effectively meet the needs of rural
Tennesseans, the Commission committed the time of staff
and commissioners to establish a monthly pro bono clinic
in each rural judicial district in the state.155
The Commission also recognized a gap between the
need and available resources. To close that gap, the 2014
plan recommends development of a public awareness
campaign for outreach to those in need of legal
assistance.156
B. Measuring and Assessing Effectiveness
1. Legal Needs Study
The Commission’s first recommendation in the
2014 Strategic Plan was to conduct a legal needs study. The
last statewide legal needs study done in Tennessee was
published in 2004 and utilized data collected in 2003. To
help the Commission and its collaborative partners refine
existing programs and launch new initiatives to impact the
most Tennesseans in the most profound way, the
Commission expressed the need for current information.157
Thanks to a generous grant from the Ansley Fund of
the Frist Foundation and in collaboration with the
Tennessee Alliance for Legal Services and the Tennessee
Bar Association, a new legal needs study was conducted by
154
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the University of Tennessee, College of Social Work,
which also conducted the study published in 2004.158 The
Legal Needs Study was completed in October 2014, and
found that more than 60 percent of vulnerable Tennesseans
face a significant civil legal need. In addition, the goal of
the study was to examine the effectiveness of delivering
legal assistance to those in need. The study showed that
only 25 percent of the respondents were aware of resources
to help find a lawyer, and even fewer knew where to find
free legal services. Less than 40 percent sought any help
pursuing a legal recourse, and a third of those decided to
navigate the system on their own. The study surveyed over
1,400 Tennesseans who are considered low-income or
impoverished, with low-income being defined as a family
of four earning $29,812 or less annually. A similarly sized
impoverished family would make $23,850 or less per year.
Civil legal problems most cited by those answering the
survey include conflicts with creditors, landlord-tenant
issues, problems obtaining or paying for health care, and
concerns regarding government benefits.159
The study found that those most severely impacted
by legal issues were the poorest, the youngest and
minorities. The study also highlighted the fact that the
most commonly reported problems were not always the
most disruptive to people’s lives. For example, medical
bills and health insurance were frequent problems, but were
not as disruptive as caring for a child after the breakup of a
marriage – a less commonly mentioned problem.
Respondents most often cited resignation to their situation
158
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http://www.tncourts.gov/news/2014/11/25/60-perce
nt-low-income-tennesseans-face-civil-legal-problems-study
-shows (press release summarizing study). The complete study is
available at https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/
files/docs/2014_legalneeds_report_1.pdf.
159

47

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 200
as a reason for not seeking help. Many also feared that
their situation could get worse if they attempted to fight for
any legal recourse.160
2. Pro Bono Reporting
The Commission also restated its support for
required reporting of pro bono work as part of the annual
attorney registration process. The Commission reasoned
that reporting would provide essential information
necessary to evaluate the pro bono services being rendered
and the volunteers providing those services. 161
Reporting of pro bono on a voluntary basis had
risen from 18% to more than 44%. Reporting peaked at
48% in 2013, extremely close to the Commission’s goal of
having 50% of Tennessee attorneys voluntarily providing
pro bono services. The voluntary reporting, however,
presents an incomplete picture of how much pro bono is
being performed and who is volunteering. While the
Commission remained unanimously against mandatory pro
bono and strongly in favor of maintaining the
confidentiality of each individual attorney's pro bono
information, the Commission believed that the Supreme
Court should require attorneys to report their pro bono
hours with their annual registration.162
The Commission filed a petition with the Tennessee
Supreme Court in November 2014. 163 In addition to
requesting that pro bono reporting be required of all
attorneys, the petition also included a recommendation that
160
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the annual registration statement included the option for
attorneys to make voluntary contributions to an access to
justice fund. The Court established a comment period
through February 2, 2015.164 The petition remains pending.
3. Other Data Collection Efforts
The Commission also implemented other methods
to increase measurement and accountability of the various
initiatives implemented previously. Online Tennessee
Justice, for example, now includes a follow up survey
distributed to all users of the website.165 The aLegalz toll
free legal services hotline also conducts follow up surveys
and provides ongoing data on the types of assistance sought
and the direction provided. The Commission also adopted a
recommendation that the Commission staff develop a
measurement tool for clinic providers and pro bono
programs to help assess their focus and efficacy.166
VI. The Next Step – Really Closing the Gap
A. Pro Se
Inherent in the goals of the Access to Justice
Commission’s Strategic Plans is the idea that the justice
system must become more accessible and understandable to
pro se litigants.167 In pursuit of this goal, the Commission
has produced a series of educational videos for selfrepresented litigants.168 It has developed and recommended
plain-language forms for self-represented litigants and has
164
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expanded the available divorce forms to include forms for
the uncontested divorce of parties with minor children.169
Working with the General Sessions Judges Conference, the
Commission has examined and made recommendations to
increase attorney involvement in helping otherwise selfrepresented individuals through Attorney-of-the-Day
programs and other limited-scope representation initiatives
in the General Sessions Courts.170 Also, in collaboration
with the Tennessee General Sessions Judges Conference, a
General Sessions Court pro se bench book, “Meeting the
Challenges of Self-Represented Litigants,” has been
created and circulated and is now being used as a model for
the creation of a Circuit and Chancery Court Pro Se Bench
book. 171 In collaboration with the Board of Professional
Responsibility, the Commission recommended and the
Court adopted a policy distinguishing between legal
information and legal advice that continues to provide
guidance to court staff, clerks, and attorneys. 172 The
Commission has developed plain-language signage for
courthouses and distributed it to courts across the state.173
The Court has also made the Access to Justice website and
the Supplemental Guidelines referenced above available in
Spanish.174
In short, the efforts and accomplishments of the
Tennessee Access to Justice Commission and its partners
have been nothing short of remarkable. But, and as often
stated by the immediate past Chair of the Tennessee Access
to Justice Commission, the fight for equal access to justice
will never be over.
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As demonstrated through the “Statewide Legal
Needs Assessment” completed in the State of Tennessee in
2014, there remain a significant number of individuals and
families that have fallen into the access to justice gap.175
This Assessment included a total of 1,184 completed
surveys across the state, with a targeted sample for
households with less than $40,000.176 The results of the
survey can be generalized to poor or near-poor households
in Tennessee at a 95% level of confidence with a +/- 2.85%
margin of error. 177 As revealed in this Assessment,
approximately four out of ten respondents (38.5%)
indicated that their household had experienced no problems
in the past 12 months. 178 For those households who
experienced at least one problem, the average number of
problems reported was 3.66. 179 This Assessment clearly
and unequivocally indicates that there is a significant
population of the indigent population of Tennessee that
faces, on a regular basis, civil legal issues.180
The work of the Commission that must be
continued to try and meet these needs include:
• Continued development of educational materials,
including online videos and written information, about the
areas of the law that these individuals face;
• Continued support of the Tennessee Supreme
Court in identifying access to justice as a strategic priority
of the Court;
175
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• Continued involvement of the Bar in addressing
these needs—particularly through volunteer attorneys that
are willing to provide advice and/or representation to
indigent individuals; and,
• Continued
leveraging
of
technological
resources—including the development of web-based “hot
docs” websites for screening of clients and completion of
basic forms.
As the pursuit of these objectives continues, it is
likely that the needs of individuals such as those that
comprise the sample of the Assessment—while not
eradicating the gaps in the justice system—will be better
addressed.
B. Increased
Programs

Resources

for

Legal

Services

When the Legal Services Corporation was first
created, the initial goal was to provide all low-income
people with at least “minimum access” to legal services,
defined as the equivalent of one legal services attorney for
every 5,000 poor persons. This goal was briefly achieved in
FY1980, but not maintained due to inflation and
subsequent budget cuts. For example, in FY2004, the LSC
estimated an appropriation of $683 million would have
been needed for minimum access; however, the LSC
received $335 million in appropriations that year.
According to a 2009 LSC study (cited above), there is one
legal services attorney for every 6,415 poor persons.181
The experience in Tennessee has been no different.
At the funding peak, for example, LSC-funded programs
employed approximately 80 lawyers in east Tennessee
181

Carmen Solomon-Fears, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34016, LEGAL
SERVICES CORPORATION: BACKGROUND AND FUNDING 5 (2013).

52

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 205
alone. There are less than 80 lawyers serving the entire
state today, and only 26 in East Tennessee. Moreover, LSC
funding is a decreasing percentage of the overall budget of
each of the four Tennessee LSC-funded programs. For
example, only 38% of the funding for Memphis Area Legal
Services comes from LSC.182 Instead the programs all rely
on other state and federal grants and funds, private
foundation grants, and fundraising campaigns.183
Yet the legal services organization, principally the
LSC-funded programs, will always be the foundation and
core of any access to justice efforts. Pro bono can only go
so far in closing the gap and simply is not as efficient as
providing direct service through a trained full-time legal
services attorney.184 While making the courts more userfriendly for self-represented litigants can make a
meaningful difference, such efforts are not the functional
equivalent of the assistance of an attorney. In fact, the
availability of providing assistance through a trained legal
services lawyer has a very significant positive economic
impact.185
To make significant meaningful progress towards
closing the access to justice gap, therefore, there must be a
major infusion of additional funding for legal service
programs, both LSC and non-LSC funded. Some
combination of state legislation, foundation and corporate
182
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support, lawyer contributions, and support from other
private donors must be cultivated and implemented. The
Commission, Tennessee Supreme Court, and their partners
must elevate the needed increase in funding to the number
one access to justice priority.
C. Leveraging Law Schools
Despite the recent increased attention on access to
justice initiatives and inclusion of law schools and law
students in addressing the same, the potential role of law
schools has been largely ignored. 186 The oversight is
understandable, however, due in part to the fact that
historically law schools generally have not played a very
significant role in helping to meet the legal needs of the
poor.187 For example, despite the longevity and importance
of clinical programs at some law schools, the legal
academy has been slow to embrace clinical education as a
core and vital part of the curriculum.188
Nevertheless, acknowledgement by the Tennessee
Supreme Court and the Access to Justice Commission of
the importance and potential of law schools and law
students with respect to the access to justice arena has been
empowering, invigorating, and has created an opportunity
for Tennessee law schools to purposefully and reflectively
consider their role in such initiatives. As Professor Phyllis
Goldfarb recently wrote, “future value of law students’
three-year sojourn will require law schools to teach less
about what the law is and more about what the law does
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and what lawyers do with law.” 189 Law schools in
Tennessee are responding to this clarion call and invitation
to be significant partners with the Court, Bar, and
profession. Significant expansion in the number and types
of law school clinics represent a potentially very
meaningful source of needed legal representation,
particularly in light of the unique position of law schools
within the profession.190 And the recent explosion of law
pro bono programs can provide not only considerable direct
representation, but also leverage the work of the private bar
and legal services programs.191 For example, in terms of
hours devoted to legal services by the students and faculty
in a clinical setting, even a very conservative estimate
approaches 20,000 hours annually – or the equivalent of ten
full-time attorneys.192 That is from just one relatively small
law school. Additionally, and as discussed above, the
involvement of Tennessee law schools and students in pro
bono initiatives has grown exponentially over the last six
years, especially in terms of number of total hours
dedicated to pro bono by law students, and the number of
projects that the law schools and students support.193
“But law schools have to step up. If the goal really
is greater access to justice, as it must be, legal education
has to commit to be a major player in the effort. Not just
because it is the right thing to do, but because such a
commitment would benefit students, faculty, and the clients
they can serve.”194 Despite the growth in terms of clinics
and pro bono programs at Tennessee law schools, there are
still those students and programs that remain on the
189
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sidelines. Additionally, law schools are often just a part of a
larger university, and they have access to student and
faculty expertise from other disciplines on behalf of clients.
The value of such a multi-disciplinary approach to the legal
needs of the poor is widely recognized.195 The newest label
for this type of legal service program is “holistic
representation.” This approach requires consideration and
analysis of the legal problem being confronted in the
context of the client’s life and larger community problems.
The “whole client condition is crucial, not just case
resolution.” 196 An essential element of this broader
problem-solving strategy is reliance on other professionals
like social workers. But we’re not there yet. Partnering with
other disciplines, and partnering throughout Tennessee law
schools, must remain on the agenda.
As noted above, despite the potential of law school
programs, there are significant limitations and hurdles.197
First, securing ample alumni, faculty, and/or other attorney
supervision is often difficult.198 Because students are not
licensed attorneys and must have appropriate supervision,
student energy and resources may be left untapped if there
are not ample attorneys to provide meaningful supervision
of student volunteers.199 This particular challenge may be
most acute at law schools that have adopted graduation
requirements that mandate pro bono participation. If such
requirements follow the definition of pro bono as set forth
in Model Rule 6.1, then the students must be adequately
195
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supervised at all times.200 If there is insufficient faculty,
staff, or private bar support to supervise students subject to
such requirements it may be difficult for the students to
meet the requirements.201
The second challenge—“securing a commitment
from the law schools to accept the responsibility and to
assume the mantle of leadership”—may be the biggest
challenge facing law school access to justice
programming.202 Although the basis for any reluctance on
the part of law schools to accept this “mantle of leadership”
may involve law school culture or reticence on the part of
faculty to assume this responsibility, the end result is the
same: law schools and student bodies that are less than
fully engaged in such efforts.203
If we accept the veracity of the preceding arguments
and examples of the benefits of law school access to justice
programming, then it stands to reason that these benefits
can only be developed further as law school programming
develops. “Developed” in this context includes: (1) growth
of law school involvement; (2) growth of student
involvement; and, (3) growth in the participation of
society—especially external partners. In the event that law
schools engage in the self-reflection advocated above, and
determine that more emphasis on access to justice is in
order, support from the faculty, staff, and administration
can greatly improve the perception in the students’ eyes of
the importance of engaging in this work.204
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VI. Conclusion
Thanks to the foresight and leadership of the entire
Tennessee Supreme Court, the creation of the Access to
Justice Commission has had a significant impact on access
to justice efforts in Tennessee. Prior to its creation, access
to justice efforts—although significant—were too often
fragmented and uncoordinated. The Commission’s unique
composition, leadership, staff support, and strong buy-in by
the larger access to justice community, have enabled that
community to engage in more collaboration and
coordinated planning. Through the combined efforts of the
Court, the Commission, and the access to justice partners
throughout Tennessee, increased awareness of, and
participation in, access to justice initiatives has increased
dramatically through the use of strategic planning,
collaboration, recognition of attorney efforts, harnessing of
technology, and measurement of results and allocation of
resources. Although the fight is not yet over, the work of
the Court, the Commission, and all those involved in
pursuit of these goals has made a substantial positive
impact on the amount and quality of services received by
those Tennesseans who need most equal access to justice.
In the long run, hopefully, the collaborations and
innovations will continue to make significant progress
toward more effective functioning of the wide range of
strategies that have been developed.
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ARTICLE
TWELVE ANGRY HOURS: IMPROVING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE HOLDS IN TENNESSEE WITHOUT VIOLATING
THE CONSTITUTION
By: Daniel A. Horwitz1
I. Introduction
Tennessee law currently provides that individuals
who have been arrested for certain domestic violence
offenses “shall not be released within twelve (12) hours of
arrest if the magistrate or other official duly authorized to
release the offender finds that the offender is a threat to the
alleged victim.”2 However, Tennessee law also provides an
exception to this “12-hour hold” requirement that permits
judges to grant the early release of alleged domestic
violence offenders under either of two circumstances. 3
Specifically, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-150 states that even
if a magistrate or duly authorized official finds an arrestee
to be a threat to an alleged victim, a judge or magistrate
“may . . . release the accused in less than twelve (12) hours
if the official determines that sufficient time has or will
have elapsed for the victim to be protected.”4
In June of 2014, public outcry erupted over the
propriety of allowing judges to waive Section 150’s 12hour hold requirement following an especially high profile
1
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Advocacy Committee of the YWCA of Nashville and Middle
Tennessee. He is a former judicial law clerk to Tennessee Supreme
Court Chief Justice Sharon G. Lee and a graduate of Vanderbilt Law
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incident of domestic violence in Nashville. On June 8,
2014, David Chase—a prominent local contractor—was
arrested for assaulting his then-girlfriend after allegedly
dragging her out of his apartment by her hair.5 Following
Mr. Chase’s arrest, Judicial Commissioner Steve Holzapfel
found that Mr. Chase posed a threat to the safety of his
girlfriend, and he imposed the 12-hour hold compelled by
Section 150 as a result.6
Less than three hours later, however—and
Commissioner Holzapfel’s finding of dangerousness
notwithstanding—General Sessions Judge Casey Moreland
directed Commissioner Holzapfel to release Mr. Chase.
Judge Moreland’s decision to order Mr. Chase’s release
was apparently based on information provided to him
during an ex-parte phone call from Mr. Chase’s attorney,
who was both a “social friend”7 of Judge Moreland as well

5
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as a political contributor to his reelection campaign. 8
Shortly after his release, Mr. Chase allegedly returned to
his apartment, began “throwing [his girlfriend] around,”
and then pinned her to a bed and choked her, exclaiming:
“You ruined my life. I'm going to kill you, I'm going to
throw you out the balcony.”9
Mr. Chase was ultimately rearrested the following
day on charges of aggravated assault by strangulation,
interference with a 911 call, and vandalism.10 Additionally,
several months later, Judge Moreland was publicly
reprimanded by the Board of Judicial Conduct for failing to
“comply with the law,” for failing to “promote public
confidence in the judiciary,” and for “abus[ing] the prestige
of his office.”11
The outcry following what came to be known as
“the David Chase incident” 12 was immediate and
unreserved. 13 Citizens were apoplectic. Media outlets in

8
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See generally supra note 5; Tony Gonzalez, Judge Casey Moreland
Reprimanded by State Judicial Board; THE TENNESSEAN (Oct. 24,
2014), http://www.tennessean.com/s
tory/news/crime/2014/10/23/judge-casey-morelandreprima
nded-state-judicial-board/17772843/.
12
Steven Hale, Here's Chief Anderson's 2005 Memo on Domestic
Violence Concerns, THE NASHVILLE SCENE (June 17, 2014),
http://www.nashvillescene.com/pitw/archivees/2
014/06/17/heres-chief-andersons-2005-memo-on-domesticviolence-concerns.
13
Adam Tamburn and Anita Wadhwani, Police Chief Slams Judge for
Role in Assault 'Fiasco', THE TENNESSEAN (June 18, 2014),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/cri
me/2014/06/17/police-chief-slams-judge-role-assault-fiasco
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Nashville and across the state covered the story day after
day. Demands for Judge Moreland’s resignation reached a
fever pitch.14 And calls for legislative reform came shortly
thereafter, with Democrats and Republicans alike 15 —as
well as both the Governor of Tennessee16 and the Speaker
of the Tennessee House of Representatives17—professing
the view that 12-hour holds should be mandatory in all

/10682387/; Adam Tamburin, Senators File Complaint Against Judge
Casey
Moreland,
THE
TENNESSEAN
(July
12,
2014),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/crime/2014/
07/11/senators-file-complaint-judge-caseymoreland/125350
59/.
14
Frank Daniels III, Judge Moreland Should Resign. Now.,THE
TENNESSEAN
(June
21,
2014),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/columnists/frank
daniels/2014/06/19/jugde-moreland-resign-now/10877125/;
Michael
Cass, Megan Barry Calls on Judge Casey Moreland to Resign, THE
TENNESSEAN
(June
18,
2014),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2014/06/18/meganbarry-calls-judge-casey-moreland-resign/10760299
/; Steven Hale, Council Members to Call for Judge Casey Moreland's
Resignation (Updated), THE NASHVILLE SCENE (June 19,
2014),http://www.nashvillescene.com/pitw/archiv
es/2014/06/19/council-members-to-call-for-judge-casey-mo
relands-resignation.
15
Anita Wadhwani, Lawmakers Pledge to Strengthen Domestic
Violence
Law,
THE
TENNESSEAN
(June
19,
2014),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/crime/2014/06/19/lawmakerspledge-strengthen-domestic-violence-law/10890
503/.
16
Chas Sisk and Walter F. Roche, Haslam Backs 12-Hour Wait in
Domestic Violence Cases, THE TENNESSEAN (June 23, 2014),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/
2014/06/23/haslam-backs-hour-wait-domestic-violence-cas
es/11278845/.
17
TN Press Release Center, House Speaker Proposes Making 12-Hour
Domestic Abuse ‘Cooling-Off Period’ Mandatory, TN REPORT (June
19, 2014), http://tnreport.co
m/2014/06/19/house-speaker-proposes-making-12-hour-do
mestic-abuse-cooling-period-mandatory/.
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cases following domestic violence arrests with no
exceptions permitted for any reason.
Motivated by the public’s understandable outrage
following the David Chase incident, two amendments to
Section 150 have already been drafted in anticipation of the
2015 legislative session that would divest the judiciary of
all discretion over 12-hour holds following certain
domestic violence arrests.18 The immediate effect of these
amendments would be to “require abuse suspects to remain
in jail for 12 hours following an arrest, with no
exceptions.”19 According to one legislator and attorney who
supports these proposed changes: “This is a very simple
change to the law, but it will protect countless victims who
have been abused and then potentially subjected to their
attacker again before the 12 hour cooling off period.”20
While the goals underlying the proposed
amendments to Section 150 are noble, it is worth nothing
that similar policies in other jurisdictions have drawn
substantial criticism from legal scholars. One Memphis
law professor, for example, has opined that “[i]t is doubtful
whether . . . extended warrantless detention of [domestic
violence] suspects . . . would pass constitutional muster,”
describing such policies as “unnecessarily prolonging the
pretrial detention of persons presumed innocent under the
law, based on a categorical assumption that all persons
accused of [domestic violence] represent a public safety
threat.” 21 Even so, the vital constitutional concerns
implicated by the proposed amendments to Section 150
have—to this point—gone largely unrecognized.
18

Id.
Id. (“The legislation will require abuse suspects to remain in jail for
12 hours following an arrest, with no exceptions.”).
20
Id.
21
See Steven J. Mulroy, “Hold” On: The Remarkably Resilient,
Constitutionally Dubious 48-Hour Hold, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815,
862 (2013).
19
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For obvious reasons, advocating in favor of a less
ambitious attempt to improve a law aimed at curbing
domestic violence is unlikely to be politically popular now
or at any point in the future. That fact notwithstanding,
however, a law divesting the judiciary of its authority to
waive or decline to impose a 12-hour hold in domestic
violence cases under any circumstances for any reason
would likely be struck down as an unconstitutional
abridgement of the Tennessee Constitution’s separation of
powers doctrine. Additionally, for the reasons detailed
below, such a change may not be able to withstand
constitutional scrutiny for several other reasons either. As
a result, the legislature should retain TENN. CODE ANN. §
40-11-150’s requirement that judges must find that a
domestic violence arrestee poses a threat to an alleged
victim prior to imposing a 12-hour hold, but the legislature
should also strengthen Section 150 by removing the
exception that currently allows judges to lift domestic
violence holds if they determine that “sufficient time has or
will have elapsed for the victim to be protected.”22
II. Potential Policy Problems with Mandatory Holds
Several examples shed light on why it would be
problematic—as a policy matter—for the legislature to
impose a mandatory hold on all domestic violence arrestees
that brooks no exceptions under any circumstances, and
that contemplates no judicial discretion of any kind for any
reason. Consider, for example, a situation in which police
are alerted to a domestic violence incident but given an
incorrect address—resulting in the erroneous arrest of an
individual who is not, in fact, suspected of having
committed any crime at all. Even if the error is discovered
immediately, the proposed amendments to Section 150
22

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-150(h)(1) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §
40-11-150(k)(1) (2012).
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would still require that the arrested individual remain in jail
for a minimum of twelve hours—with no exception
available to remedy the acknowledged law enforcement
mistake. Such a problem could quickly and easily be
resolved under current law, whereas the proposed
amendments to Section 150 would dramatically exacerbate
it.
Alternatively, consider another somewhat frequent
scenario in domestic violence cases: a situation in which
two family members are arguing loudly enough to be heard
by concerned neighbors, but where no violence, threat of
violence, or other issue justifying law enforcement’s
concern has taken place. Under such circumstances, if
police are called to investigate the incident, the
investigating officers are frequently under pressure—due to
an official departmental policy or otherwise—to make an
arrest, even if both parties are adamant that law
enforcement’s involvement is neither welcome nor
necessary.23 Such “mandatory arrest” policies can result in
highly unfortunate consequences,24 such as the mother who
agrees to be arrested in place of her son because she does
not want him to have a criminal record. Furthermore, in the
non-trivial number of cases in which two individuals are
arrested simultaneously and each is held for twelve hours
(which can, and sometimes does, result in young children
or infants being left unsupervised for dangerously long
periods of time), or in situations in which one individual is
arrested for an alleged domestic violence incident that
23

See, e.g., Daniel G. Saunders, The Tendency to Arrest Victims of
Domestic Violence, 10 JOURNAL OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 147
(1995) (“the adoption of mandatory arrest policies may exacerbate
officers’ tendency to arrest victims.”), available at http://deepblue.li
b.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/68953/10.1177_0886260595010
002001.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y; http://
heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/ajgsp2&div=9
&id=&page=.
24
Id.
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occurred weeks, months, or even years in the past, it is
unclear whether the goals underlying the legislature’s push
for a mandatory “cooling down” period are even
implicated.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is crucial
to understand that the legal system is often used for
retaliatory purposes by well-resourced batterers.25 Toward
this end, false allegations of domestic violence are possible
and sometimes likely.26 In total, just 16.4% of reported
domestic violence incidents—and only 30.5% of domestic
violence arrests—result in a conviction. 27 Moreover,
victims of domestic violence are themselves arrested in an
astounding 27% of reported domestic violence cases. 28
Without question, such statistics are indicative of serious
systemic problems related to domestic violence
prosecutions, but they provide cause for concern about the
potentially high incidence of erroneous and retaliatory
domestic violence arrests as well. Consequently, it is
25

Antoinette Bonsignore, Domestic Violence Survivors Battle Within
the Courts: Confronting Retaliatory Litigation, TRUTHOUT (June 22,
2012), http://truth-out.org/
news/item/9915-domestic-violence-survivors-battle-within-the-courtsconfronting-retaliatory-litigation.
26
B.P Foster, Analyzing The Costs And Effectiveness Of Governmental
Policies: The Domestic Violence Example, COST MANAGEMENT
(May/June 2008), http://www.saveser
vices.org/downloads/Justice-Denied-DV-Arrest-Policies; ht
tp://www.saveservices.org/downloads/False-DV-Allegation
s-Cost-20-Billion.
27
Joel H. Garner & Christopher D. Maxwell, Prosecution and
Conviction Rates for Intimate Partner Violence, 34 CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REVIEW
Table
1-2
(2009),
available
at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/236959.pdf.
28
Mary Haviland et al., The Family Protection and Domestic Violence
Intervention Act of 1995: Examining the Effects of Mandatory Arrest in
New
York
City
(2001),
available
at
http://www.connectnyc.org/cnyc_pdf/Mandato
ry_Arrest_Report.pdf.
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foreseeable that in at least some instances,29 the proposed
revisions to Section 150 could actually be exploited by
batterers or other individuals who “may have personal
reasons for giving shaded or otherwise inaccurate
information to law enforcement officials”30 as a means of
inflicting further harm upon those whom the law is
intended to protect.31 Under such circumstances, even if
overwhelming evidence comes to light that a particular
arrestee was actually a victim of domestic violence—rather
than an abuser—if the proposed amendments to Section
150 were to become law, the error could not be remedied
until at least twelve hours had elapsed.
Unfortunately, the above examples represent just a
few of the many possible unintended policy consequences
that a mandatory 12-hour hold policy could produce in
practice and which the proposed amendments to Section
150 would prevent the judiciary from resolving. Even if a
mandatory 12-hour hold policy were to be enacted,
however, the possibility that such a policy would
29

In general, a statement from a citizen is sufficient by itself to
establish probable cause to make an arrest. State v. Williams, 193
S.W.3d 502, 507 (Tenn. 2006) (“[I]nformation provided by a citizen
informant is presumed to be reliable.”). This remains true even under
circumstances when the individual providing the information necessary
to establish probable cause is an estranged domestic relative or
acquaintance of the person being arrested. Id. (citing United States v.
Phillips, 727 F.2d 392 (5th Cir.1984) (finding probable cause under the
totality of the circumstances where arrestee's wife “had recently
quarreled with and left her husband”); Massachusetts v. Upton, 466
U.S. 727 (1984) (finding probable cause under the totality of
circumstances analysis where information was provided by an
estranged girlfriend); State v. Wilke, 55 Wash. App. 470 (1989)
(finding probable cause under the two-prong Aguilar–Spinelli test
where information was provided by the defendant's ex-wife); State v.
Luleff, 729 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (finding probable cause
under the totality of circumstances analysis where information was
provided by the defendant's estranged wife)).
30
United States v. Flynn, 664 F.2d 1296, 1303 (5th Cir. 1982).
31
Haviland, supra note 28.
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nonetheless be foreclosed as a constitutional matter
provides serious cause for concern as well.
III. The Constitutional Implications of
Proposed Changes
The practical effect of the proposed amendments to
Section 150 would be to divest judges of any discretion to
release individuals who have been arrested for certain
domestic violence offenses within twelve hours of their
arrest.32 Consequently, all individuals who are arrested for
one or more of these offenses would be required to spend at
least twelve hours in jail, with no exceptions to the “12hour hold” requirement permitted for any reason. Such a
policy would stand in sharp contrast to existing law, which
requires judges to make a specific finding that an alleged
offender “is a threat to the alleged victim” prior to
imposing a 12-hour hold, 33 and which also permits a hold
to be lifted by a judge before twelve hours have elapsed “if
the official determines that sufficient time has or will have
elapsed for the victim to be protected.” 34
Although seemingly minor at first glance, these
proposed changes implicate at least four major
constitutional issues: (1) the Tennessee Constitution’s
separation of powers doctrine; (2) the right to bail under the
Tennessee Constitution; (3) the right to be free from
unreasonable seizures under both the federal and Tennessee
Constitutions; and, (4) the federal and state constitutional
right to due process of law. Of note, at least one local
practitioner has also expressed the additional concern that
“a mandatory twelve-hour hold could be viewed as a
punishment, thus triggering double jeopardy protections
32

TN Press Release Center, supra note 17.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-150(h)(1) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §
40-11-150(k)(1) (2012).
34
Id.
33
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and requiring dismissal of the charge.” 35 Although this
concern is probably unfounded,36 the four remaining issues
35

See Ben Raybin, What is Tennessee’s Domestic Violence “Cooling
Off” Period?, HOLLINS RAYBIN WEISSMAN CRIMINAL LAW BLOG (June
20, 2014), http://www.hollinsle
gal.com/2014/06/20/cooling-off-period/.
36
Because the pre-trial confinement compelled by TENN. CODE ANN. §
40-11-150 is imposed for the legitimate governmental purpose of
protecting domestic violence victims, such detention does not qualify
as punishment for double jeopardy purposes. See, e.g., State v. Jones,
130 So.3d 1 (La. App. 2013) (holding that cooling-off hold prior to
admitting defendant to bail after domestic abuse arrest did not violate
double jeopardy.) As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained: “Absent a
showing of an express intent to punish on the part of the State,”
whether a detention qualifies as punishment “generally will turn on
whether an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally
be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it.” Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 269 (1984). See also Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 839
(Tenn. 1988) (“In determining whether . . . confinement . . . is
punishment, [a] Court must decide whether the confinement is imposed
for the purpose of punishment or whether it is an incident of a
legitimate governmental purpose. Where . . . no showing of an express
intent to punish is made, that determination generally will turn on
whether an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally
be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.”) (citing Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)); State v. Pennington, 952 S.W.2d 420, 423
(Tenn. 1997) (holding that post-arrest detention of suspected drunk
drivers serves “a remedial purpose, not a punitive one,” and therefore
does not preclude subsequent prosecution under double jeopardy
principles); State v. Coolidge, 915 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1995) (“if the state action is remedial and not intended to inflict
punishment as a means of vindicating public justice, the double
jeopardy clause serves as no protection”), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Troutman, 979 S.W.2d 271 (Tenn. 1998); United States v.
Grisanti, 4 F.3d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that because “bail
revocation hearing [i]s not ‘essentially criminal,' . . . pretrial detention
was not punishment, [and Defendant] has not twice been put in
jeopardy.”). This “alternative purpose” standard is satisfied by Section
150. See Hopkins v. Bradley Cnty., 338 S.W.3d 529, 536 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2010) (“It is clear, based on reading Tenn. Code Ann. § 40–11–
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pose legitimate constitutional concerns that merit serious
consideration. Of these four issues, the one that is most
likely to derail the proposed amendments to Section 150 is
the separation of powers doctrine.
A. The Separation of Powers Doctrine
1. Judicial Supremacy Concerning Judicial
Functions
The Tennessee Supreme Court has long been firm
in holding that “[i]t is an imperative duty of the judicial
department of government to protect its jurisdiction at the
boundaries of power fixed by the Constitution.” 37 The
fundamental rule established by the Tennessee
Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine is that: “If the
power is judicial in character, the legislature is expressly
prohibited from exercising it.”38 Based on recent precedent
from the Tennessee Supreme Court, the essential question
to be answered with respect to the proposed amendments to
Section 150 is as follows: Does divesting the judiciary of
the power to determine whether to release an individual
within the first twelve hours of an arrest “frustrate or
interfere with the adjudicative function of Tennessee
courts”?39 Because the proposed amendments to Section
150 would have the effect of precluding judicial review and
suspending enforcement of the writ of habeas corpus within
150 in its entirety, that it was the intent of the General Assembly to
protect the victims of domestic abuse from additional abuse when the
offender is taken into custody.”).
37
State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 482 (Tenn. 1991) (quoting State ex
rel. Shepherd v. Nebraska Equal Opportunity Comm’n, 557 N.W.2d
684, 693 (Neb. 1997)) (alterations omitted).
38
Id. at 483 (quoting People v. Jackson, 371 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ill.
1977)).
39
State v. McCoy, No. M2013-00912-SC-R11CD, 2014 WL 6725695,
at *7 (Tenn. Dec. 1, 2014).
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the first twelve hours of a defendant’s arrest—and because
they would also preclude the release of a warrantless
arrestee even under circumstances in which a judge has
determined that there was not probable cause to support a
defendant’s arrest in the first place—the answer to this
question is likely to be “yes.”
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s most thorough
examination of the separation of powers doctrine is found
in the 2001 case, State v. Mallard. 40 Mallard’s primary
holding was that “the legislature [has] no constitutional
authority to enact rules . . . that strike at the very heart of a
court’s exercise of judicial power.”41 As the Mallard court
explained:
Only the Supreme Court has
the inherent power to
promulgate rules governing
the practice and procedure of
the courts of this state[.] . . .
Furthermore, because the
power to control the practice
and procedure of the courts is
inherent in the judiciary and
necessary to engage in the
complete performance of the
judicial function, this power
cannot be constitutionally
exercised by any other branch
of government. In this area,
the court is supreme in fact as
well as in name.42
Applying this reasoning, the Mallard court
explained unequivocally that “any legislative enactment
40

Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 480-83 (Tenn. 2001).
Id. at 483.
42
Id. at 480-81.
41
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that . . . impairs the independent operation of the judicial
branch of government . . . can[not] be permitted to stand.”43
Both in Mallard and in subsequent cases, the
Tennessee Supreme Court has characterized the separation
of powers inquiry in slightly different ways, generally
asking whether a legislative enactment “strike[s] at the very
heart of a court’s exercise of judicial power” 44 or otherwise
“impairs the independent operation of the judicial branch of
government.”45 Most recently, however, in the December
2014 case, State v. McCoy, the Tennessee Supreme Court
framed the inquiry as whether a particular law “frustrate[s]
or interfere[s] with the adjudicative function of Tennessee
courts.”46 Furthermore, the Tennessee Supreme Court has
explained that “[w]hile it is sometimes difficult to
practically ascertain where Article II, section 2 draws the
line, the distinction may be simply stated as that between
cooperation and coercion.”47
2. Judicial Deference to the Legislature
Despite the Tennessee Supreme Court’s avowed
adherence to the principle of separation of powers, it is
worth noting that the judiciary customarily defers even to
legislative enactments that regulate practices and
procedures of the judiciary if such laws: “(1) are reasonable
and workable within the framework already adopted by the
judiciary, and (2) work to supplement the rules already
promulgated by the Supreme Court.”48 Because “comity
and cooperation among the branches of government are
beneficial to all,” the court has explained, “such practices
43

Id. at 483.
Id.
45
Id.
46
McCoy, 2014 WL 6725695, at *7.
47
Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 481-82.
48
Id. at 481.
44
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are desired and ought to be nurtured and maintained.”49
Thus, “purely out of considerations of inter-branch comity .
. . judges will lean over backward to avoid encroaching on
the legislative branch’s power.”50
The January 2014 case, Bush v. State,51 provides a
particularly lucid example of the judiciary “lean[ing] over
backward” to accommodate the state legislature. 52 Bush
involved a direct conflict between the courts and the
legislature over when a new rule of criminal procedure
must be applied retroactively to old cases. In Meadows v.
State, the Tennessee Supreme Court had held that “a new
state constitutional rule is to be retroactively applied to a
claim for post-conviction relief if the new rule materially
enhances the integrity and reliability of the fact finding
process of the trial.” 53 Two years later, however, the
legislature enacted the Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
which called for an entirely different retroactivity rule.
Specifically, rather than using Meadows’s “materially
enhances the integrity and reliability of the fact finding
process” standard, the Post-Conviction Procedure Act
instead stated that: “A new rule of constitutional criminal
law shall not be applied retroactively in a post-conviction
proceeding unless the new rule . . . requires the observance
of fairness safeguards that are implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.”54
Thus, the question raised in Bush was whether the
judiciary’s retroactivity standard or the legislature’s
retroactivity standard would be used going forward to
determine when a new rule of constitutional criminal
49

Id.
Id. at 482 (quoting Anderson Cnty. Quarterly Court v. Judges of the
28th Judicial District, 579 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978)).
51
Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tenn. 2014).
52
Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 482.
53
Meadows v. State, 849 S.W.2d 748, 755 (Tenn. 1993).
54
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-122 (1995).
50
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procedure would be applied retroactively.55 Faced with this
question, the Tennessee Supreme Court not only “lean[ed]
over backward” to avoid encroaching on the legislative
branch’s power,”56 but arguably performed Olympic-level
judicial gymnastics. First, the Bush court deferred entirely
to the state legislature’s retroactivity rule, holding that:
…because Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40–30–122 is an integral
part of a purely statutory
remedy created by the
General
Assembly
and
because its reach does not
extend beyond the Post–
Conviction Procedure Act,
we hold that the retroactivity
of new constitutional rules in
post-conviction proceedings
should
henceforth
be
determined using Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40–30–122.57
Next, the court went even a step further. Rather
than applying the comparatively broad retroactivity
standard that had in fact been included in the PostConviction Procedure Act, the Bush court instead held that
an even narrower third standard—which the court
summarily concluded that the legislature must have
“intended” to enact based upon a pair of confused
statements made by the bill’s House sponsor nineteen years
earlier—would henceforth govern retroactivity law in

55

Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2014).
Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 482.
57
Bush, 428 S.W.3d at 16.
56
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Tennessee.58 In light of such precedent, it stands to reason
that judicial deference to legislative enactments will play a
vital role in determining whether the legislature has
unlawfully encroached upon the judicial power with respect
to the proposed amendments to Section 150 as well.
3. Application to the Proposed Amendments to
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-150
Although the Tennessee Supreme Court has
acknowledged that “it is sometimes difficult to practically
ascertain where Article II, section 2 draws the line”
between legislative and judicial power, the legislature
unquestionably oversteps its bounds when it crosses the
line “between cooperation and coercion.” 59 Several
considerations support the conclusion that the proposed
amendments to Section 150 satisfy this standard.
Specifically, by eliminating judicial review and effectively
suspending judicial enforcement of the writ of habeas
corpus within the first twelve hours of a defendant’s arrest,
58

See Bush, 428 S.W.3d at 19-20. Unfortunately, this result is not
easily explained. It is black-letter law that “courts must ‘presume that
the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says there.’” See Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15
S.W.3d 799, 803 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v.
Greer, 972 S.W.2d 663, 673 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). Thus, “[i]t is not
for the courts to alter or amend a statute.” Id. A court “certainly may
not supply a provision no matter how confident [it is] of what the
Legislature would do if it were to reconsider today.” West v.
Schofield, No. M2014-00320-COA-R9CV, 2014 WL 4815957, at *9
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2014), appeal granted (Oct. 21, 2014),
quoting MacMillan v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 434 A.2d 620, 621
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981). Stated differently: “Where a statute
is plain and explicit in its meaning, and its enactment within the
legislative competency, the duty of the courts is simple and obvious,
namely, to say sic lex scripta, and obey it.” Miller v. Childress, 21
Tenn. 320, 321-22 (1841).
59
Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 481-82.
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the proposed amendments force judges to permit the
extended detention of domestic violence arrestees in all
cases—even if they conclude that such arrests are unlawful
due to the absence of probable cause.60 Moreover, because
the proposed amendments to Section 150 completely
restructure the existing framework that applies to pre-trial
detention, 61 the judiciary’s interest in promoting interbranch comity is unlikely to carry the day. Thus,
notwithstanding the strong presumption of constitutionality
accorded to legislative enactments,62 it seems likely that the
judiciary will ultimately conclude that the proposed
amendments to Section 150 unconstitutionally “frustrate or
interfere with the adjudicative function of Tennessee
courts.”63
The most persuasive argument against the
constitutionality of the proposed amendments is that they
would significantly frustrate judicial review of the legality
of a defendant’s confinement by forcing even unwilling
judges to permit an arrestee’s continued detention for a
minimum of twelve hours. Crucially, however, the right to
challenge the legitimacy of one’s confinement at the hands
of the state—in other words, the writ of habeas corpus—is
perhaps the most fundamental individual right that exists
60

In order to be lawful, an arrest must be supported by probable cause.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause[.]”). See also State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d
295, 300 (Tenn. 1999) (“custodial arrest[] is justified upon a showing
of probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, and that
the suspect of the investigation committed that crime.”).
61
Id. at 483.
62
See, e.g., Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 882 (Tenn. 2009) (“[The
judiciary’s] charge is to uphold the constitutionality of a statute
wherever possible. In evaluating the constitutionality of a statute, we
begin with the presumption that an act of the General Assembly is
constitutional.”) (internal citation omitted).
63
McCoy, 2014 WL 6725695, at *7.
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under either the federal or state Constitutions. 64 Known
historically as “the Great Writ,” the writ of habeas corpus
affords anyone who has been incarcerated an immediate
judicial mechanism “for challenging all forms of detention .
. . [that] requires the detaining authority to justify the
detention of the subject or to release him.”65 The judiciary
alone is vested with the authority to vindicate a defendant’s
claim for release under the Great Writ, and its practical
value lies in the fact that it is available in nearly all
circumstances to anyone who is incarcerated at any time.66
As the Tennessee Supreme Court recently explained in
May v. Carlton, “the essential purpose of a writ of habeas
corpus is to subject imprisonment or any other restraint on
liberty, for whatever cause, to judicial scrutiny.”67
The United States Constitution, the Tennessee
Constitution, and the Tennessee Rules of Criminal
Procedure all separately afford arrestees an additional form
of pre-trial judicial review of their arrests as well.68 Both
individually and collectively, each mandates that all arrests
64

TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“the privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or
invasion, the General Assembly shall declare the public safety requires
it.”).
65
See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, FINDING, FRAMING, AND HANGING
JEFFERSON: A LOST LETTER, A REMARKABLE DISCOVERY, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM, 172-73 (2007).
66
TENN. CONST. ART. I, § 15 (“the privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or
invasion, the General Assembly shall declare the public safety requires
it.”); Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993) (“a writ of
habeas corpus may be brought at any time while the petitioner is
incarcerated, to contest a void judgment or an illegal confinement.”).
67
May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tenn. 2008).
68
Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); State v.
Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666, 673 (Tenn. 1996). TENN. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)
(“Any person arrested—except upon a capias pursuant to an indictment
or presentment—shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the
nearest appropriate magistrate[.]”).
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either be approved in advance by a judicial warrant or else
promptly reviewed by a neutral and detached magistrate
after a defendant has been taken into custody.69 The express
purpose of such requirements, of course, is to place a robust
and upfront judicial check on the abuse of executive power.
However, such a goal is substantially undermined by
permitting—and, in fact, mandating—an extended period
of detention for anyone who is arrested on suspicion of
having committed a domestic violence offense when the
defendant’s arrest is based exclusively on a probable cause
determination made by law enforcement.70
In light of these vital constitutional considerations,
the conclusion that the proposed amendments to Section
150 would substantially “frustrate or interfere with the
adjudicative function of Tennessee courts”71 seems almost
unavoidable. The amendments plainly suspend judicial
review within the first twelve hours of domestic violence
arrests. Moreover, even if judicial review were to occur
within the first twelve hours of a defendant’s arrest,
69
70

Id.
As the United States Supreme Court has explained:
The
point
of
the
Fourth
Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not
that it denies law enforcement the
support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime.

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
71
McCoy, 2014 WL 6725695, at *7.
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divesting judges of any authority to release domestic
violence arrestees would effectively suspend judicial
enforcement of the writ of habeas corpus.72 Furthermore, in
direct violation of both federal and state constitutional
mandates requiring that arrests be supported by probable
cause,73 the proposed amendments to Section 150 would
preclude judges from releasing a defendant before twelve
hours have elapsed even if a judge determines that probable
cause did not exist to justify the defendant’s arrest in the
first place.
Given the historical importance of the judiciary’s
ability to adjudicate and ensure the legitimacy of a
defendant’s confinement at the hands of the state,
legislatively mandating that judges permit the extended
detention of domestic violence arrestees under such
circumstances represents a profound and substantial
encroachment upon a quintessential and sovereign judicial
function. As a result, it is difficult to imagine how such a
law could not be deemed to be an unconstitutionally
coercive74 legislative attempt to “frustrate or interfere with
the adjudicative function of Tennessee courts,”75 and the
proposed amendments would likely be invalidated
accordingly.
B. The right to bail under the Tennessee
Constitution
Article I, § 15 of the Tennessee Constitution
provides: “That all prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient
72

TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“the privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or
invasion, the General Assembly shall declare the public safety requires
it.”).
73
See supra note 61.
74
Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 481-82.
75
McCoy, 2014 WL 6725695, at *7.
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sureties, unless for capital offences, when the proof is
evident, or the presumption great.”76 The practical effect of
Article I, § 15 is to create an affirmative right to bail for all
non-capital offenses. Of note, the right to bail is considered
so fundamental in Tennessee that even a defendant who has
already been afforded bail but defaulted on his first bail
bond must still be afforded access to bail.77 Additionally,
no exceptions are carved out for considerations of potential
danger to victims, although such considerations certainly
affect the amount at which bail is set. For these reasons, the
Tennessee Constitution affords arrestees a markedly
broader right to bail than is guaranteed by the federal
Constitution, since “the Eighth Amendment does not
mandate bail in all cases.”78
Due to the fundamental importance of the right to
bail under the Tennessee Constitution, a colorable claim
can be made that the proposed amendments to Section 150
violate the Tennessee Constitution because they would
suspend a defendant’s right to bail for a minimum of twelve
hours. Of note, however, courts have thus far rejected
similar arguments when considering challenges brought
under the federal Constitution. Reasoning that the Eighth
Amendment addresses only “the amount of bail, not the
timing,” 79 such claims have previously failed to curry
76

TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15.
Wallace v. State, 245 S.W.2d 192 (Tenn. 1952).
78
Fields v. Henry Cnty., Tenn., 701 F.3d 180, 183-84 (6th Cir. 2012)
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2036 (2013) (citing United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 753–54 (1987)).
79
See Fields, 701 F.3d at 185 (“[Defendant] also claims that the 12–
hour holding period was a ‘denial of bail.’ Not so. The Eighth
Amendment's protections address the amount of bail, not the timing.”)
(internal citation omitted), (citing Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529,
545 (5th Cir. 2004) (“There is no right to post bail within 24 hours of
arrest.”)); Woods v. City of Michigan City, 940 F.2d 275, 283 (7th Cir.
1991) (Will, D.J., concurring) (“Nothing in the eighth amendment,
however, guarantees instant release for misdemeanors or any other
offense.”).
77
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judicial favor.80 Importantly, at least one federal court has
opined that the Tennessee Constitution does not afford
defendants “a specific right to post bail within a particular
time frame,” either.81
In light of the authority referenced above, if
Tennessee courts adopted the reasoning of the federal
courts that have examined this issue, the proposed
amendments to Section 150 would not be invalidated on the
basis that they violate Article I, § 15. That said, however, it
is worth noting that the reasoning of the above-cited cases
lacks any explicit limiting principle, and thus may be
subject to future reconsideration.82 Put differently: if the
80

Hopkins v. Bradley Cnty., 338 S.W.3d 529, 539 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2010) (“being held for twelve hours before being released on bail does
not automatically constitute a constitutional violation.”) (citing Turner
v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005) (city's “official
policy of holding domestic violence arrestees for a minimum period of
20 hours unless arraigned and released by the court” is not
unconstitutional); Lund v. Hennepin Cnty., 427 F.3d 1123, 1126–28
(8th Cir. 2005) (holding that no violation of due process occurred
where defendant was held for twelve hours after judge ordered that
defendant could be released with no bail); Collins v. Ainsworth, 382
F.3d 529, 545 (5th Cir. 2004) (“There is no right to post bail within 24
hours of arrest”)). See also Campbell v. Johnson, 2006 WL 3408177,
at *3 (N.D. Fla. 2006) (“[the defendant] has . . . failed to state a basis
for a substantive Due Process claim, that is, that he has a fundamental
right to access the bail system once bail has been set by the releasing
authority, since courts have held that access to the bail system once an
individual is found eligible for bail does not constitute a fundamental
right, and government limitations on access to the bail system need
only be reasonable.”) (citing Broussard v. Parish of Orleans, 318 F.3d
644, 651 (5th Cir. 2003)).
81
See Fields, 701 F.3d at 184, n. 1 (“While Tennessee grants criminal
defendants a general ‘right to bail pending trial’ . . . it does not grant
defendants a specific right to post bail within a particular time
frame[.]”) (citations omitted).
82
See generally The Immigrant Legal Resource Center and Ozment
Law, MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS PROTECTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS, § 6.9:
INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHT TO BAIL (2d ed. 2013) (characterizing the
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constitutional provisions guaranteeing defendants access to
bail only address “the amount of bail, not the timing,”83
then what would prevent a jurisdiction from lawfully
delaying a defendant’s bail determination for a day, or a
week, or a year? Furthermore, given that Article I, § 15
affords defendants a broader right to bail than the Eighth
Amendment, there is ultimately no way to be certain that
Tennessee courts would adopt the reasoning of federal
courts when interpreting the scope of the right to bail
guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution.
C. The Right to be Free from Unreasonable
Seizures
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be
secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be
right to bail as a series of four separate rights that includes: [1] “the
right to have bail set”; [2] “the federal constitutional mandate that bail
not be excessive”; [3] “the right to post bail after is has been set”; and
[4] “the right to be released from detention upon paying it.”). Cf.
Fields, 701 F.3d at 186 (“An expectation of release may qualify as a
constitutionally protected liberty interest.”) (citing Greenholtz v.
Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979)
(“[T]he expectancy of release provided in this statute is entitled to some
measure of constitutional protection.”)).
83
Id. at 185.
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searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.84
Similarly, Article I, § 7 of the Tennessee
Constitution states:
That the people shall be
secure in their persons,
houses,
papers
and
possessions,
from
unreasonable searches and
seizures; and that general
warrants, whereby an officer
may be commanded to search
suspected places, without
evidence
of
the
fact
committed, or to seize any
person or persons not named,
whose offences are not
particularly described and
supported by evidence, are
dangerous to liberty and
ought not to be granted.85
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Tennessee
Supreme Court have long held that unreasonably delaying a
warrantless arrestee’s opportunity to receive a judicial
determination of probable cause implicates a citizen’s
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures.86
84

U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
TENN. CONST., art. I, § 7.
86
See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103; Cnty. of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d
666, 673 (Tenn. 1996). The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v.
Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 490 n. 2 (Tenn. 1997).
85
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Thus, even if defendants cannot assert a constitutional right
to a timely bail determination under the Eighth Amendment
or Article I, § 15 of the Tennessee Constitution, there is
reason to believe that the Fourth Amendment or Article I, §
7 provides this right instead.87
Helpfully, both state and federal courts have
provided guidance on this very question. Specifically, in
2010, the Tennessee Court of Appeals favorably quoted the
following passage of a decision from the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, stating:
The U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that probable
cause decisions must be made
promptly, but has also
recognized that states should
be given enough time to
combine such hearings with
other preliminary procedures,
including bail determinations.
Thus, in County of Riverside
v. McLaughlin, the Supreme
Court held that jurisdictions
which provide probable cause
hearings within forty-eight
hours will generally be
immune
from
systemic
challenges. The clear import
of McLaughlin, then, is that a
bail hearing held within 48
hours of a warrantless arrest
is
also
presumptively
constitutional—if indeed the

87

Id.
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Constitution speaks to that
issue.
Given that a bail hearing may
be delayed up to forty-eight
hours absent some improper
motive, the Court finds that a
12–hour delay in releasing
Plaintiff in this case did not
amount to a constitutional
deprivation.88
This persuasive precedent offers a strong indication
that a reviewing court would hold that the proposed
amendments to Section 150 comport with the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment even though the amendments
would delay a defendant’s bail hearing for a minimum of
twelve hours. Crucially, however, there are two major
problems with relying on the above authority in support of
the amendments’ constitutionality.
First, the Tennessee Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that Article I, § 7 of the Tennessee Constitution
affords defendants greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment provides, 89 and given the fundamental
importance of the right to bail under the Tennessee
Constitution,90 mandating that domestic violence arrestees
be subjected to extended pre-trial detention for the express
purpose of delaying their bail hearings may be precisely the
88

Hopkins, 338 S.W.3d at 538-39 (quoting Tate v. Hartsville/Trousdale
Cnty., No. 3:09-0201, 2010 WL 4054141, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 14,
2010) (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
89
See, e.g., State v. Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Tenn. 2002);
Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1,
15 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989);
Drinkard v. State, 584 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tenn. 1979); State v. Lakin,
588 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tenn. 1979).
90
See supra Section III-B
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sort of situation that would merit greater protection under
Article I, § 7. Thus, even if the proposed amendments to
Section 150 were held to satisfy the minimum requirements
of the Fourth Amendment, it is possible that they would
still be unable to satisfy the “greater . . . protections
[afforded] to the citizens of this State . . . under article I, §
7 of the Tennessee Constitution.”91
Second, there is a glaring omission and likely fatal
flaw within the reasoning cited above. Specifically, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in McLaughlin—which held
that “a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of
probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general
matter, comply with the promptness requirement” of the
Fourth Amendment—was expressly based on the
“inevitable” and “often unavoidable” administrative delays
of an overly burdened criminal justice system.92 As the
McLaughlin court explained:
[S]ome delays are inevitable.
. . . Records will have to be
reviewed,
charging
documents
drafted,
appearance
of
counsel
arranged, and appropriate bail
determined. On weekends,
when the number of arrests is
often higher and available
resources tend to be limited,
arraignments may get pushed
back even further. In our
view, the Fourth Amendment
permits
a
reasonable
postponement of a probable
cause determination while the
91
92

Randolph, 74 S.W.3d at 335.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 at 56.
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police cope with the everyday
problems
of
processing
suspects through an overly
burdened criminal justice
system. . . .
Courts cannot ignore the
often unavoidable delays in
transporting arrested persons
from one facility to another,
handling late-night bookings
where no magistrate is
readily available, obtaining
the presence of an arresting
officer who may be busy
processing other suspects or
securing the premises of an
arrest, and other practical
realities.93
Toward this end, and in an effort to prevent law
enforcement from abusing pre-trial detentions, the
McLaughlin court offered three specific examples of delays
that are categorically impermissible within the first fortyeight hours of a defendant’s arrest, explaining:
This is not to say that the
probable cause determination
in a particular case passes
constitutional muster simply
because it is provided within
48 hours. Such a hearing
may nonetheless violate
Gerstein if the arrested
93

Id. at 56-57.
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individual can prove that his
or her probable cause
determination was delayed
unreasonably. Examples of
unreasonable delay are [1]
delays for the purpose of
gathering additional evidence
to justify the arrest, [2] a
delay motivated by ill will
against
the
arrested
individual, or [3] delay for
delay’s sake.94
Thus, if McLaughlin provides the framework for
determining the point by which defendants must be
afforded a bail determination, then the major problem with
the proposed amendments to Section 150 is that they would
not cause a defendant’s bail hearing to be delayed for
“inevitable” and “often unavoidable” administrative
reasons.95 Instead, they mandate delaying a defendant’s bail
hearing for intentional and administratively unnecessary
reasons. Given that McLaughlin should properly be read to
prohibit any intentional and administratively unnecessary
delays to a warrantless arrestee’s judicial probable cause
hearing, 96 there is strong reason to be concerned that a
94

Id. at 56.
Id. at 56-57.
96
See Daniel A. Horwitz, The First 48: Ending the Use of
Categorically Unconstitutional Investigative Holds In Violation of
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 519, 539
(2015) (“the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits law
enforcement from deliberately delaying a defendant’s Gerstein hearing
for any administratively unnecessary reason[.]”). See also Mark J.
Goldberg, Weighing Society's Need for Effective Law Enforcement
Against an Individual's Right to Liberty: Swinney v. State and the
Forty-Eight Hour Rule, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 73, 106 (2004) (“[T]here is
no common rationale shared among the examples of impermissible
95
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statutorily mandated delay in a defendant’s bail
determination would not be able to withstand constitutional
scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.
D. The Right to Due Process
Both the federal Constitution and the Tennessee
Constitution afford defendants a fundamental right to due
process of law.97 Under each, a governmental deprivation
of a constitutionally-protected liberty interest implicates the
guarantees of due process. 98 Without question,
incarceration qualifies as a deprivation of such an interest.99
In defining the contours of the Due Process clause,
the U.S. Supreme Court has instructed that “[t]he
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.’”100 Even so, however, the Supreme Court has also
explained that the requirements of due process are “flexible
and call[] for such procedural protections as the particular
delays [in McLaughlin]. . . . Consequently, if an individual can show
that their [sic] judicial determination of probable cause was
intentionally delayed for a purpose not relating to circumstances
beyond law enforcement's control, a Fourth Amendment violation
should be declared.”).
97
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“. . . nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”);
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“[N]o man shall be taken or imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled,
or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property,
but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”).
98
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
99
See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 750 (1987). See also
State v. Thompson, 508 S.E.2d 277, 287 (N.C. 1998) (“In considering
the first factor articulated in both Mathews and Mallen, it is beyond
question that the private interest at stake, liberty, is a fundamental
right.”).
100
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)).
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situation demands.”101 In determining what process is due
in a given situation, the U.S. Supreme Court instructed in
the seminal case, Mathews v. Eldridge, that:
“[T]he specific dictates of
due
process
generally
require[] consideration of
three distinct factors: First,
the private interest that will
be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such
interest
through
the
procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of
additional
or
substitute
procedural safeguards; and
[third], the Government's
interest,
including
the
function involved and the
fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or
substitute
procedural
requirement would entail.”102
Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court
“slightly reformulated these factors for use in assessing the
permissibility of post-deprivation process delay,”103 stating:
In determining how long a
delay is justified in affording
a post-[deprivation] hearing
and decision, it is appropriate
101

Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
Id. at 335.
103
Thompson, 508 S.E.2d at 286.
102
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to
examine
[1]
the
importance of the private
interest and the harm to this
interest occasioned by delay;
[2] the justification offered
by the Government for delay
and its relation to the
underlying
governmental
interest;
and
[3]
the
likelihood that the interim
decision may have been
mistaken.104
104

FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242 (1988). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit speculated that:
Presumably, this refinement was
undertaken out of recognition of
the awkwardness of a literal
application of the Mathews factors
in this context. Where the question
is not whether there will be postdeprivation review, but the
timeliness of such review, it is not
meaningful to inquire, as it is in the
typical procedural due process
context, whether the procedure
sought—sooner
review—would
reduce the likelihood of an
erroneous deprivation.
The
deprivation has already occurred, it
is understood that there will be
judicial
review,
and
the
deprivation, even if in error, cannot
be “undone” by sooner judicial
review. At most, the risk of an
extended erroneous deprivation
could be reduced. The more
relevant questions therefore are the
harm to the private interests that
will be occasioned by the delay in

92

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 245
The first factor of Mathews and Mallen compels
consideration of the private interest at stake. Here, the
proposed amendments to Section 150 implicate the liberty
of a presumptively innocent individual. The significance of
this liberty interest is not subject to reasonable
disagreement, as the incarceration of a presumptively
innocent individual for any period of time is a serious
constitutional matter. 105 Toward this end, the U.S.
Supreme Court has taken at face value the notion that
“[e]veryone agrees that the police should make every
attempt to minimize the time a presumptively innocent
individual spends in jail.” 106 “Pretrial confinement,” the
U.S. Supreme Court has observed, may “imperil [a]
suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his
family relationships.”107
Additionally, following the U.S. Supreme Court’s
2012 decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders
of County of Burlington, arrestees may even be forced to
submit to the dehumanizing requirement that they “expose
their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a
review and the state's justifications
for the delay.
Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 345 (4th Cir. 1994)
(internal citations omitted).
105
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (“liberty from
bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental
action”) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Cf. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)
(holding that a juvenile’s “interest in freedom from institutional
restraints, even for [a] brief time . . . is undoubtedly substantial[.]”).
106
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 58.
107
Id. (citing RONALD L. GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE
AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM 32-91 (1965); LEWIS KATZ, JUSTICE IS THE
CRIME 51-62 (1972)).
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[warrantless] strip search” without any individualized basis
for suspicion. 108 This notwithstanding, however, the
magnitude of the deprivation at stake is tempered
substantially by the fact that the 12-hour hold mandated by
the proposed amendments to Section 150 is only meant to
be temporary in nature. Taken together, on balance this
factor weighs against the constitutionality of the proposed
amendments to Section 150.
The second set of factors to be considered—under
Mathews, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and
under Mallen, “the likelihood that the interim decision may
have been mistaken”—is mixed. In order to trigger an
arrest at all, either a law enforcement officer or a member
of the judiciary must first determine that there is probable
cause to believe that a defendant has committed a criminal
offense.109 This requirement provides a built-in procedural
safeguard that reduces the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of liberty, which weighs in favor of the constitutionality of
the proposed amendments.
In most cases, however, the probable cause
determination necessary to effect an arrest will be made
exclusively by law enforcement, rather than pre-approved
by a judge. With this in mind, the U.S. Supreme Court has
cautioned that: “[t]he point of the Fourth Amendment,
which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is . . . [that]
inferences [must] be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
108

See generally Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of
Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1516, (2012) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520 (1979)).
109
See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (“A
warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a felony, or a
misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence, is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment if the arrest is supported by probable cause.”). See
also supra note 61.
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in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.”110 This unfortunate reality tempers the value of this
procedural safeguard significantly.
Furthermore, there are several valuable and easilyadministered procedural safeguards that could be added to
supplement the proposed amendments to Section 150 in
order to reduce the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation
of liberty. Incidentally, however, these procedural
safeguards are precisely those portions of the law that the
proposed amendments to Section 150 seek to excise. For
example, requiring individualized judicial fact-finding that
an arrestee poses a threat to his or her alleged victim before
the arrestee is subjected to a 12-hour hold is probably the
single most effective way to reduce the likelihood of an
erroneous deprivation of liberty. Additionally, the
likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of liberty could be
reduced even further by increasing the standard of proof
required to support a judicial finding that “the offender is a
threat to the alleged victim,”111 since the likelihood of an
110

See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112-13 (quoting Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
111
Interestingly, TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-150 does not specify what
standard of proof is necessary to support this finding. However, a
colorable claim can be made that anything short of a “clear and
convincing evidence” standard would not comport with due process.
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) (holding that “the
preponderance standard falls short of meeting the demands of due
process” with respect to involuntary civil commitment proceedings and
that a “clear and convincing evidence” standard is the minimum level
of proof required). Conversely, where, as here, the deprivation is
limited in time and based on a reasonable legislative determination that
domestic violence arrestees pose a heightened threat to victims in the
period immediately following an arrest. See infra notes 114-15, this
requirement of judicial fact-finding may yield. See, e.g., State v.
Atkinson, 755 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (approving
statutorily mandated eight-hour detention of apparently drunk drivers,
notwithstanding absence of judicial fact-finding requirement, and
analogizing such detentions “to the detention of persons under
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erroneous deprivation of liberty necessarily decreases as
the required standard of proof increases. The proposed
amendments to Section 150, however, would do away with
the law’s existing judicial fact-finding requirement entirely,
effectively creating an irrebuttable presumption of
dangerousness in all cases.112 These concerns pose serious
constitutional problems113 that, on balance, weigh against
the constitutionality of the proposed amendments as well.
The third set of factors to be considered—the
government’s interest in and justification for imposing a
12-hour hold and the law’s relation to this interest—weighs
heavily in favor of the proposed amendments. To start, the
“cooling off” period compelled by Section 150 would
directly further at least two governmental interests. First,
such a hold would provide immediate intervention to
prevent violent recidivism during what is believed to be an
especially heightened period of danger. 114 Second,
detaining domestic violence arrestees for a minimum of
twelve hours would allow victims a sufficient and defined
period of time to get to safety and to obtain legal

quarantine orders wherein a threat is posed to the public health and
safety.”).
112
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-150(h)(1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11150(k)(1).
113
See, e.g., Steven J. Mulroy, “Hold” On: The Remarkably Resilient,
Constitutionally Dubious 48-Hour Hold, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815,
862 (2013).
114
Hyunkag Cho and Dina J. Wilke, Does Police Intervention in
Intimate Partner Violence Work? Estimating the Impact of Batterer
Arrest in Reducing Revictimization, 11 ADVANCES IN SOCIAL WORK
283-85 (2010) (citing Sherman & Berk, 1984 (concluding that arresting
a batterer and detaining him overnight is the most effective law
enforcement policy to prevent recidivism)). See also In re Conard, 944
S.W.2d 191, 201 (Mo. 1997) (“In many instances there are valid
reasons for keeping an individual in jail for the twenty hours allowed
by [state law]. This is so especially in instances of domestic abuse
when continued violence is a threat.”).
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protection—such as a restraining order—against their
alleged abusers.115
These governmental interests are indisputably
compelling. As the Supreme Court has explained: “The
‘legitimate and compelling state interest’ in protecting the
community from crime cannot be doubted.” 116
Additionally, “society’s interest in crime prevention is at its
greatest” where “the [g]overnment musters convincing
proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer
for a serious crime, presents a demonstrable danger to the
community.”117 Of note, preventive detentions much more
extensive than twelve hours have also been upheld by the
Supreme Court in other contexts,118 albeit with the crucial
additional caveat that the requirements necessary to justify
the detentions in those cases carried much more robust
procedural safeguards than those contemplated by the
proposed amendments to Section 150. 119 Assuming that
115

See, e.g., State v. Kapela, 82 Haw. 381, 391, 922 P.2d 994, 1004
(Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (citing legislative history stating that “when we
talked about a cooling[-]off period and we provided twelve hours for a
cooling[-]off period, it was to give Daddy a chance to cool down a little
bit, get his head together so when he comes home, he doesn't hit Mama
anymore. Now, truly, we as a society are beginning to recognize that
the cooling[-]off period isn't just for Daddy to cool down. The
cooling[-]off period is necessary so that the woman can get a temporary
restraining order to keep him away from her so he doesn't continue
beating her and the kids. It's necessary for her to get legal counsel. It's
necessary for her to find alternative shelters instead of going into the
homeless environment.”).
116
Schall, 467 U.S. at 264 (citing De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144,
155 (1960)).
117
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
118
See, e.g., Schall, 467 U.S. 253 (pretrial detention of juvenile
detainees); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (detention of
involuntarily committed mental patients); See also Gary H. v.
Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir.1987) (detention of juveniles).
119
Schall, 467 U.S. 253. For example, required a specific and
individualized judicial finding that there was “a ‘serious risk’ that the
[detainee], if released, would commit a crime prior to his next court
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Tennessee courts will defer to the legislature’s conclusion
that arresting alleged batterers and detaining them for a
minimum period of twelve hours is an effective way to
protect victims of domestic violence,120 the government’s
vital interest in preventing recidivism and affording
domestic violence victims a minimum period of time to get
themselves to safety cannot realistically be doubted.
Considering these factors together, whether the
proposed amendments pose a due process problem is an
extremely close question. The liberty interest at stake is
vitally important, and the absence of any individualized
judicial determination of dangerousness to safeguard this
interest is highly problematic. So, too, is the requirement
that all people arrested for certain domestic violence
offenses must be subjected to a 12-hour hold no matter the
circumstances. Furthermore, each of these procedural
omissions can be improved considerably without adding
much in the way of administrative or fiscal burdens.121
Even so, however, the state’s interest in domestic violence
prevention is similarly compelling, and this interest is at its
zenith under circumstances when an arrestee poses a
heightened risk of violent recidivism.122 Taken together,
and relying substantially on the rule that statutes carry a
strong presumption of constitutionality, 123 it seems
appearance” unless the hold were implemented. 467 U.S. at 278. The
procedure involved also required “notice, a hearing, and a statement of
facts and reasons . . . prior to any detention.” Id. at 277.
120
See supra notes 114-15.
121
See, e.g., Thompson, 508 S.E.2d at 288 (“providing a domesticviolence arrestee with a pretrial-release hearing before the first
available judge . . . would involve little or no expense to the State.”).
122
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
123
See Waters, 291 S.W.3d at 882 (“[The judiciary’s] charge is to
uphold the constitutionality of a statute wherever possible. In
evaluating the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with the
presumption that an act of the General Assembly is constitutional.”)
(internal citation omitted).
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probable—although far from a guarantee—that Tennessee
courts would hold that the proposed amendments to Section
150 satisfy due process.
IV. The Solution
Although the proposed amendments to Section 150
will face substantial constitutional obstacles if enacted, a
middle-ground solution is available that would go a long
way toward alleviating the constitutional concerns
presented above. Specifically, the current version of
Section 150 could be strengthened considerably by simply
removing the exception permitting judges to lift domestic
violence holds if they determine that “sufficient time has or
will have elapsed for the victim to be protected.” 124
If the exception permitting judges to lift domestic
violence holds under circumstances when they have
determined that “sufficient time has or will have elapsed
for the victim to be protected”125 were removed—and if the
current requirement that a “magistrate or other official duly
authorized to release the offender find[] that the offender is
a threat to the alleged victim” as a precondition to imposing
any hold were retained126—then this updated version of
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-150 would likely be able to
overcome each of the aforementioned constitutional
obstacles. First, by maintaining near-immediate judicial
review of domestic violence arrests, such a change would
completely avoid any legislative encroachment on the
judicial function, sidestepping entirely the law’s most
daunting constitutional hurdle. 127 Moreover, both a
temporary denial of bail and a temporary judicial hold—
124

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-150(h)(1) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §
40-11-150(k)(1) (2012).
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
See supra Section III-A.
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even one intentionally created by statute—would be made
eminently more reasonable following a judicial
determination that an alleged batterer was both arrested
legitimately and poses an immediate threat to his or her
victim.128 Finally, preserving the requirement that a judge
make an individualized determination of dangerousness as
a precondition to imposing a hold would avoid the most
troubling due process concerns raised by the proposed
amendment to Section 150 by reducing erroneous
deprivations of freedom and by retaining an essential
judicial check on potential missteps made by law
enforcement.
Most importantly, however, such a change would
finally end the highly questionable practice of releasing
domestic violence arrestees based on nothing more than
judicial speculation that “sufficient time has or will have
elapsed for the victim to be protected.” 129 This reform
would also go a long way toward preventing the premature
release of batterers resulting from either poor judgment or
judicial misconduct—as apparently occurred in the David
Chase incident—which prompted the demand for policy
reform in the first place. In sum, although the legislature
should retain Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-150’s requirement
that judges must find that a domestic violence arrestee
poses a threat to an alleged victim prior to imposing a 12hour hold, the legislature should still strengthen Section
150 by removing the exception allowing judges to lift
domestic violence holds if they determine that “sufficient
128

See supra Sections III-B and III-C. Of note, the U.S. Supreme
Court has also expressly authorized jurisdictions to delay an arrestee’s
probable cause hearing for the purpose of preparing for “combination”
proceedings that combine both a probable cause determination and
other pre-trial proceedings that occur early in the pretrial process. See
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 58.
129
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-150(h)(1) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §
40-11-150(k)(1) (2012).
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time has or will have elapsed for the victim to be
protected.”130

130

Id.
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ARTICLE
PROMOTING THE SUSTAINABILITY OF BIOFUELS IN
AMERICA: LOOKING TO BRAZIL
By: Julia Johnson*
“We stand now where two roads diverge. But unlike the
roads in Robert Frost’s familiar poem, they are not
equally fair. The road we have long been traveling is
deceptively easy, a smooth superhighway on which we
progress with great speed, but at its end lies disaster. The
other fork of the road — the one less traveled by — offers
our last, our only chance to reach a destination that
assures the preservation of the earth.”
― Rachel Carson, Silent Spring
I. Introduction
Many Americans today would struggle to
envision the United States (“U.S.”) completely
independent from foreign oil. The U.S. is so intertwined
with its foreign oil interests that debates over the U.S.’s
continued reliance on foreign oil now pervade the
country’s political, economic, and national security
agenda. Calls for increased energy independence1 and a
transition to a green economy have largely failed to
materialize. 2 Moreover, the U.S.’s economy remains
stagnant in the wake of the 2008 recession, leaving
*

Duke University School of Law.
Final Staff Report of the Select Committee on Energy Independence
and Global Warming, H.R. REP. NO. 11–709, (2011) (statement of
Edward of J. Markey) (stating that “[o]ther countries are taking the lead
in clean energy and the United States must act now if it is to remain
competitive in this rapidly developing global market.”).
2
Matthew L. Wald & Edmund L. Andrews, Call to Cut Foreign Oil
is a Refrain 35 Years Old, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at A16.
1
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policymakers struggling to revive America’s prosperity.
Perhaps then, it is ludicrous to strive for an increased role
for alternative energy sources, which so far have failed to
garner widespread public support and remain highly
partisan. 3 Nonetheless, installing innovative energy
policies has become increasingly important as the U.S.
stands at a crossroads.
Previous attempts at incorporating biofuels into
energy legislation have failed to experience widespread
success because the U.S. has not adequately incentivized
consumers to purchase biofuel blends. Notably, the U.S.
has not sufficiently promoted the competitiveness of
biofuels in the marketplace, thereby limiting their longrun viability. 4 While the U.S.’s policies remained
targeted at subsidizing producers, Brazil’s policies
place a greater emphasis upon creating and maintaining
ethanol demand. 5 Due to this approach, Brazil’s
biofuels framework has now become a model for
emulation.6

3

See Letter to Congress from Secretary Jacob J. Lew, U.S.
DEP’T OF TREASURY (May 31, 2013) (warning of consequences of
the failure to raise the debt ceiling).
4
See NREL Highlights 2012 Utility Green Power Leaders: Top 10
Programs Support More Than 4.2 Million MWh of Voluntary Green
Power, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB (June 5, 2013) (detailing
alternative energy providers and price markup over conventional
fuels).
5
See Nancy I. Potter, How Brazil Achieved Energy Independence and
the Lessons the United States Should Learn from Brazil’s Experience, 7
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 331, 346–7 (2008).
6
ROLAND A. JANSEN, SECOND GENERATION BIOFUELS AND
BIOMASS: ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR INVESTORS, SCIENTISTS AND
DECISION MAKERS 159–60 (2013) (stating “Brazil is considered to
have the world’s first sustainable biofuels economy and be the biofuel
industry leader, a policy model for other countries, and its sugarcane
ethanol ‘the most successful alternative fuel to date’”) (emphasis in
original).
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For the U.S.’s biofuels policies to be more
effective, the nation must employ better consumer-side
factors and devise policies around promoting biofuels’
ability to compete with conventional fuels. Consumerside factors include biofuels’ accessibility and pricing, as
well as the ease and attractiveness of purchasing
alternative energy-powered vehicles. As shall be
discussed, the U.S.’s initiatives have neither been
aggressive enough, nor sufficiently comprehensive, to
enable the U.S. to mirror Brazil’s success.
This article will review the factors that have limited
the efficacy of the U.S.’s biofuels initiatives, as compared
to Brazil. First, a background of Brazil’s ethanol
framework will be provided. Second, the U.S.’s biofuels
policies will be reviewed. Third, the factors reducing the
success of the U.S.’s policies, as compared to those policies
in Brazil, shall be considered. Finally, recommendations
will be set forth describing how the U.S. can more
effectively incorporate biofuels into its energy framework.
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II. Background
A. Energy Policy in Brazil
By taking a multi-faceted approach that
integrates supply-side and demand-side considerations,
Brazil’s biofuels program has remained viable for the
past thirty years.7 Furthermore, Brazil’s continued efforts
to promote and cultivate ethanol have also played a vital
role in fostering the nation’s energy independence,
though increased domestic oil production has been
employed as a corresponding strategy.8
Broadly, there have been several key government
initiatives attributed to ethanol’s current success.
Specifically, Brazil has: (1) generated and maintained
consumer demand for alternative fuels; 9 (2) artificially
reduced the price of ethanol for consumers; 10 (3)
developed infrastructure supports, including ensuring that
consumers have ready access to fueling stations selling
ethanol;11 (4) effectively utilized its natural opportunities
for expanded sugarcane ethanol production as a
7

Potter, supra note 5, at 345.
Id. at 334 (stating “following the 1973 oil crisis, Brazil adhered to a
two-prong strategy of increasing domestic oil production through the
state-owned oil company Petrobras and decreasing petroleum demand
by developing sugarcane-based ethanol as a viable alternative”).
9
David N. Cassuto & Carolina Gueiros, The Evolution of Brazilian
Regulation of Ethanol and Possible Lessons for the United States, 30
WIS. INT’L L. J. 477, 488 (2012).
10
Sergio Barros, Brazil: Biofuels Annual, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOR.
AGRIC. SERV. (2010), at 4 (providing that “the government set a 65
percent price ratio (later increased to 67 percent) between hydrated
ethanol (E100) and gasoline prices at the pump based on the energy
power both fuels”).
11
Potter, supra note 7, at 337 (stating that “[o]ver twenty-nine
thousand filling stations across the country are equipped with
ethanol pumps, which enables the market to function and allows
consumers to choose equally between ethanol and gasoline”).
8
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centerpiece for its biofuels program; 12 and, (5) created
incentives for private investors, who otherwise may have
been deterred by unstable or tepid market demand, to
engage in research and development within the industry. 13
Consequently, increasing consumer demand for ethanol
has promoted its long-term sustainability by fostering
continued production and development.14
The history of Brazil’s ethanol policies may be
broken down into four phases. Phase 1 comprises the
initiation of Pró-Álcool beginning in 1975. Phase 2
comprises the period beginning in mid-1979 whereby
Brazil strengthened and refined its ethanol targets.
Phase 3 is characterized by deregulation and a decline in
ethanol production. Phase 4 begins in 2003 and
comprises the beginning of widespread use of flex-fuel
vehicles (FFVs) in the nation.

12

Id. at 348.
Barros, supra note 10, at 5, 7 (noting the role of the private sector).
14
See id. at 7.
13
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1. PHASE 1
Phase 1 of Brazil’s biofuels program began on
November 14, 1975, when Decreto No. 76.593 launched
the beginning of Pró-Álcool in response to the 1973
foreign oil crisis. 15 Although Brazil had previously
attempted a variety of initiatives to encourage biofuel
use, Pró-Álcool marked a substantial turning point in
Brazil’s energy policy by requiring that ethanol be mixed
into conventional fuels, thereby merging the sugarcane and
fuel industries.16
Decreto No. 76.593 lays out the regulatory
framework of Pró-Álcool (also referred to herein as the
National Alcohol Program). 17 In its early phases, the
National Alcohol Program was overseen by the National
Commission on Alcohol (hereinafter “Commission”),
which was comprised of representatives from the
Ministries of Finance, Agriculture, Industry and Trade,
Mines and Energy, Interior, as well as the Planning
Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic.18 A key
15

National Alcohol Programme (PROALCOOL), Decreto No.
76.593 de 14 de Novembro de 1975, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 14.11.1975 (Braz.) [hereinafter Decreto No. 76.593].
16
James Bixby, The 2005 Energy Policy Act: Lessons on Getting
Alternative Fuels to the Pump from Minnesota’s
Ethanol Regulations, 26 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 353, 359-60 (noting
that, in response to the 1973 oil crisis, among other initiatives, the
Brazilian government required gasoline to contain at least 10 percent
ethanol); see also Vanessa M. Cordonnier, Ethanol’s Roots: How
Brazilian Legislation Created the International Ethanol Boom, 33 WM.
& MARY ENVT. L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 296-97 (2008).
17
For purposes of this paper, Pró-Álcool and National Alcohol
Program are used synonymously.
18
Decreto No. 76.593, (1975), art. 3. Please note that the Commission
was replaced in 1979 by the National Council of Alcohol, though the
Council inherits these responsibilities. See also Decreto No. 83.700 de
05 de Julho de 1979, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 5.7.1979
(Braz.) [hereinafter Decreto No. 83.,700], art. 4.
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role was conferred upon the Commission, that of creating
biofuel initiatives and considering proposals for revising
the Program’s framework. 19 The Commission also
devised policies that directly and indirectly helped
expand ethanol production. 20 For example, the
Commission worked to formulate a criterion that best
determined where to place ethanol production facilities
geographically.21 Similarly, the Commission developed an
annual schedule specifying the appropriate use for a
variety of types of biofuels.22
Among other initiatives, early legislation notably
created the minimum blend- requirements for ethanol in
fuel, which demand that a certain minimum percentage
of ethanol must be mixed into gasoline prior to sale,
and remains in place today. In response to supply
fluctuations and other market factors, the Ministerio da
Agricultura, Pecuaria e Abasecimento (“MAPA”)
received the responsibility to periodically alter the
minimum blend requirements.23 Furthermore, throughout
this period, the Instituto do Acucar e Alcool (“IAA”)
19

Decreto No. 76.593 (1975).
Id.
21
Id. When determining where an ethanol production facility will be
located, the Commission considers factors including (i) reducing
income disparities within a region, (ii) availability of resources, (iii)
costs of transportations, as well as (iv) production needs of the unit. Id.
22
Id. Decreto No. 83.700 develops factors that the Commission must
consider when reviewing the Alcohol Program’s framework, including
(i) economic production, (ii) investment levels, (iii) production factors
availability, (iv) where consumption is located, (v) transportation costs,
(vi) road infrastructure and other distribution issues, as well as (vii)
income disparities within a region. Decreto No. 83.700, (1970), art. 4.
23
See Cassuto & Guerios, supra note 9, at 490. See Portaria No.
143/2007/MAPA, Article 1, de 29 de Junho de 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL
DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.), Portaria No. 7/2010/MAPA, Article 1, de
12 de Janeiro de 2010, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.),
Portaria No. 678/2011/MAPA, de 1 de Setembro de 2011, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] Braz.).
20
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controlled the price of ethanol; the IAA helped to
promote price parity between ethanol and sugar, and
subsidized the price of ethanol relative to gasoline. 24
During this time, the IAA subsidized the price of
ethanol for consumers so that its price remained
consistently 59% of the price of gasoline.25
Brazil also encouraged modernization of
production methods 26 and redevelopment of existing
idle sugar distilleries. 27 Brazil’s government banks,
including Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento
Economico e Social, Banco da Amazônia, Banco do
Brasil, and Banco do Nordeste do Brasil, assisted with
funding for investment in ethanol production.28 Similarly,
the National Monetary Council helped to fund and
develop projects to spur production in regions that
traditionally had little ethanol production.29 Coupled with
government funding and support, Brazil also promoted
ethanol’s viability on the commercial market by
developing an ethanol distribution system to facilitate its
sale at petroleum companies. 30 Even more, Brazil
encouraged private investment in sugarcane ethanol
production by dispersing over $4.9 billion in subsidized
government loans with interest rates that were below the
nation’s inflation levels. 31
24

Decreto No. 76.593, supra note 15, art. 8; Decreto No. 80.762 de 18
de November de 1977, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] 18.11.1977
(Braz.), art. 8 (amending Decreto No. 76.593).
25
Decreto No. 76.593, (1975), art. 8; see also Michael McDermott,
Marcio Cinelli, Denise J. Luethge & Philippe Byosiere, Brazil and
Biofuels for Autos: A Model for Other Nations, 2 GSTF BUS. REV. 162
(Mar. 2013).
26
Id. at Art. 2.
27
Id.
28
Id. at Art. 5(a).
29
Id. at Art. 5(b)§1.
30
Id.at Art. 7.
31
Renato Guimarães Jr. & Bruce B. Johnson, Legal Implications of
Biomass Energy: The Case of Brazil’s Alcohol Program 3–4 (São
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Many of the policies encompassed within PróÁlcool have been refined or expanded since the initial
authorizing legislation was devised. Notably, in 1978,
Decreto No. 82.476 established a reimbursement plan
as a way to encourage investment by ethanol
producers. 32 Similarly, additional infrastructure supports
were also developed. For instance, in 1979, through
government assistance, initially about 300 ethanol pumps
were outfitted at gas stations and storage tanks were built
to store ethanol in between locations where the ethanol
was being produced and consumed.33
Moreover, in 1979, Decreto No. 83.700 further
refined the National Alcohol Program. 34 Expanding
membership and regulatory oversight of the Program,
Decreto No. 83.700 abolished the Commission and
created the National Council of Alcohol (“Council”).35
The Council is comprised of former members of the
Commission, as well as representatives from the
Ministries of Transport and Labor, representatives from
the National Confederation of Agriculture, Trade, and
Industry, and the Technological Affairs Deputy Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces. 36 The Council inherited the
Commission’s responsibilities and has the authority to
develop criteria to help determine ethanol market prices,
as well as other financing conditions.37
In conclusion, Phase 1 was marked by the
development of a number of initiatives to spur investment,
as well as the creation of minimum blend requirements
Paulo Conference on the Law of the World. Work Paper, 1981). See
also McDermott et. al., supra note 25.
32
Decreto No. 82.476, de 23 de Otubro de 1978, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.10.1978 (Braz.).
33
Cordonnier, supra note 16, at 297.
34
See Decreto No. 83.700 (1979).
35
Id. at Art. 4.
36
Id. at Arts. 2–6.
37
See id. at Art. 2.
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and the beginning of significant price subsidies for
ethanol.
2. PHASE 2
Motivated by the 1979 Middle East oil shocks,
Brazil responded by reinvigorating its ethanol policies.38
Expanding upon early legislation, Phase 2 heightened
ethanol-blend requirements 39 and, during this time, on
average required that ethanol constitute roughly 22% of
conventional fuel blends.40 Moreover, Brazil also pushed
automobile makers to redesign vehicle engines to more
effectively run on ethanol.41 In 1982, Brazil set forth an
objective that required automobile makers to produce
and retail 500,000 ethanol-powered vehicles before the
year’s end. 42 To further expand ethanol production in
anticipation of heightened demand, the government
created new financial incentives that encouraged the
creation of new ethanol distilleries.43
In addition to its production-side initiatives, the
Brazilian government also worked to promote consumer
confidence in ethanol’s quality as compared to
gasoline.44 For instance, in 1981, as a way to promote
transparency
surrounding
ethanol
products
to
consumers, Brazil required that fueling stations affix
“direct-reading, temperature-corrected hydrometers” at

38

Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 9, at 484.
Guimarães & Johnson, supra note 31.
40
See e.g., Portaria No. 144/1984/MAPA, Article 1, de 21 de Agosto
de 1984, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.).
41
Cordonnier, supra note 16, at 298.
42
Id. at 302. Please note these vehicles were not the FFVs as will be
later discussed.
43
Id.
44
Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 9, at 484–85.
39
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each ethanol dispenser that would “allow the consumer
himself to verify the quality of the product.”45
Brazil’s efforts to increase the palatability,
accessibility, and affordability of ethanol fuel were
largely successful.46 The number of ethanol-run vehicles
increased dramatically within a few years, and as of 1984,
84% of vehicles sold in Brazil could run on ethanol.47
3. PHASE 3
Beginning in 1986 with the demise of Brazil’s
dictatorship, Phase 3 is characterized by the deregulation
and decrease in support for ethanol production.48 These
policies resulted in a consequent reduction in ethanol
supply. 49 In 1990, the IAA, which had been controlling
ethanol prices, was disbanded. 50 As the Brazilian
government ceased to regulate ethanol, its use as a fuel
in vehicles declined dramatically. 51 Ethanol production
became subject to market forces, which largely reduced
ethanol’s attractiveness.52 Consequently, as the century
came to an end, it appeared that ethanol would no
longer play a prominent role in Brazil’s energy
framework.
4. PHASE 4
Beginning in 2003 and continuing to present-day,
Phase 4 is notably characterized by the introduction of
45

Cordonnier, supra note 16, at 302.
Id at 303.
47
Id.
48
Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 9, at 485.
49
Id.
50
Decreto No. 99.240, de 7 de Maio de 1990, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] DE 7.5.1990 (Braz.), art. 1.
51
Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 9, at 486.
52
Id. at 486–87.
46
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flex-fuel vehicles (“FFVs”) in the nation, thereby initiating
a dramatic resurgence in the use of ethanol fuel.53 FFVs
have become extremely popular among consumers and
are now retailed in a variety of makes and models. By
2006, 83% of vehicles sold in Brazil had the capacity to
run on either ethanol or gasoline, and this figure had
ballooned to roughly 90% by 2009.54 Unlike the FFVs
sold in the U.S., which can only operate on gasoline or
E85,55 Brazilian FFVs can operate on any gasoline-toethanol combination. 56 Therefore, by fostering the
consumer’s ability to choose which fuel to purchase by
quickly comparing the price of ethanol to that of gasoline,
FFVs have simultaneously promoted consumer choice
and revived ethanol’s competitiveness.57 Even more, for
those vehicles operating on gasoline, Brazil’s ethanol
blend requirements have also remained intact and
conventional fuel continues to be blended with ethanol.
The mandatory ethanol blend requirement for
automobiles varies, but has in recent years wavered
between 20% and 25%.58
53

Id. at 487–88.
Juscelino F. Colares, A Brief History of Brazilian Biofuels
Legislation, 35 SYR. J. INT’L L. & COM. 293, 295 (2008).
55
See id. (noting that “[t]he introduction of ‘flex fuel’ engine
technology in Brazil has allowed motorists to safely switch between
consumption of either gasoline or ethanol depending on prices at the
pump”). E85 is a fuel blend that is 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline.
56
Cassuto & Guerios, supra note 9, at 487–88; see also Jose
Goldemberg, Brazil’s Energy Story: Insights for U.S. Energy Policy,
ASPEN INST. (2013) (noting that FFVs in Brazil “can run on any
proportion of ethanol and gasoline, from zero to 100 percent, as they
have sensors that can detect the proportion and adjust the ignition
electronically”).
57
Id. at 488.
58
Compare Portaria No. 143/2007/MAPA, Article 1, de 29 de Junho de
2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.), with Portaria No.
7/2010/MAPA, Article 1, de 12 de Janiero de 2010, DIÁRIO OFICIAL
DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.), and with Portaria No. 678/2011/MAPA,
54
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Next, although Brazil has not reintroduced the
ethanol subsidies and stringent pricing regimes of earlier
decades, the nation continues to employ a number of
mandates, subsidies, and taxes that help to accommodate
ethanol production. 59 For instance, under the
Contribuicao de Intervencao no Dominio Economico
(“CIDE”), Brazil imposes higher taxes on gasoline than
it does on ethanol.60 Likewise, Brazil continues to provide
credits for ethanol producers to further spur innovation
and investment; over 94% of this funding is applied to
capital investments such as machinery and equipment.61
As a complementary strategy, Brazil has also recently
sought to more effectively incorporate biodiesel into its
energy framework.62 As one example, in 2005, pursuant

de 1 de Setembro de 2011, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.)
(demonstrating the variability of ethanol requirements between 20 and
25 percent); see also Country Analysis Briefs: Brazil, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN (Feb. 28, 2012) at 5.
59
Lei No. 9.478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997, (Braz.) (discussing national
energy policy which oversees ethanol production and use). See also Lei
No. 12.249, de 11 de Junho de 2010, (Braz.) art. 131 (establishing
infrastructure incentives); Barros, supra note 10 at 6–7 (providing
examples of Brazilian government support programs).
60
Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 9, at 490 (noting that “the imports and
internal sales of gasoline is R$860 per cubic meter, while ethanol
imports and internal sales are charged only R$37.20 per cubic meter”).
61
Constanza Valdez, Brazil’s Ethanol Industry: Looking Forward, U.S.
DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV. (June 2011) at 24.
62
Rodrigo Augusto Rodrigues & José Honório Accarini, Brazil’s
Biodiesel
Program,
(Dec.
15,
2013),
http://dc.itamaraty.gov.br/imagens-e-textos/Biocombustivei
s-09ing-programabrasileirobiodiesel.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2013);
see Decreto No. 5.297, de 6 de Dezembro de 2004, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO (Braz.) (implementing the Social Fuel Seal); see also Gabriella
P.A.G. Pousa, André L.F. Santos & Paulo A.Z. Suarez, History and
Policy of Biodiesel in Brazil, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 5393, 5393 (2007)
(discussing the current biodiesel fuels used in Brazil).
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to Lei No. 11.097, Brazil required that at least 5%
biodiesel be blended into diesel fuel.63
Phase 4 is also characterized by policies
addressing ancillary considerations that can be
intertwined with ethanol production, such as promoting
development in rural areas, ensuring the profitability of
smaller sugarcane ethanol farms, and zoning and
environmental considerations. For example, in 2003,
Brazil created the National Programme of Biodiesel
Production (hereinafter “PNPB”) to encourage increased
biodiesel production, especially outside of urban
centers.64 Similarly, in order to preserve small farmers’
profitability, the Ministério de Desenvolvimento Agrário
(“MDA”) created the Selo Combustivel Social, which
promotes business relationships with small ethanol
farmers.65 Additionally, Brazil has recently implemented
an agroecological zoning plan to expand sugarcane
ethanol production, while placing a significant emphasis
on mitigating environmental damage.66
63

Lei No.11.097, de 13 de Janeiro de 2005, (Braz.) (mandating that at
least 5% biofuel by volume be incorporated). The portion of the law
cited has been repealed by Law No. 13.033.
64
See National Program for Production and Use of Biodiesel,
MINISTÉRIO
DE
MINAS
E
ENERGIA,
http://www.mme.gov.br/programas/biodiesel/menu/biodiesel/pnpb.html
(last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (providing that “[s]ince the launch of
PNPB, the private sector is contributing resources, investing in the
distribution of fuel., in laboratories, in research, production of raw
materials, all thanks to the security of the regulatory environment
provided by the regulatory setting goals and creating a legal framework
for biodiesel”).
65
See generally ANDRE CHAGAS ET AL., An Application of Dynamic
Spatial Panels to Municipalities in the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil, in
ENERGY BIO FUELS AND DEVELOPMENT: COMPARING BRAZIL AND THE
UNITED STATES 292 (Edmund Amann et al. eds, 2011); see also
Decreto No. 5297, de 6 de Dezembro de 2004.
66
Marlon Arraes J. Leal, The Agro-ecological Sugarcane Zoning in
Brazil, MINISTÉRIO DE MINAS E ENERGIA (Sept. 16, 2010),
https://www.iea.org/media/bioenergyandb
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In sum, the effectiveness of Brazil’s biofuels
regime can be attributed to its emphasis on all aspects of
ethanol’s production and sale.67
B. History of Biofuel Initiatives
Like Brazil, the U.S. responded to the 1973
foreign oil crisis by enacting legislation to reduce the
nation’s dependence on foreign oil. However, in seeking
to reduce its foreign oil reliance, the U.S. has
traditionally focused more upon reducing the nation’s
overall fuel consumption and less upon increasing
biofuels use. Due to this approach, biofuels have not yet
experienced comparable success in the U.S. Moreover,
though the U.S. has recently taken strides to increase
its biofuels initiatives, these policies have been largely
aimed at reducing production costs for biofuels
producers.
As a response to the sharp spike in oil prices
caused by the crisis, Congress passed the Energy Policy
and Conservation Act of 1975 (“1975 Act”), which
aimed to reformulate U.S. energy initiatives and increase
fuel conservation.68 Notably, the 1975 Act set forth the
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (“CAFE”) standards,
which created fuel economy requirements for American
vehicles. 69 At present, the CAFE standards, requiring
gradual improvements in vehicle efficiency, have played
a key role in reducing fuel consumption in vehicles.70
iofuels/06_arraes.pdf.
67
Sizou Matsuoka, Jesus Ferro & Paulo Arruda, The Brazilian
Experience of Sugarcane Ethanol Industry, IN VITRO CELLULAR &
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY – PLANT 372, 379 (2009).
68
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89
Stat. 871 (1975).
69
Id. at § 301.
70
Virginia McConnell, The New CAFE Standards: Are They Enough
on Their Own?, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 1, 29 (2013),
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Nonetheless, despite their success in increasing vehicle
efficiency, 71 the CAFE standards have not been
correspondingly effective in promoting biofuels. 72 For
instance, one of the shortcomings of the CAFE standards
is that automobile manufacturers have been able to obtain
CAFE credits for selling FFVs in the form of large
vehicles and SUVs that in practice nearly always run on
gasoline.73
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (“1992 Act”) was
the next major legislation targeted at improving the U.S.’s
energy efficiency and increases the authority of the
Department of Energy (“DOE”) to oversee alternative
fuels use and production. 74 The 1992 Act contains
several provisions specifically devised to increase the use
of biofuels and other renewable energy sources. Among
other efforts, the Act creates the Alternative Fuel
Vehicle Program, which incentivizes research that focuses
upon improving engine technology in alternative fuelpowered vehicles.75 The 1992 Act also develops production
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-13-14.pdf (noting that the
“new reformed CAFE rules would require fuel use and CO2 emissions
by light-duty vehicles to fall by close to 40 percent over the next 15
years”).
71
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-921, REFORMING
FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS COULD HELP REDUCE OIL CONSUMPTION
BY CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS, AND OTHER OPTIONS COULD
COMPLEMENT THESE STANDARDS 3 (Aug. 2, 2007).
72
Id. at 5.
73
REPORT TO CONGRESS: EFFECTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE MOTOR FUELS
ACT: CAFE INCENTIVES POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2002), at xii; see also U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-551T, PASSENGER VEHICLE
FUEL ECONOMY: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON
CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS 17 (2007) (noting
that CAFE credits “may be actually increasing oil consumption among
passenger vehicles”).
74
See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776.
75
Id. at § 2023(a)–(c).
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incentives for renewable energy sources and alternative
fuels, including payment for qualified producers.76 More
broadly, the Act reduces tax burdens for renewable
energy projects. 77 Similarly, in order to encourage
innovation, the Act creates the Renewable Energy
Advancement Awards, which provide monetary awards
for innovative projects.78
Among other initiatives established pursuant to
the legislation, DOE’s increased regulatory authority
under the 1992 Act has led to the development of new
programs aimed at improving the viability of biofuels.79
For example, in 1993, in response to its heightened
authority, the DOE created the ‘Clean Cities’ program as
a way to promote the use of alternative fuels in major
cities. 80 As of 2013, the ‘Clean Cities’ program is
estimated to have reduced petroleum usage by 6.5 billion
gallons since its inception.81
More recently, the Energy Policy Act of 2005
(“2005 Act”) reinvigorated attempts 82 to incorporate
76

Id. at § 1212.
Id. at § 1205. Please note that “renewable energy” is not limited to
biofuels, but may encompass other energy forms such as wind and
solar.
78
Id. at § 1204.
79
Key Federal Legislation: Alternative Fuels Data Center, U.S. DEP’T
OF
ENERGY, (Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.afdc.energy.gov/
laws/key_legislation.
80
About Clean Cities, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, (Dec. 10, 2013),
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/cleancities/about.html
(providing that
“DOE created Clean Cities in 1993 to provide informational, technical,
and financial resources to EPAc–regulated fleets and voluntary
adopters of alternative fuels and vehicles”).
81
Clean Cities Goals and Accomplishments, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
(Dec. 10, 2013) http://www1.eere.energy.gov/clea
ncities/ accomplishments.html.
82
See Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE), ENVTL PROT. AGENCY,
(Dec. 12, 2013) www.epa.gov/mtbe/gas.htm. The 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments set forth the Reformulated gasoline (RFG) program,
which demanded an oxygenate requirement for gasoline. However,
77
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alternative fuels. 83 Notably, the 2005 Act created the
Renewable Fuels Standard (“RFS”), which mandates that a
certain volume of ethanol be blended into automobile
gasoline.84 The RFS originally mandated that, by 2012,
7.5 billion gallons of alternative fuels be mixed into
gasoline.85 The Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007 (“EISA”) later expanded upon the 2005 Act’s
provisions by increasing RFS mandates and setting
volume targets for usage of advanced biofuels.86
EISA broadened the scope of the RFS to
expand its application to diesel fuel and demands use
of a variety of advanced biofuels, including cellulosic
biofuel and biomass-based fuels.87 EISA also raises the
RFS mandate to require that 36 billion gallons of
renewable fuels be mixed into gasoline by 2022. 88 The
2013 RFS requires that cellulosic biofuel comprise
0.004% of total U.S. fuels, biomass-based diesel
comprise 1.13% of total fuel, advanced biofuel
comprise 1.62% of total fuel, and renewable fuel
comprise 9.74% of total fuel.89 Largely due to the RFS
upon discovering the toxicity of Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE),
a key oxygenate, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 removed this
requirement and replaced it with the Renewable Fuel Standard. Id.
83
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594
[hereinafter EPA 2005].
84
Id. at § 1501.
85
Id.
86
See Energy Independence and Security of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110140, §202, 121 Stat. 1492 [hereinafter EISA].
87
Id.; See Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.epa.gov/OTA
Q/fuels/ renewablefuels/.
88
EISA § 202.
89
2013 Renewable Fuel Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 49,794 (Aug. 15,
2013) codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80); see also 2012
Renewable Fuels Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 1320 (Jan. 9, 2012) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80). The 2012 Renewable Fuel Standards provide that
there must be 10.45 million gallons of cellulosic biofuel, 1.5 billion
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mandates, ethanol and other biofuels are currently mixed
into roughly 50% of all U.S. gasoline, though most is
mixed at 10% ethanol or lower levels. 90 Nonetheless,
because the vast majority of U.S. vehicles are not
equipped to run on fuel that is comprised of more than
10–15% ethanol without risking significant engine
damage, and thereby encountering what is known as the
“blend-wall,” the RFS’s continued expansion may be
limited.91
In addition, the U.S. has also created a variety of
tax credits in order to help encourage biofuel use.92 For
example, in 2004, the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax
Credit (“VEETC”) was created and fostered the
development and production of biofuels through tax
incentives. 93 The VEETC became one of the major ways
by which the U.S. subsidized ethanol until it expired in
2011. 94 The VEETC provided that, subject to certain
restrictions, ethanol blenders could be “eligible for a tax
gallons of biomass- based diesel, 2.0 billion gallons of advanced
biofuel, and 15.2 billion gallons of renewable fuel. Id.
90
Hazardous Liquid Pipelines Transporting Ethanol, Ethanol Blends,
and other Biofuels, 72 Fed. Reg. 45002 (Aug. 10, 2007) (to be codified
at 49 C.F.R. pt. 452) (stating that “[t]oday, nearly half of all U.S.
gasoline contains some ethanol (mostly blended at the 10 percent level
or lower)”).
91
See EPA Proposes 2014 Renewable Fuel Standards/ Proposal
Seeks Input to Address “E10 Blend Wall,”
Reaffirmed Commitment to Biofuels, ENVTL PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 15,
2013), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf
/bd437 9a92ceceeac8525735900400c27/81c99e6d27c730c
485257c24005eecb0!opendocument.
92
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, § 301, Pub. L. No. 108-357,
§301, 118 Stat. 1418, 1459-63, (2004) [hereinafter Jobs Creation Act].
93
Alternative Fuels Data Center: Expired, Repealed, and Archived
Incentives, U.S. DEP’T. ENERGY, http://www.
afdc.energy.gov/laws/laws_expired.
94
Zachary M. Wallen, Far From A Can of Corn: A Case For
Reforming Ethanol Policy, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 129, 135
(2010).

121

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 274
incentive in the amount of $0.45 per gallon of pure
ethanol . . . blended with gasoline.”95 Costing nearly $6
billion annually, the VEETC garnered widespread
criticism that it did not adequately promote advanced
biofuels and instead unnecessarily incentivized corn
ethanol production.96 Among other incentives,97 further
examples have included the Small Ethanol Producer
Credit, which provided 10 cents per gallon to small
ethanol producers to offset production costs, 98 and the
Biodiesel Tax Credit, which provided a $1.00 per gallon
tax credit to biodiesel producers. 99 Similarly, another
policy that has been proposed includes taxing the
carbon dioxide output on conventional fuels. 100
Nevertheless, many of these initiatives have been
allowed to expire amid considerable backlash. 101
Moreover, in addition to tax credits, there are
working groups and programs already in place 102 that
have been created to promote investment in biofuels

95

Alternative Fuels Data Center, supra note 93.
See e.g., Let the VEETC Expire: Moving Beyond Corn Ethanol
Means Less Waste, Less Pollution and More Jobs, NAT. RES. DEF.
COUNCIL (Aug. 2010), at 1–2 (describing shortcomings of VEETC).
97
See BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RES. SERV., R40110, BIOFUELS
INCENTIVES: A SUMMARY OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS, 1–5 (2012) (listing
biofuels initiatives).
98
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 § 11502, Pub. L. No.
101-508 (1990) [hereinafter Omnibus Act]
99
See Alternative Fuels Data Center, supra note 95 Jobs Creation Act §
302.
100
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-713, BIOFUELS:
DOE LACKS A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO COORDINATE INCREASING
PRODUCTION WITH INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND VEHICLE
NEEDS 22 (2007); see also Phil Izzo, Economists Back Fossil-Fuel Tax
To Spur Alternative Energies, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2007, at A6.
101
YACOBUCCI, supra note 97, at 1.
102
Id. at 2-3.
96
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production.103 For instance, in 2009, the U.S. created the
Biofuels Interagency Working Group to expand and
promote the competitiveness of the biofuels market.104
Likewise, in 2008, the Food, Conservation, and Energy
Act created the Biorefinery Crop Assistance Program
(“BCAP”), which provides financial assistance for
developing biorefineries to produce advanced biofuels.105
BCAP aims to simultaneously help producers transition
to cellulosic energy crop production while promoting
economic development in rural areas. 106 On October
21, 2013, USDA announced that the government would
provide $181 million to help fund these initiatives. 107

103

See e.g., Production Incentive or Cellulosic Biofuels, 74 Fed. Reg.
52,867 (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 452) (providing an example of
additional incentive).
104
Biofuels and Economic Development: Memorandum for the
Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Energy, [and] the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 74 Fed. Reg.
21,531 (May 5, 2009) (proposing that the Working Group shall develop
“the Nation’s first comprehensive biofuel market development
program”).
105
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110246, §9009, 112 Stat. 1651, 2089-93 (2008); see also USD Announces
Availability of Funding to Develop Advanced Biofuels Projects, U.S.
DEP’T
AGRIC.
(Oct.
21,
2013),
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdamediafb?
contentid=2013/10/0195.xml&printable=true&contentidonly=true.
106
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-446, BIOFUELS:
POTENTIAL EFFECTS AND CHALLENGES OF REQUIRED INCREASES IN
PRODUCTION AND USE 48 (2009). (“Under [BCAP], producers would
enter into multiyear contracts with USDA to obtain payments of up to
75 percent of the cost for planting and establishing a perennial energy
crop”).
107
See USDA Announces Availability of Funding to Develop Advanced
Biofuels Projects, supra note 105. There, Tom Vilsack, USDA
Secretary, stated that “benefits [of BCAP] go beyond reducing our
dependence on foreign oil. These biorefineries are also creating lasting
job opportunities in rural America and are boosting the rural economy
as well.” Id.
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Thus, like Brazil, some recent U.S. biofuels policies have
been motivated by dual aims.
In sum, the U.S. has already undertaken a
substantial investment to promote the viability and use of
alternative fuels; a report by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) estimated that from 1979
to 2000, about $11 billion in tax incentives were
employed to promote ethanol fuels.108 However, despite
these expenditures, the policies devised by the U.S. have
not been as effective as those in Brazil.
III. Comparing U.S. AND Brazilian Policies
Despite a number of similarities, the U.S.’s
policies have not been as successful as those in Brazil
because they do not consider consumer-side factors to
the same extent as do Brazil’s policies.109 Consumer-side
initiatives help to create and sustain market demand, and
also encourage private-sector investors to infuse
additional resources into research and development.110
108

Letter from Jim Wells, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Sen. Tom
Harkin (Sept. 25, 2000), at 2, available at http://
www.gao.gov/archive/2000/rc00301r.pdf.
109
CHAGAS E T A L ., supra note 65, at 292; see also Maurício
Antonio Lopes, Agricultural Innovation and Challenges in Promotion
of Knowledge and Information Flows in Agrifood Systems in Brazil,
OECD (2012).
110
CRAIG A. HART, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR:
SCALING UP PRIVATE SECTOR RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2013),
at 82-83; McDermott, et. al., supra note 25. Moreover, as shall be
further discussed, the U.S. has not undertaken sufficient efforts to
ensure that biofuels are accessible, nor has the U.S. forced large oil
companies and car makers to play a role in spearheading technological
and infrastructure changes. For instance, as FFVs have become
increasingly popular in Brazil, car makers, including mainstream
producers Ford and Toyota, have responded by creating a number of
attractive vehicles models and sizes, which has further bolstered the
success of Brazil’s biofuels policies.
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Additionally, the U.S. and Brazil’s policies differ in
their extent; Brazil’s initiatives have been significantly
more stringent and have had a broader application. 111
Nonetheless, as demonstrated by the number of
commonalities between the U.S. and Brazil’s biofuels
policies, increasing biofuels use can be both viable and
sustainable in the U.S.
A. Brazil’s ethanol-blend mandates have nearly
always been more stringent than the U.S.’s
RFS, and biofuels are mixed into a greater
proportion of Brazil’s conventional fuel supply.
First, Brazil’s biofuels policies have had a greater
impact because the nation’s biofuels mandates are
significantly more demanding and are broader in reach
than comparable U.S. policies.
The U.S. and Brazil’s present-day biofuels policies
are facially similar in many regards. Both nations employ
a two-track regime for incorporating biofuels into the fuel
supply: through biofuel-blend requirements in gasoline
and through the sale of FFVs. These policies have both
proven effective in ensuring that biofuels are incorporated
into each nation’s fuel supply112 and guarantee constant
demand for these fuels. 113 Moreover, though Brazil’s
111

Kaylan Lytle, Driving the Market: The Effects on the United States
Ethanol Industry if the Foreign Ethanol Tariff is Lifted, 28 ENERGY L.J.
693, 695–96 (2007).
112
Constanza Valdes, Can Brazil Meet the World’s Growing Need for
Ethanol?, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV. (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/a
mber-waves/2011-december/can-brazil-meet-the-world’s-g
rowing-need-for-ethanol.aspx#.VS_qI86sTS4 (“As in the U.S., support
for consumption of ethanol continues through mandatory blending of
ethanol with gasoline”).
113
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-513, BIOFUELS:
CHALLENGES TO THE
TRANSPORTATION, SALE, AND USE OF

125

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 278
blend requirements have been comparatively more
responsive to supply and price considerations, both the
RFS and Brazil’s blend requirements are periodically
adjusted in response to current needs.114
Nevertheless, Brazil’s blend requirements have
nearly always been more stringent than those mandated by
the RFS. Specifically, while Brazil’s ethanol blendrequirements have demanded that gasoline be comprised
of 11–25% ethanol,115 the RFS has not yet required more
than a 10–15% concentration due to concerns of damaging
older vehicles’ engines. 116 Additionally, Brazil’s blend
requirements extend through a greater proportion of the
nation’s fuel supply than does the RFS. Whereas biofuels
are currently mixed into only about 50% of U.S.
INTERMEDIATE ETHANOL BLENDS (2007), at 2–4; see also Op-Ed,
Ethanol’s Best Kept Secret – The Brazil Mandate, U.S. ENVIROFUELS
LLC (Jan. 9, 2012) (noting that “approximately 50% of Brazil’s motor
fuel supply is ethanol as a direct result of ethanol’s mandated use”).
114
See e.g., Meghan Sapp, Brazil May Boost Ethanol Blends to Offset
Gasoline Imports, BIOFUELS DIGEST (June 27, 2012) (raising the
ethanol blend requirements to reduce gasoline imports). Compare Erin
Voegele, Brazil to Increase Ethanol Blend Level to 25 Percent,
ETHANOL PRODUCER MAG. (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.ethanolpro
ducer.com/articles/9628/brazil-to-increase-ethanol-blend-le
vel-to-25-percent (In 2011, “the 25 percent blend mandate was reduced
to 20 percent due [to] a poor cane harvest. The blend level was
expected to return to 25 percent once sugarcane production recovered”)
with EPA Finalizes Renewable Fuel Standard for 2013; Additional
Adjustments Expected in 2014, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN,
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=12531 (stating that
“[t]he rule sets a 6 million gallon target for cellulosic biofuels use in
2013, less than half the level of the proposed rule issued in February
2013, and far below the 1 billion gallon target specified in the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007”).
115
Jansen, supra note 6, at 24 (discussing the variability in ethanol
blend mandates from 11-25%).
116
E15: Frequently Asked Questions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Dec. 15,
2013, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/fu
els/additive/e15/e15-faq.htm (noting previous gasoline fuels blended at
E10).
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automobile fuel,117 gasoline-only fuels are no longer sold
in Brazil.118
B. Brazil has encouraged car makers to produce
and retail FFVs to a much greater extent, which
has increased FFVs’ popularity with
consumers.
Second, Brazil’s biofuels policies have been more
successful because policymakers have been more
aggressive in encouraging the production and sale of
FFVs and comparable models than has the U.S. While
Brazil has placed immense pressure upon auto makers to
develop FFVs and ethanol-powered vehicles, the U.S. has
focused its initiatives on increasing vehicle fuel
efficiency. As a result, the U.S. auto industry has not been
comparably incentivized to produce FFVs and similar
designs. In order to increase the number of FFVs and
biofuel-operated vehicles on the road, U.S. policymakers
would likely need to impose additional demands on
carmakers to develop engines suitable for these fuels.
Brazil’s strategy has demonstrated efficacy in two
separate instances. First, in the 1980s, Brazil gave the auto
industry targets as to the number of ethanol-powered
vehicles to be retailed, which rapidly increased the sale
of these vehicles. 119 Second, since 2003, Brazil has
117

Pipeline Safety: Hazardous Liquid Pipelines Transporting Ethanol,
Ethanol Blends, and other Biofuels,72 Fed. Reg. 45002 (Aug. 10,
2007).
118
Barros, supra note 10, at 10 (describing fuel offerings as a “75
percent gasoline and 25 percent ethanol blend” as well as a 100 percent
ethanol fuel); see also Statistical Yearbook 2011, AGÊNCIA NACÍONAL
DO PETRÓLEO, GÁS NATURAL E BIOCOMBUSTIVELS Dec. 16, 2013,
http://www.brasil-rounds.gov.br/portugues/anuario_estatisti
co.asp.
119

Cordonnier, supra note 16, at 302.
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strongly incentivized the production and sale of FFVs,
and has looked to the private automobile sector to play a
prominent role in increasing FFVs’ attractiveness and
palatability among consumers. 120 As mentioned in
Section II, FFVs have become extremely popular with
consumers, and automobile manufacturers have created a
variety of car models for customers to choose from. By
utilizing the automobile industry’s ability to redesign and
develop ethanol-powered vehicles as a way to promote
ethanol use, these efforts have helped to further the
viability of Brazil’s biofuels program. 121 In both
instances, Brazil’s efforts to force the automobile industry
to produce ethanol-powered vehicles resulted in a
dramatic increase in their use within a short period of
time, which incidentally also promoted ethanol use.122
In contrast, the U.S.’s policies have not
comparably pressured domestic carmakers to produce
biofuel-powered vehicles, but instead have focused
120

See John Wilkinson, The Emerging Global Biofuels Market, 32
REVIEW (FERNAND BRAUDEL CENTER) 91, 99 (2009); see also See
Kenneth Rapoza, Brazil Auto Makers Drive on the Road to Ethanol,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2008) (“Everyone in Brazil wants a flex-fuel
car,” said Angelo Bressan, a biofuels specialist at the Agriculture
Ministry. “The auto makers here have helps push ethanol forward, but
it’s been the consumers who really made the difference,” he said. “If
these guys don’t make flex-fuel cars, they lose market”).
121
Id.
122
See id. The limited number of FFVs in the road helps to demonstrate
this discrepancy. Compare Flexible Fuel Vehicles: Alterative Fuels
Data
Center,
U.S.
DEP’T
ENERGY,
http://www.afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/flexible_f
uel.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2013) (noting that there are 10.6 million
FFVs in the U.S.), with Table 1-11: Number of
U.S. Aircraft, Vehicles, Vessels, and
Other
Conveyances,
BUREAU TRANSP. STAT., http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/si
tes/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation_statistics/
html/table_01_1 html (last visited Dec. 15, 2013) (providing that, in
2011, there were 253,108,389 registered vehicles in the U.S.)
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more so upon increasing vehicle efficiency. 123
Accordingly, under current U.S. policy, U.S. carmakers
have little incentive to produce FFVs or other biofueloperated vehicles, though the auto industry has
accommodated the government’s demands to design
engines for increased fuel efficiency. 124 The auto
industry’s responsiveness to increased demands for
increased fuel efficiency suggests that a comparable
approach could be effectively employed to increase the
use of biofuels in U.S. vehicles. Thus, to some degree,
the design of today’s vehicles is the product of
choices made by government regulators. For FFVs and
biofuel-powered vehicles to be more widely used, the
U.S. would likely need to devise regulatory initiatives
that demand domestic carmakers produce these
vehicles.125
Consequently,
by
pushing
automobile
manufacturers to produce FFVs and ethanol-powered
vehicles, Brazil has fostered their popularity among
consumers. In contrast, U.S. policymakers have not
comparably demanded that domestic carmakers produce
FFVs or other biofuel-operated vehicles.

123

McConnell, supra note 70, at 29. See also infra Section II.
See Bill Vlasic & Jaclyn Trop, Vehicle Fuel Efficiency Reaches a
High, Nearing Goal for 2016, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2013, at B3. (“The
car companies are under pressure to increase fuel efficiency to meet
strict federal [CAFE] standards”).
125
Moreover, if these vehicles are made more available on the market,
recent studies have indicated that consumers will become increasingly
willing to purchase these vehicles. See Consumer Research: What Do
Consumers Think About Fuel Retailers and the Future?, ASS’N FOR
CONVENIENCE & FUEL RETAILING (2013), http://www.nacs
online.com/YourBusiness/FuelsReports/GasPrices_2013/Pa
ges/What-Do-Consumers-Think.aspx (noting that 46% of consumers
who were considering purchasing a vehicle would consider a non-gas
vehicle; likewise, 55% of consumers would consider purchasing a flexfuel vehicle).
124
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C. While Brazil has mandated ethanol’s sale at
fueling stations, the U.S. has not undertaken
sufficient efforts to ensure that consumers
have access to affordable biofuel blends.
Third, Brazil’s biofuels policies have been more
effective than those of the U.S. because policymakers
have devised initiatives to ensure that biofuel blends are
accessible to consumers. While the Brazilian
government has largely spearheaded efforts to install
ethanol pumps at fueling stations, the U.S. has been more
willing to allow retailers to make this decision. These
differing approaches have caused significant disparities in
the number of ethanol fueling stations in each nation.
Notably, Brazil has installed mandates that
ethanol be retailed at a number of fueling stations since
the 1970s, when it first required that ethanol pumps be
installed at fueling stations;126 currently, nearly all fueling
stations in the nation retail ethanol blends.127 As a result
of these initiatives, Brazilian consumers who own a FFV
or ethanol-powered vehicle are able to readily access and
purchase ethanol fuels. On the contrary, the U.S.’s
policies have not comparably encouraged that ethanol and
other biofuels be accessible at fueling stations. The U.S.
has further hindered this effort by failing to impose
mandates or targets for the sale of biofuels blends.128
Because it is seldom cost-effective to outfit a fueling
station with ethanol fuel due to uncertain financial
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Cordonnier, supra note 16, at 297.
Barros, supra note 10, at 10.
128
Christopher Doering, Ethanol Makers Face Obstacles to Expanding,
USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 2013) (noting that currently, only about 60
fueling stations sell E15, and about 3,200 fueling stations sell E85).
127
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returns, fueling stations are not likely to install ethanol
pumps without government support.129
The U.S. already has explored using tax
incentives through the Alternative Fuel Station Credit,
which subsidized the price of installing biofuel
infrastructure. Yet current initiatives have been largely
insufficient to dramatically increase the number of
alternative fueling stations. 130 Due to a lack of
government initiatives, there are presently only 12,888
fueling stations retailing alternative fuels,131 as compared
to the approximately 160,000 gasoline stations in
operation in the U.S. 132 Due to the weak response to
previous initiatives, the U.S. would likely need to create
additional tax incentives or impose mandates in order to
motivate fueling stations to retail biofuel blends.
Additionally, Brazil has undertaken a much more
active role in promoting ethanol’s sale at fueling stations
by encouraging consumers to purchase ethanol fuel when
it is cost-effective to do so.133 In Brazil, a relatively simple
129

See Michael Hirtzer, Analysis: High-Ethanol Gas – Not Coming to a
Pump
Near
You,
REUTERS
Nov.
27,
2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/27/us-usa-ethanol-e85analysis-idUSBRE9AQ1AU20131127.
130
See EPA 2005 § 1342 (creating the Alternative Fuel Station Credit).
131
Alternative Fuels Data Center, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
http://www.afdc.energy.gov/locator/stations/ (last visited Nov. 23,
2013).
132
Access to Alternative Transportation Fuel Stations Varies Across
the Lower 48 States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 30, 2012),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenerg
y/detail.cfm?id=6050; see GAO-11-513, supra note 113, at 13, 25.
Demonstrating these infrastructure shortcomings, the U.S. mandated
that all government vehicles be transitioned to flexible fuel vehicles
(FFVs), yet has been unable to consistently fuel these vehicles.
133
See David Luhnow & Geraldo Samor, As Brazil Fills Up on
Ethanol, It Weans Off Energy Imports, WALL. ST. J., (Jan. 9, 2006),
available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB113676947533241219.
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ratio is employed as a way to indicate to consumers when
it is cost-effective to purchase ethanol or vice-versa for
their FFVs. 134 Pursuant to this ratio, consumers are
encouraged to purchase ethanol when its cost is 70% of
that of gasoline, and revert to conventional gasoline when
the cost ratio is higher.135
In contrast, in the U.S., the fraction of fueling
stations that do retail higher concentrations of ethanol
often do not adequately promote these blends or price
them competitively. Because biofuels are generally not
sold under the conventional producer’s brand label, these
fuels often do not constitute a major source of revenue
for many large producers.136 Due to limited marketing,
U.S. FFV owners may be unaware of the possible option
of choosing a biofuel blend to fuel their vehicles. 137
Consequently, while Brazil has mandated that
fueling stations retail ethanol blends, the U.S. has not
undertaken comparable initiatives, which has limited
consumer access to biofuels.

134

Barros, supra note 10, at 32-34
Id. (“The 70 percent ratio between ethanol and gasoline prices is the
rule of thumb in determining whether flex car owners will choose to fill
up with ethanol (price ratio below 70 percent) or gasoline (price ratio
above 70 percent)”).
136
GAO-07-713, supra note 100, at 30 (According to representatives
from BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips ExxonMobile, and Shell Oil
Products, “while no stations are prohibited from selling biofuels, none
of the companies offer E85 to their stations as a branded product and
none of the companies offer biodiesel except where required to by state
mandate”).
137
Id.
135
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D While Brazil has carefully monitored the price
of ethanol, the U.S.’s policies are produceroriented and often only indirectly influence the
consumer price of biofuel blends.
Next, Brazil’s policies have been more successful
than those of the U.S. because Brazil has been more
influential in dictating the price of ethanol, which has
enabled it to be cost-competitive in the marketplace.
While Brazil has employed several strategies to ensure
that the price of ethanol remains below that of gasoline,
the U.S.’s policies often only incidentally reduce the
consumer price of biofuel blends. Although the U.S. has
imposed a number of tax credits and other subsidies
targeted at producers, these initiatives generally have
not been directly focused upon lowering the consumer
price of biofuel blends as compared to gasoline. Because
many of the U.S.’s policies have been aimed at reducing
input costs for producers, these policies have fallen short
because they do not adequately push the cost-savings on to
consumers.
As mentioned in Section II, a key reason for
ethanol’s long-term success in Brazil has been its costcompetitiveness with gasoline. 138 While Brazil has
created a variety of producer-oriented incentives, these
policies play a comparatively smaller role within
Brazil’s ethanol framework. Instead, Brazil’s policies
have been focused more so upon improving ethanol’s
viability in the marketplace, and the government has
pursued several different options to ensure that ethanol’s
price remains attractive. 139 For instance, in the 1970s,
the IAA oversaw the price of ethanol; during this time,
ethanol’s price was subsidized so that its cost was 59% of
138
139

See infra Section II.
McDermott, supra note 25, at 163-64.
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that of gasoline.140 The importance of the price subsidy
was demonstrated when its repeal in 1990 brought about a
rapid decline in ethanol use across the country.141 Today,
even though Brazil has not re-installed price subsidies for
ethanol, ethanol’s price relative to gasoline remains
influenced by tax incentives such as the Contribuicao
de Intervencao no Dominio Economico (“CIDE”),
which imposes higher taxes on gasoline than on
ethanol. 142 Consequently, Brazil continues to oversee
the price of ethanol as a way of maintaining its
viability.
Unlike Brazil, the U.S. has not undertaken
comparable efforts to ensure that the consumer price of
biofuels is consistently below that of gasoline. Instead,
the U.S.’s biofuels initiatives are largely produceroriented. For instance, many of the United States’
incentives, such as the Volumetric Excise Tax Credit, the
Small Producer Tax Credit, and the Biodiesel Tax Credit,
are designed to reduce the costs paid by producers, but do
not directly manipulate how these reductions would be
passed on to consumers.143 Moreover, the U.S. has no
140

Brazilian Ethanol and (Some of) It’s Lessons, U. MINN. DEP’T
ECON. (2012), http://www.econ.umn.edu/~schwe2
27/teaching.s12/files/slides/18-ethanol6.pdf (noting ethanol price
ceiling at 59% of gasoline prices).
141
Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 9, at 486. In 1990, the IAA was
disbanded and ethanol’s price was subjected to market forces, which
reduced the fuel’s competitiveness with gasoline.
142
Id. at 483. Currently, the Agencia Nacional do Petroleo is the
primary agency that currently regulates biofuels in Brazil. See Biofuels,
AGENCIA NACIONAL
DO PETROLEO GÁS
NATURAL E
BIOCOMBUSTÍVES (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://www.anp.gov.br/?pg=60467&m=&t1=&t2=&t3=&t4
=&ar=&ps=&cachebust=1387565952900 (describing the ANP’s
involvement in biofuels regulation).
143
See American Job Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 301
(creating the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit which imposed a
51 cents/gallon tax credit for ethanol blenders); Food, Conservation,
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comparable mechanism to ensure that the price of biofuels
remains consistently lower than the price of conventional
fuels.
Unless biofuel blends become more costcompetitive with conventional fuels, consumers will not
be incentivized to purchase these blends. Because
biofuels are associated with reduced fuel economy, their
price must be below that of gasoline to enable these
blends to be competitive.144 Nonetheless, as demonstrated
by the graph below, in the U.S., high-concentration
ethanol blends can often be more expensive than
gasoline.145

and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 15321 (creating the
Credit for Production of Cellulosic Biofuel which imposes a 1.01
dollar/gallon tax credit); American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-357, § 302 (creating the Biodiesel Tax Credit which imposes a
0.50 dollar/gallon credit for biodiesel producers). Notably, however,
these initiatives are aimed at reducing the inputs costs for producers,
yet any price reductions passed on to consumers would be incidental.
144
The Great Ethanol Debate, CONSUMER REPORTS (2011),
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2011/01/thegreat-etha
nol-debate/index.htm (noting that “[e]thanol’s lower fuel economy
results from its lower energy content compared to gasoline”).
145
Fuel Prices: Alternative Fuels Data Center, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY
(Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fue
ls/prices.html. But cf. CLEAN CITIES ALTERNATIVE FUEL PRICE
REPORT, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY 7 (Oct. 2013),(For the month of October,
“[o]n average, E85 is about 41 cents lower in price than regular
gasoline on a per-gallon basis”).
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Therefore, Brazil’s policies have been more
effective because they are targeted at ensuring that
ethanol’s price is competitive for consumers, while the
U.S.’s policies often only indirectly reduce the costs of
biofuel blends in the marketplace.
E. Brazil’s policies incorporate comprehensive
infrastructure supports, while the U.S.’s
initiatives are more modest and rely upon
investment from the private sector to improve
distribution networks.
Additionally, Brazil’s policies have been more
successful than those of the U.S. because Brazil has
focused
comparatively
more
on
creating
accommodations to foster ethanol’s distribution and sale.
While Brazil’s government plays an active role in
overseeing its ethanol distribution networks, the U.S. has
relied to a greater extent upon private sector investments
to devise infrastructure accommodations.
Brazil’s infrastructure initiatives are fairly
expansive and encompass distribution networks
throughout the nation. Specifically, Petrobras, an oil
company controlled by the state, operates nine ethanol
and distribution facilities, which are spread across the
country. 146 Similarly, Transpetro, a quasi-state entity,
oversees a transport system that includes 44 export
terminals and 156 storage facilities to assist in ethanol

146

ILDO SAUER, BIOFUELS IN BRAZIL: SALES AND LOGISTICS 50 (2009)
(providing that “[t]he Petrobras logistics infrastructure plays a key
role in domestic ethanol distribution . . . [t]hrough nationwide
multimode systems, Petrobras ships, stores and distributes fuels all over
Brazil”).
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distribution. 147 Among other supports, governmentfunding initiatives have been used to install ethanol
storage tanks at intermediate locations from distilleries
and at fueling stations.148
In contrast, the U.S.’s infrastructure supports lack
the comprehensive approach evidenced in Brazil’s
policies. The U.S.’s initiatives have often been sporadic
and piecemeal, and much of the assistance provided to
biofuel production facilities occurs through other
avenues.149 For instance, funding to install fuel dispensers
for high-concentration ethanol blends have often been left
to the states and private foundations. 150 Due to the
more limited approach, as the U.S.’s current biofuel
distribution networks reach their capacity, private
investors will likely need to provide funding to expand
these networks.
Nonetheless, despite Brazil’s investment in
infrastructure supports, neither nation has shown an
advantage in reducing biofuel transport costs once the
fuel leaves a distribution facility. Both nations employ
relatively inefficient transport methods, including rail
cars, trucks, and barges to transport biofuels.151 In order
to reduce transport costs, both the U.S. and Brazil have
147

Valdes, supra note 61, at 14. The system helps to transport ethanol
as well as other fuels.
148
Cordonnier, supra note 16, at 297.
149
Joshua A. Blonz, Shalini P. Vajjhala & Elena Safirova, Growing
Complexities: A Cross-Sector Review of U.S. Biofuels Policies and
their
Interactions
31–2
(Dec.
2008),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1368419 (noting that the RFS can increase
private investment in infrastructure).
150
Id. at 28-29.
151
See FRED BOSSELMAN ET. AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 1093 (Robert C. Clark et. al., eds., 3d ed. 2010); see
also Valdes, supra note 112 (noting that “Brazil faces considerable
infrastructure and transportation constraints along its supply chain . . .
[t]he bulk of ethanol is transported from processing plants to collection
centers and then to ports by truck”).
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considered the development of an ethanol pipeline.
While the U.S. has not yet begun funding a pipeline,
Brazil has already begun construction on an ethanol
pipeline, which is scheduled to be completed in 2016.152
Nonetheless, any cost reductions from building a pipeline
would only be realized over the long run,153 and thus,
Brazil’s decision to fund a pipeline may not necessarily
indicate that the U.S. should employ a similar strategy.
Consequently, while neither Brazil nor the U.S.
has an advantage over the other in devising methods to
reduce transport costs, Brazil has undertaken significant
efforts to install ethanol storage tanks and create
distribution centers, while the U.S. has failed to
adequately address many of these infrastructure issues.
F. Although it is viable for Brazil to rely heavily
on a single input, the U.S. has been unable to
replicate these results with policies centered
upon corn ethanol because it lacks a similar
advantage in corn production.
Next, Brazil’s policies have been comparatively
more successful than those of the U.S. because many of
its initiatives are centered upon the nation’s natural
production strengths. Though Brazil was able to achieve
considerable success with sugarcane as the key input
underpinning its biofuels framework because of its ability

152

GAO-07-713, supra note 100, at 6; 49 C.F.R. pt. 452 (stating that
“[a] large pipeline can transport roughly two million barrels of gasoline
a day. By way of comparison, 9,375 large semi-truck tankers are
required to transport two million barrels of product.”). See also Valdes,
supra note 112 (noting the proposal of a Brazilian ethanol pipeline to
be completed by 2016 which will accommodate about 22 billion liters
(doubling current transportation capacity) at about one-third the current
cost of shipping ethanol by truck”).
153
Id.
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to produce a cheap supply of sugarcane ethanol,154 the
U.S. has not been able to obtain similar results by
centering its policies upon the production of corn
ethanol.155
In the U.S., although corn remains the choice input
for ethanol production, its increased cultivation has
resulted in labor and production barriers, and has reduced
the amount of corn available for the food supply. 156
154

Cordonnier, supra note 16, at 311; See also Valdes, supra note 112
(noting that “[t]he rapid expansion in Brazil’s sugarcane production is
the result of a favorable climate, land availability, abundant labor, a
pro-ethanol public policy, and research by public agencies to develop
higher yielding cane varieties and new planting techniques to increase
efficiency”).
155
Christine L. Crago, Madhu Khanna, Jason Barton, Eduardo Giuliani,
& Weber Amaral, Competitiveness of Brazilian Sugarcane Ethanol
Compared to U.S. Corn Ethanol, ENERGY BIOSCIENCES INST. 1, 4
(2010),
http://www.ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/60895/2/crago_costofcorn
andsugarcaneethanol_AAEA.pdf (finding that “on average (for the
2006-2008 period) the domestic production cost of sugarcane ethanol in
Brazil is 24% lower than corn ethanol in the U.S.”).
156
Steven Wallander, Roger Claasses, & Cynthia Nickerson, The
Ethanol Decade: An Expansion of Corn Production, 2000-09, U.S.
DEP’T AGRIC. ECON.
RESEARCH SERV. 1,
3
(2011),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/medi
a/121204/eib79.pdf (stating that “[n]on-ethanol uses of corn have not
increased over the past decade, as greater ethanol production has
captured a larger share of corn production”). See also Colin Carter,
Gordon Rausser, & Aaron Smith, The Effect of the U.S. Ethanol
Mandate on Corn Oil Prices, U.C. DAVIS, DEP’T OF AGRIC. &
RESEARCH ECON. 1, 1-3 (2011), http://www.ourenergypol
icy/org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/The-Effect-oftheUS-E
thanol-Mandate-on-corn-prices-.pdf (noting that U.S. energy policy
now mandates that about 15 percent of global corn production to be
converted into ethanol for use); C. Matthew Rendleman & Hosein
Shapouri, New Technologies in Ethanol Production, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.
(2007), at i (stating that “the fraction of annual U.S. corn production
used to make ethanol rose from around 1 percent in 1980 to around 20
percent in 2006”); Timothy A. Wise, The Cost to Developing Countries
of U.S. Corn Ethanol Expansion, 5 (Global Dev. & Envt’l Inst.,
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Because the U.S. will increasingly need to source corn from
multiple inputs to meet demand without further
encroaching upon the corn crop, 157 Brazil’s narrower
policy focus upon a single feedstock does not constitute a
viable approach for the U.S. Due to production barriers
associated with corn ethanol, the U.S. would likely need
to diversify its sources in order to expand biofuel
production significantly. For that reason, this is an aspect
where Brazil’s policies would provide only limited
guidance for the U.S.
In order to help foster the long-run sustainability
and cost-competitiveness of biofuels, the U.S. likely
must rely upon advanced biofuels to a much greater
degree than Brazil has.158 Advanced biofuels can come
from a variety of natural sources. For instance, cellulosic
feedstocks include “corn stover, switchgrass, poplar trees,
and any other raw material composed primarily of
cellulose.”159 Title XV of the Energy Policy Act of 1992
defines cellulosic biomass ethanol as ethanol “derived
from any lignocellulosic or hemicellulosic matter”
obtained from a renewable source, including wood,
plants, grasses, fibers, and animals and other
wastes.160 Additionally, Executive Order 13134 defines
renewable biomass as “any organic matter that is
Working Paper No. 1202, 2012) (noting that the poor are strained by
increasing agricultural commodity price).
157
CONG. RES. SERV., RL33928, ETHANOL AND
BIOFUELS:
AGRICULTURE, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND MARKET
CONSTRAINTS
RELATED TO EXPANDED PRODUCTION 3, 8 (2007) (describing
agricultural and infrastructure barriers to expanded corn ethanol
production).
158
See generally Blonz, et. al., supra note 149 (describing mechanisms
to reduce costs).
159
See generally Wallace E. Tyner, The U.S. Ethanol and Biofuels
Boom: Its Origins, Current Status, and Future Prospects, 58
BIOSCIENCE 646, 649 (2008).
160
Energy Policy Act § (o)(1)(A)(i)-(viii) (2005).
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available on a renewable or recurring basis.” 161
Similarly, another promising alternative fuel for use in
vehicles is biobutanol, a corn-based isobutanol, which
can also be cheaper to produce than either corn-based or
cellulosic ethanol.162
Nevertheless,
there
remains
considerable
uncertainty as to advanced biofuels’ viability as an
adequate replacement. 163 Advanced biofuels are often
characterized by significant technological barriers and
can be more expensive to produce than corn ethanol.164
For instance, cellulosic ethanol often has high production
costs, 165 and there remain several technical challenges
hindering its commercial viability, including reducing the
costs of converting biomass into fermentable sugars.166
Consequently, the U.S.’s policies have been less
effective than those in Brazil because the U.S. lacks a
161

Exec. Order No. 13,134, 64 Fed. Reg. 44,639 (Aug. 16, 1999); see
also Energy Policy Act § 1512(4)(B) (2005).
162
See generally Timothy A. Slating & Jay P. Kesan, A Legal Analysis
of the Effects of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2) and Clean Air
Act on the Commercialization of Biobutanol as a Transportation Fuel
in the United States, 4 GCB BIOENERGY 107, 107 (2012).
163
See generally Jay J. Cheng & Govinda R. Timilsina, Advanced
Biofuels Technologies: Status and Barriers (Pol’y Research Working
Paper
No.
5411,
2010),
available
at
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/
1813-9450-5411.
164
Replacing the Whole Barrel to Reduce U.S. Dependence on Oil,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
ENERGY
1,
11
(2013),
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/bioenergy/pdfs/replacing_barrel_overvie
w.pdf (“Federal investment can significantly accelerate progress in
bringing these hydrocarbon biofuels to market”).
165
Manuel B. Sainz, Commercial Cellulosic Ethanol: The Role of
Plant-Expressed Enzymes, 45 In VITRO CELLULAR & DEVELOPMENTAL
BIOLOGY-PLANT 314, 315 (2009) (noting that “[t]he major economic
barrier to viable commercial ethanol production are high production
costs, estimated to be between US$102 and 123 per barrel or more than
US$2.50 per gallon”).
166
Id.
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comparable production advantage in producing corn
ethanol, though the nation’s policies have traditionally
emphasized its production.
G. Brazil has played a much more directive role
in shaping the biofuels industry, while the U.S.
has enabled producers to dictate the market’s
development.
Brazil’s biofuels policies have proven more
sustainable because its government has been aggressive in
influencing the ethanol industry’s formation over time.167
In contrast, the U.S.’s policies have often granted
deference to producers to dictate their supply chain,
biofuel retail prices, and related factors.168 To maintain
biofuels’ long-run feasibility, the U . S . would likely need
to become more engaged through the entire production and
sale process.
Though Brazil has also created legislation aimed at
reducing input costs for producers,169 the U.S.’s policies
have been more deferential to producers and market
participants than Brazil’s policies. Many of the U.S.’s
initiatives are characterized by a more moderate, marketoriented approach. This disparity is likely a consequence

167

See Cordonnier, supra note 16, at 317 (describing the relationship
between the Brazilian government and the market).
168
See e.g., What Happened to Biofuels? ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quar
terly/21584452-energy-technology-making-large-amountsfuel-organic-matter-has-proved-be?fsrc=scn/tw_ec/what_ha
ppened_to_biofuels_ (noting the role of the market in biofuels
projects); USDA Accomplishments 2009-2012, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
http://www.usda.gov/documents/Result
s-Energy.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2013) (outlining a number of biofuel
initiatives).
169
Id.
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of differing government structures;170 while Brazil had in
place a military dictatorship for many of the years at
the beginning of Pró-Álcool, 171 the U.S.’s policies are
created through a democracy.
Additionally, Brazil’s policies have been
especially comprehensive from their inception, which has
enabled the country to play a greater role in shaping the
industry. For instance, from the outset of Pró-Álcool, the
government oversaw numerous production factors,
including influencing where ethanol production facilities
should be located geographically, 172 and was instrumental
in fostering the redevelopment of idle sugar distilleries
and the creation of new ethanol production facilities.173
Currently, in addition to instilling production mandates,
the government also plays a key role in overseeing
ethanol distribution networks and spearheading reforms
in the market. On the consumer side, Brazil has been
assertive in demanding measures to help instill consumer
confidence in biofuels through mandatory labeling and
quality control at fueling stations.174 By overseeing nearly
every facet of ethanol’s production and sale, Brazil has
been able to safeguard ethanol’s viability.
On the contrary, the U.S.’s policies often do
not provide significant oversight of the entire
production process. For instance, the Small Ethanol
Producer Credit and the Biodiesel Tax Credit are
limited in focus upon reducing input costs for
producers, yet do not provide extensive guidance as to

170

See Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 9, at 496 (noting that Brazil’s
aggressive initiatives during the early years of Pró-Álcool were made
possible by Brazil’s military dictatorship).
171
Id.
172
Decreto No. 76.593 (1975), art. 3.
173
Cordonnier, supra note 16, at 298.
174
Id. at 297.
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how these funds must be spent. 175 Similarly, the
VEETC has been heavily criticized for not being
sufficiently targeted to its ultimate goal, but was instead
though to be subsidizing the efforts of wealthy oil
companies.176
Consequently, the success of some of the U.S.’s
biofuels policies has been hampered because they have
not been sufficiently directive to ensure that policymakers’
intended outcomes are achieved.

175

See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 11502 (1998); Job
Creation Act § 302 (2004).
176
See Let the VEETC Expire, supra note 96.
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H. Brazil’s ethanol policies have been more
sustainable because many of these initiatives
are motivated by dual aims, though the U.S.’s
biofuels policies have recently incorporated
ancillary goals.
Lastly, Brazil’s ethanol framework has been viable
over time because many of its policies incorporate
ancillary goals, such as economic revitalization, which
helps sustain support for these programs. In contrast,
many of the U.S.’s biofuels policies have traditionally
been narrower in focus, which has limited their long-run
application. However, recent initiatives such as the
Biorefinery Crop Assistance Program (“BCAP”) and the
Rural Energy for America Program (“REAP”) suggest
increasing willingness of the U.S. to incorporate dual
aims in its policies, which could help to promote the
longevity of these biofuels initiatives.177
As demonstrated in Brazil, biofuels initiatives
are often linked with other national issues, such as redeveloping low-income areas. For instance, during the
early years of Pró-Álcool, the Commission and later, the
Council, helped determine where ethanol production
facilities should be located in an attempt to reduce
regional income disparities.178 Likewise, Brazil provided
funding and created projects that helped to promote
ethanol production in poor crop areas.179 More recently,
Brazil has undertaken efforts to promote the viability of
biodiesel and other crops as a way to spur economic
177

See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 110246, §9003, 122 Stat. 1651, 2012 (2008) (codified at 7 U.S.C. 8103
(2012)); Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 110246, §9007, 122 Stat. 1651, 2007 (2008) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §8107
(2012)).
178
See Decreto No. 76.593, de 14 de Novembro de 1975, DIARIO
OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 14.11.1975 (Braz.) (1975), art. 3.
179
Id., at Art. 5(b) § 1.
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development in rural areas.180 By linking two or more
initiatives, Brazil simultaneously increased its GDP and
promoted the success of its biofuels program.181
In contrast, many of the U.S.’s biofuels initiatives
reflect a narrower focus by only incentivizing a single
factor, resulting in reduced support for these initiatives
over the long- term. For instance, programs devised to
reduce costs for producers have been met with widespread
criticism that this funding has not been appropriately
distributed and is sometimes provided directly to large
producers.182 Nevertheless, this trend may be changing.
The U .S.’s most recent biofuel policies employ more
targeted metrics, such as increasing economic
development in the Midwest and rural areas and ensuring
the profitability of smaller producers and businesses,
which can help the nation achieve multiple goals
concomitantly. 183 Accordingly, the U.S.’s biofuels
policies may become more sustainable as dual goals are
more readily incorporated—a move which could render
these initiatives less partisan and divisive.
Overall, Brazil has been more effective than the
U.S. at incorporating market forces and consumer
preferences into its biofuels policies. Though the U.S.
and Brazil share similar motivations for reducing their
180

Programa Nacional de Producao e uso do Biodiesel, MINISTERIO DE
MINAS E ENERGIA, supra note 64.
181
See Valdez, supra note 61, at 4.
182
See Let the VEETC Expire, supra note 96, at 4 (“If the VEETC is
allowed to expire, taxpayers will save money and big oil companies
won’t get paid to consume a few billion gallons more of corn ethanol
we don’t need”).
183
See e.g., Rural Energy for America Program Renewable Energy
Systems & Energy Efficiency Improvement Loans & Grants Program
101, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.rd.us
da.gov/programs-services/rural-energy-for-america-progra
m-renewable-energy-systems-energy efficiency (last visited Mar. 8,
2015).
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consumption of foreign oil, Brazil’s comprehensive
approach spearheaded the long-run viability of its biofuel
policies.184
IV. Recommendations
In order to better integrate biofuels into the U.S.
energy framework, the U.S. must take more directive
action to shape how the industry forms over time.
Though promoting the sustainability of biofuels requires
a comprehensive approach, several considerations require
specific attention:
A. The U.S. should work to more effectively
promote private competition within the biofuel
industry in order to expand the competitiveness
of advanced biofuels.
Due to increased government support, some
corporate entities already show interest in increasing
research and investment in advanced biofuels.185 While
early signs have been encouraging, the U.S. should
introduce further initiatives aimed at promoting the
entrance of new corporate players into the biofuels
market; this will spur technological innovation and
184

Wilkinson, supra note 120 (“Comprehensive regulation ensured the
attractiveness of this option at a time when the Brazilian automobile
market was largely self-sufficient and protected from imports”).
185
USDA Putting Big Money Into Advanced Biofuels, Business Wire,
Oct.
1,
2013,
available
at
http://www.bloomberg.com/bb/newsarchive/abgSiOn1MN5M.html.
There, Paul Watson of Green Technology Solutions, Inc. noted that
“[t]he USDA’s payment program is an extremely positive sign that the
need for an alternative fuel source is being taken seriously. . . . It
should be encouraging to [the company’s] investors and Americans in
general that our government is putting its money where its mouth is
when it comes to advanced biofuels.”
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lower input prices, which may ultimately reduce prices for
consumers.186
Because the biofuels industry is young and
developing, new and transitioning producers can play a
key role in shaping the future of renewable energy.
Pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Section
1501(a), the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
conducts market saturation studies for the ethanol
industry.187 In its 2013 study, the FTC determined that
“[t]he level of concentration and the large number of
market participants in the U.S. ethanol production industry
suggests that exercise of market power to set prices or
coordination on prices or output levels is unlikely.”188 In
light of this malleability and relative ease of entry, U.S.
policymakers should incentivize interested fuel producers
186

Today in Energy: Ethanol Producers Respond to Market
Conditions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=1031
(discussing the relationship between profit margins, production,
consumption and prices of ethanol). As mentioned in Section II, the
creation of the Biofuels Interagency Working Group suggests that some
efforts at these initiatives have already begun. See infra Section II.
187
Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1501(a), 42 U.S.C. 7545.
188
2013 Report on Ethanol Market Concentration, FED.
TRADE COMM. (2013), available at https:/
/www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2013-fe
deral-trade-commission-report-Congress-ethanol-market co
ncentration-november-2013/2013ethanolreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 8,
2015); see 2012 Report on Ethanol Market Concentration, FED.
TRADE
COMM.
(2012),
available
athttps://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2012federal-trade-commission-report-Congress-ethanol-marketconcentration/2012ethanolreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2015); see
also Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin and Daniela Helena Godoy,
International Trade Regulatory Challenge for Brazil and Some Lessons
from the Promotion of Ethanol 1, 29 (2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2207894 (discussing mobilization of the
private sector) (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
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of all sizes to enter the market, thereby promoting
heightened competition within the biofuels industry.
Nonetheless, new producers will not be motivated
to enter the biofuels industry unless it is profitable.
Although the outcome of tax incentives has not been
heavily studied, a study by the Food and Agriculture
Policy Research Institute found that ethanol production
would likely decline by nearly 80% if it were not
incentivized. 189 In order to entice producers to enter the
biofuels industry, the U.S. should devise subsidies or tax
credits that provide additional benefits to new or
converted alternative fuel producers, thereby shifting the
focus of current initiatives away from subsidizing
existing biofuel producers and instead to increasing
market competition. Moreover, the U.S. should also
strengthen conversion incentives for farmers seeking to
convert their crop to biofuel production, a move
increasing access to arable lands.
Consequently, as a way to spur innovation within
the industry, tax incentives should be specifically aimed
at encouraging the entry of new producers and corporate
entities into the biofuels market.
B. The U.S. should promote biofuels’ costcompetitiveness and develop a price-ratio
formula
to
help
ensure
the
pricecompetitiveness of biofuels.
Consumer demand for biofuel is generally
surmised to be perfectly or almost-perfectly elastic. 190

189

BRENT D. YACCOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33290, FUEL
ETHANOL: BACKGROUND AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES, at 12 (2008)
(noting possible production decline of up to 80% without exemption).
190
John Cobb, Mitigating the Unintended Consequences of Biofuel Tax
Credits, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 451, 458

149

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 302
Therefore, consumers’ willingness to purchase biofuel
blends is a direct function of its price as compared to
that of gasoline. 191 Although strongly incentivizing the
use of alternative fuels is imperative to sustain consumer
demand, the burden must ultimately be placed on
producers and private investors to engage in research
and development initiatives that will help to mitigate the
price differential, as well as to design vehicles that can
use these fuels more effectively.
However, in the interim, one way to promote the
cost-competitiveness of alternative fuels is through
creating a price-ratio formula that ensures that biofuels
prices remain consistently below gasoline prices.
Pursuant to this price-ratio formula, ethanol or a
comparable blend would be subsidized so that its cost
would be fixed to a certain proportion below that of
conventional fuels. Though this may artificially reduce
the price of biofuels for consumers, lowering the costs
below that of gasoline is necessary to offset the loss of
fuel economy associated with these blends. In this way,
consumers whose vehicles can run on a biofuel blend will
not be incentivized to instead choose a conventional fuel.

(2012) (providing that “in the long term consumers and motor vehicle
fuel suppliers are likely to be relatively indifferent between relying on
gasoline and biofuels. Therefore, the long-term demand for biofuels is
likely quite elastic, at least in ranges where it is priced competitively
with gasoline.”).
191
Id. See generally Robert Z. Lawrence, How Good Politics Results in
Bad Policy: The Case of Biofuel Mandates (Harv. Kennedy School
Faculty Research, Working Paper, RWP10-044, 2010) (providing that
ethanol use is also correlated to oil prices; if oil prices drop
substantially, this could impair effort to convert to ethanol in the
absence of stringent federal requirements).
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C. The U.S. should mandate that a certain number
of FFVs are sold in the nation per year.
Like Brazil, the U.S. could require that a certain
number of ethanol-powered vehicles or FFVs be sold
annually, or strongly promote their sale. FFVs are already
available for sale in the U.S., though accessibility, price,
and access to fueling stations remain impediments to
their widespread use.192 By requiring flex-fuel engines on
a number of new vehicles, many of the barriers hindering
the expansion of alternative energy shall be reduced, and
mass-production and geographic dispersion will increase
their affordability and accessibility. 193 Specifically, the
U.S. government, which already owns a large stake in the
auto industry, should heavily incentivize domestic
automobile makers to increase efforts to re-design
vehicles that can more effectively operate on biofuels.194
These initiatives could be tied into existing policies
targeting the ailing domestic automobile industry and
could be viewed as an additional way for the auto industry
to adapt and become more competitive with foreign
manufacturers.195
192

See GAO-09-446, supra note 106, at 122 (comparing ethanol
transport costs as 13 to 18 cents per gallon as compared to 3 to 5 cents
per gallon of gasoline).
193
See Lytle, supra note 111, at 694–95.
194
See Examining the State of the Domestic Automobile Industry:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
110th Cong. 2nd Sess. 1–3 (Nov. 18, 2008) (statement of Chairman
Christopher J. Dodd) (stating that “the Big Three [auto manufacturers] .
. . . derided hybrid vehicles as making ‘no economic sense.’ They have
dismissed the threat of global warming, the role played by their
products in creating it, and the strong desire of the American people to
do something to stop it. The prices of GM and Ford shares have
declined steadily and have now reached historic lows. In short, the auto
makers have failed to adapt to change . . .”).
195
Remarks on the United States Automobile Industry, 2009 Daily
Comp. Pres. Doc. 738 (Jun. 1, 2009) (There, President Obama stated
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Similarly,
an
important—albeit somewhat
ancillary— consideration is meeting consumer demand
by providing a greater selection of attractive biofuelpowered vehicles to choose from. Correspondingly,
adequate consumer demand will incentivize automobile
manufacturers to respond by creating new models that
appeal to consumers. 196 In Brazil, FFVs have grown
extensively in popularity, 197 and as of 2010, there
were 59 models of FFVs produced by 9 different auto
manufacturers.198 Thus, as demonstrated by their success
in Brazil, FFVs need not necessarily restrict a consumer’s
ability to purchase a vehicle that suits his or her tastes.
Especially in light of the current technological
barriers associated with the “blend wall,’ relying
predominately upon the RFS is likely to be insufficient
to dramatically increase use of biofuels. 199 Therefore,
developing targets or incentivizing the sale of FFVs may
be yet another way to improve the cost-competitiveness
of
biofuels,
while
simultaneously encouraging

that “I decided [] that if GM and Chrysler and their stakeholders were
willing to sacrifice for their companies’ survival and success, if they
were willing to take the difficult but necessary steps to restructure and
make themselves stronger, leaner, and more competitive, then the
United States Government would stand behind them”). Accordingly,
pushing the industry to redevelop vehicles that can more effectively
operate on biofuels could be a way to simultaneously help to promote
the revitalization and competitiveness of the domestic auto industry.
196
See Id.
197
See Wilkinson, supra note 120, at 99-100 (discussing Brazil’s
ethanol policy, the author notes that the turning point occurred when
FFVs were introduced, “which in the five years since 2003 have soared
from zero to over 80% of total car sales.” One notable factor is that
“differently from the previous ethanol program, choice of fuel can now
be made at the petrol pump and not, more irrevocably, at the moment of
purchase”).
198
McDermott et al., supra note 25.
199
Blonz, Vejjhala, & Safirova, supra note 149.
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innovation within the domestic automobile industry.200 By
giving customers the ability to decide which fuel to use
depending upon the relative price of ethanol compared to
gasoline, FFVs can support consumer preferences while
reducing gasoline consumption.201
D. The U.S. should work to increase consumer
awareness of biofuels.
Due to limited marketing initiatives, U.S.
consumers often lack awareness of the option to purchase
biofuels or biofuel-powered vehicles. 202 One way to
promote consumer awareness of alternative fuels is to
require oil producers and retailers to sell biofuel
blends alongside conventional gasoline products and
market these products comparably. Furthermore,
policymakers could demand that a certain fixed
percentage of a large fuel company’s revenue or total
sales be derived from retailing biofuel blends, and impose
penalties if these targets are not met.
Coupled with increased marketing efforts, large
oil producers, which also own a significant number of
fueling stations in the U.S., should be required to
employ initiatives that will help to prevent consumers

200

GAO-07-713, supra note 100, at 7.
See McDermott et al., supra note 25.
202
Amanda Peterka, Survey Shows Low Consumer Awareness of E15,
GOVERNORS’
BIOFUELS
COALITION
(2013),
http://www.governorsbiofuelscoalition.org/?p=631
9 (citing a 2012 study by the National Association of Convenience
Stores). Pursuant to the study, “[o]nly 26 percent of surveyed fuel
consumers were aware of E15. After survey takers described E15 to
consumers, 59 percent, or three out of five consumers, said they would
consider purchasing the fuel if it were the same price as gasoline. Three
out of five of those consumers, though, had primary vehicles with
model years for which it’s illegal to fuel up with E15.”
201
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from “ misfueling” their vehicles. 203 Correspondingly,
stringent labeling requirements should be imposed at
fueling stations in order to help avoid damage to older
vehicles that cannot operate on higher biofuel
concentrations.204 Though some efforts at mandating the
use of these labels to prevent “misfueling” are already
underway, these policies will become increasingly
important as a variety of different biofuel blends begin
to appear on the market.205 Even more, further labeling
requirements may have the ancillary effect of promoting
consumer awareness of, and likely consumer interest in,
biofuels.
E. The U.S. should bolster infrastructure
supports and expand geographic locations of
biofuel production facilities.
Currently, most U.S. biofuel production is
concentrated in the Midwest and is undertaken by a small
number of producers, which has reduced its efficacy
and viability outside of the region. 206 Because the
203

See GAO-11-513, supra note 113, at 30 (“Because the EPA has only
allowed E15 for use in model year 2001 and new automobiles,
representatives from several industry associations stated that consumers
may not be aware of the distinction between approved and unapproved
engines, or they may be confused about which fuel to use”); see also
Automobile Fuel Ratings, Certification and Posting, 75 Fed. Reg.
12,470 (Mar. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 306) (proposing
labeling for ethanol blends as a way to reduce consumer confusion).
204
GAO-11-513, supra note 113, at 30.
205
Id. Because only a small percentage of U.S. cars are currently
powered predominately by biofuels, this initiative will need to be
developed concomitant to other policies, such as increasing the number
of FFVs or predominately
ethanol-powered vehicles on the road.
206
Annette Hester, A Strategy Brief on U.S. Ethanol Markets and
Policies, CENTRE FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION 1, 2 (2007)
(stating that “data from the Renewable Fuels Association shows that
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transport expenses for ethanol and other biofuels are
relatively costly, incentivizing the development of new
biofuel production facilities on the East and West Coasts,
where a significant number of potential consumers
reside, will help to reduce biofuels’ price- markup over
conventional fuels.207 Since high transport costs have been
a major factor reducing the cost-competitiveness of
biofuels, 208 increasing geographic dispersion of
production facilities, and thereby reducing the distances
traveled, will help to lower these costs until reducedcost transport options become available.
In order to intertwine this initiative with promoting
economic development in rural areas, these biofuel
production facilities could be located in rural locations
on the Coasts, such as in South Carolina and Oregon.
Moreover, expanding ethanol production facilities
geographically can also help to buffer supply shocks
caused by unfavorable weather conditions that sharply
diminish the fuel crop. 209 Therefore, as the industry
expands, increasing geographic dispersion of biofuel
production facilities need not necessarily detract from
the initiatives focused upon promoting growth of the
biofuels industry in the Midwest, and can help to spur
economic growth in other areas.
Simultaneously, policymakers should strive to
foster increased trade relationships between the U.S. and
Brazil, as well as with other international producers, to
the top ten producers account for almost 50% of total production.
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) alone accounts for 20% of this
capacity”).
207
See BOSSELMAN ET. AL., supra note 151, at 1093.
208
Id.
209
See Joseph Cooper, Agricultural Commodity Support and Biofuels
Policy,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUT.
(July
18,
2011),
http://www.rff.org/Publications/WPC/Pages/Agricultural-CommoditySupport-and-Biofuels-Policy.aspx (noting the problems associated with
price shocks).
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help prevent crises during times of shortage.210 Although
the U.S. has begun importing biofuels from other
nations, policymakers remain cautious due to concerns
over protecting the nascent biofuel industry.
Nevertheless, as biofuels are progressively incorporated
into
the
nation’s
energy
framework,
this
interdependence will become more important and can
serve as another way to help reduce the nation’s
dependence on foreign oil.
Furthermore, as demonstrated recently, forging a
stronger relationship with ethanol-producing nations
need not exclusively result in increased imports into the
U.S. For instance, in 2011, Brazil was faced with a sharp
decline in sugarcane ethanol availability. However, Brazil
maintained its relatively high ethanol blend requirement,
and was unable to produce enough ethanol to meet
demand.211 As a result, Brazil chose to import ethanol
from the U.S., even though ethanol produced in the
U.S. is typically more expensive than Brazil’s
sugarcane ethanol. 212 Consequently, strengthening trade
relationships for alternative fuels need not be one-sided,
and may ultimately benefit the U.S.

210

See Energy Analysis: International Trade of Biofuels, NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEP’T ENERGY (2013) (describing
biofuels trade).
211
See Isis Almeida & Tony Dreibus, Brazil to Become Net Importer of
U.S. Ethanol, Czarnikow Says, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 22,
2011, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-22/brazil-to-become-netimporter-of-u-s-ethanol-czarnikow-says.html.
212
Id.
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F. The U.S. should increase the regulatory
authority of its agencies to play an active role in
overseeing the nation’s biofuels initiatives.
As demonstrated by the success of DOE’s Clean
Energy Program, enabling government agencies to play a
much more directive role can help to ensure that current
funding initiatives are effective at increasing biofuels’
viability. 213 Accordingly, federal agencies such as EPA
and USDA should undertake a more active approach to
ensure that the aims of these programs and funding
initiatives are met.214 For example, because USDA has
already begun undertaking a substantial investment
through the Advanced Biofuel Payment Program,

213

See Clean Cities Goals, supra note 81. The DOE has a number of
successful biofuel programs, which demonstrates that a more active
role by federal agencies can be viable and need not encroach upon the
authority of producers. For instance, DOE has created almost 100
“Clean Cities Coalitions,” which help to promote biofuels on a local
level. See Coalitions, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/cleancities/coalitions.html
Similarly,
pursuant to the “Clean Cities National Parks Initiative,” DOE works
with national parks to increase use of biofuel-powered vehicles in
parks. See Clean Cities National Parks Initiative, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY
(Dec. 17, 2013) http://www1.eere.energy.gov/cleancities/na
tional_parks.html. Although these and similar initiatives by DOE have
been largely successful, additional agencies could devise additional
biofuel programs without overlapping upon DOE’s authority.
214
See id. Expanding upon previous efforts, agencies could work more
closely with local governments to convert public transportation and
other city machinery to operate on biofuel blends, especially in cities
that lack sufficient funding to foster this transition. Agencies could
also help to promote consumer awareness of biofuels through
partnerships with local organizations and community groups.
Moreover, agencies could take a much more active role in ensuring that
biofuel pumps are installed at fueling stations by working with station
operators to help ensure that appropriate infrastructure supports, such
as storage tanks, are available.
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engaging in additional oversight of the biofuels industry is
merely another way to help ensure its efficacy.215
Currently, federal agencies employ many efforts
that are reactive and research-oriented, while enabling
producers to shape the biofuels market. For instance,
USDA employees presently analyze market data for
biofuel feedstocks and other inputs, and they conduct
some outreach and educational initiative.216 Nonetheless,
in tandem with existing initiatives, USDA could influence
the market by helping to link retailers with suppliers.
USDA could engage in additional oversight over
producers as well. Although USDA has already begun
some of these efforts, by bolstering these initiatives, the
agency can ensure that federal funds are effectively
utilized.217
Instead of continuing to allow the biofuels
market to be producer-led, increasing the authority of
federal agencies can help to promote biofuels’ long-run
viability. Because the U.S. has already undertaken a
significant investment to support biofuels cultivation
through payments programs and conversion incentives,

215

USDA Announces Support for Producers of Advanced Biofuel, U.S.
DEP’T
AGRIC.
(Sept.
12,
2013),
http://usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=2013/09/0177.xm
l. There, USDA notes that the payments are part of its efforts to
“support the research, investment and infrastructure necessary to build
a strong biofuels industry that creates job and broadens the range of
feedstocks used to promote renewable fuel.” Accordingly, enabling
agencies to play a more directive role in shaping the industry will help
to ensure that these aims are achieved.
216
Biofuel Feedstock & Coproduct Market Data, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.
ECON.
RES.
SERV.
(Dec.
17,
2013),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/bioenergy/bi
ofuel-feedstock-coproduct-market-data.aspx.
217
See e.g., Rural Development: Technical Assistance, U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC., (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.rurdev.usda.g
ov/Subject_RD (outlining technical assistance endeavors).
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granting federal agencies increased regulatory authority
may help to increase the efficacy of these initiatives.
V. Conclusion
To conclude, Brazil’s ethanol framework
demonstrates that increased use of ethanol and similar
biofuels can be a viable route for nations seeking to
reduce their reliance on foreign oil. As in Brazil,
gasoline and alternative fuels can be simultaneously
utilized to propel the U.S.’s automobiles and machinery.
In this transition, the U.S. must shift the thrust of its
policies from production-side factors to promoting
consumer and market demand for biofuels. Thus, perhaps
Brazil’s largest contribution to renewable energy is to
foster awareness that a number of elements determine
whether an alternative fuels policy will be viable, yet
nonetheless demonstrates that the increased use of biofuels
can be a sustainable option for the U.S.
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS EXPLANATION
COMPARING U.S. AND BRAZILIAN POLICIES
1.

Brazil’s ethanol-blend mandates have nearly
always been more stringent than the U.S.’s RFS,
and biofuels are mixed into a greater
proportion of Brazil’s conventional fuel supply.

2.

Brazil has encouraged carmakers to produce and
retail FFVs to much greater extent, which has
increased FFVs’ popularity with consumers.

3.

While Brazil has mandated ethanol’s sale at
fueling stations, the U.S. has not undertaken
sufficient efforts to ensure that consumers have
access to biofuel blends.

4.

While Brazil has carefully monitored the price of
ethanol, the U.S.’s policies are producer-oriented
and often only indirectly influence the consumer
price of affordable biofuel blends.

5.

Brazil’s policies incorporate comprehensive
infrastructure supports, while the U.S.’s initiatives
are more modest and rely upon investment from
the private sector to improve distribution
networks.

6.

Though it is viable for Brazil to rely heavily on a
single input, the U.S. has been unable to replicate
these results with policies centered upon corn
ethanol because it lacks a similar advantage in
corn production.
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7.

Brazil has played a much more directive role in
shaping the biofuels industry, while the U.S. has
enabled producers to dictate the market’s
development.

8.

Brazil’s ethanol policies have been more
sustainable because many of these initiatives are
motivated by dual aims, though the U.S.’s
biofuels policies have recently incorporated
ancillary goals.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1.

The U.S. should work to more effectively promote
private competition within the biofuel industry in
order to expand the competitiveness of advanced
biofuels.

2.

The U.S. should promote biofuels’ costcompetitiveness and develop a price-ratio formula
to help ensure the price-competitiveness of
biofuels.

3.

The U.S. should mandate that a certain number of
FFVs are sold in the nation per year. The U.S.
should work to increase consumer awareness of
biofuels.

4.

The U.S. should bolster infrastructure supports
and expand geographic locations of biofuel
production facilities.

5.

The U.S. should increase the authority of its
agencies to play an active role in overseeing the
nation’s biofuel initiatives.
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IF IT AIN’T BROKE, BREAK IT – 1
HOW THE TENNESSEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISMANTLED
AND DESTROYED TENNESSEE’S UNIQUELY EXCELLENT
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
By: Penny J. White2
“The concentrating [of all government power] in the same
hands is precisely the definition of despotic government. . .
. If therefore the legislature assumes . . . judiciary powers,
no opposition is likely to be made; nor, if made, can it be
effectual. . . . The time to guard against corruption and
tyranny is before they shall have gotten hold on us. It is
better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust to
drawing his teeth and talons after he shall have entered.” 3
I.

Introduction4

In Tennessee, the wolf has entered the fold. The
Tennessee General Assembly has assumed judicial power
by reasserting its role as the “preeminent” branch of
government and reclaiming its historic dominance over the

1

The title is taken from the common phrase, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix
it,” popularized by Bert Lance, White House Director of the Office of
Management and Budget under President Jimmy Carter.
2
Penny J. White is the E.E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law
and the Director for the Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution at
the University of Tennessee College of Law and previously served as a
trial and appellate judge in the state of Tennessee.
3
GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 17761787 451 (1969) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of
Virginia, Query 13, 120-21 (1784)).
4
I am grateful to Professor Judy Cornett for her insight and ingenuity;
to Jacob Feuer whose enthusiasm and acumen inspired me; and to
Jason Collver, Cassie Kamp, Benjamin Lemly, Patrick Morrison,
Brianna Powell, and David Samples, students at the University of
Tennessee College of Law who provided excellent research assistance.
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state judiciary.5 This unfortunate development has led me
to write this article for a variety of reasons. For future
generations, I wish to chronicle the events that led to the
dismantling of Tennessee’s unique, high-quality judicial
system. 6 In this way, I seek to archive essential
information for those who trumpet the important role that
fair courts play in our society. I hope to inspire vigilance,
triggering watchful eyes as the new judiciary unfolds; and
perhaps, I also aspire to encourage efforts to draw the teeth
and talons before more damage is done.
II. Evolution of a Model Judicial Selection, Evaluation,
and Retention System-a/k/a Tennessee’s Judicial
System Was Not Broken.
The early Tennesseans gave the legislative branch
the power to control the creation, composition, and
jurisdiction of the courts. 7 Following North Carolina’s
lead,8 the first Tennessee Constitution, adopted in 1796,
provided for three separate branches of government and
granted judicial power to the courts, but left entirely to the

5

N. Houston Parks, Judicial Selection – the Tennessee Experience, 7
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 615, 619 (1977) (noting that Tennessee’s first
constitution “resembl[ed] other early state constitutions, [and] made the
popularly elected legislature, or general assembly, preeminent”).
6
I am using the phrase “judicial system” in this article to refer to the
method by which judges are selected initially for the bench and the
means by which their continued service is determined.
7
For a complete discussion of the history of the Tennessee judicial
branch, see Parks, supra note 5, at 617-34; see also Thomas R. Van
Dervort, The Changing Court System, in TENNESSEE GOVERNMENT
AND POLITICS: DEMOCRACY IN THE VOLUNTEER STATE 55-64 (John R.
Vile & Mark Byrnes eds., 1998).
8
Tennessee was viewed as the “daughter of North Carolina,” which led
her “quite naturally” to adopt the “judicial system of the Mother State.”
SAMUEL C. WILLIAMS, PHASES OF THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF TENNESSEE 5 (1944).
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legislature whether to create courts at all. 9 Notably,
Tennessee’s first Constitution referred to “superior” and
“inferior” courts, but did not require the legislature to
create any courts.10 Although the legislature did create
courts “from time to time,” as the Constitution provided,11
it was more than a decade before the legislature created a
court of last resort and even then, the legislature retained
the power to abolish the Tennessee Supreme Court until
1835. 12 Only with the passage of Tennessee’s 1834
Constitution did the Tennessee Supreme Court gain
constitutional status, sufficient to forbid its abolition by the
legislature.13
This legislative preeminence in Tennessee was
consistent with the model in place in most states during the
early days of the Nation.14 But this legislative dominance
9

JOSHUA W. CALDWELL, STUDIES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
TENNESSEE 149 (2d ed. 1907).
10
The 1796 Constitution provided that “[t]he judicial power of the state
shall be vested in such superior and inferior courts of law and equity as
the legislature shall, from time to time, direct and establish.” TENN.
CONST. art. V, § 1 (1796).
11
Id.
12
The Tennessee Supreme Court was created in 1809, but was not
given appellate jurisdiction until 1819. That appellate jurisdiction did
not become exclusive until 1834. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 75-76.
13
Id. at 76-77. The 1834 Constitution vested judicial power in “one
Supreme Court [and] in such Inferior Courts as the Legislature shall
from time to time ordain and establish.” TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 1
(1834).
14
Despite the separation of powers provided for in Article III, Section 1
of the United States Constitution, the framers had mixed feelings about
the implications of the separation of powers doctrine, in general, and
about what would come to be known as judicial independence, in
particular. John Adams, for example, believed “that the judicial power
ought to be distinct from both the legislative and executive, and
independent upon both, that so it may be a check upon both . . . .” 4
THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 198 (C. Adams, ed. 1851). Others,
including Thomas Jefferson, occasionally, held an altogether different
view of the role of the courts. In a letter to Edmund Pendleton written
just eight years before the quote that introduces this article, Jefferson
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was short-lived, due in part to the public’s growing “fear of
legislative despotism” and the resulting threat to individual
freedom. 15 Additionally, with the establishment of the
power of judicial review16 came the realization that courts
would assume prominence as guardians of individual
sovereignty and, thus, should be more accountable to the
public.17
Over the course of the next two centuries, states
detached their judiciaries from legislative control by
removing judges from legislative appointment and adopting
a variety of other selection methods for state court judges.
Initially, most states moved to partisan elections believing
that judges who were accountable to the voters would be
more independent. This idea was prompted by the
principles of Jacksonian democracy and the emergence of
the populist movement. 18 But “by the early twentieth
century, elective judiciaries were increasingly viewed as
plagued by incompetence and corruption.”19 The growth of
a more urban and industrialized society had complicated

advocated that “mercy [should] be the character of the law-giver, but . .
. the judge [should] be a mere machine.” Letter to Edmund Pendleton,
Document 9 (Aug. 26, 1776) in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (J.
Boyd, ed. 1950). Initially, according to historian and scholar Gordon
Wood, “[t]he Revolutionaries had no intention of curtailing legislative
interference in the court structure and in judicial functions, and in fact
they meant to increase it.” WOOD, supra note 3, at 161.
15
Id. at 453-54. As Wood explains, this fear was brought about by
legislative overreaching and the public’s reaction to the effect that this
abuse of power had on the judicial function. Id.
16
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
17
Parks, supra note 5, at 622-625 (stating that the “single most
significant manifestation of the changing conception of the judicial
function was the emergence of the doctrine of judicial review.”). Id. at
622.
18
Id. at 624-25.
19
Stephen P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 723 (1994).
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the law, demanding that judges be skilled and intelligent,
rather than partisan and political.
Some states turned to nonpartisan elections to solve
the issues of incompetence and political cronyism,20 but
other states, prompted by professional organizations,
tinkered with creating judicial selection and retention
methods that would insulate judges more completely from
the political aspects of the electoral process.21 By 1990,
almost half of the states had adopted a new model – a socalled merit selection system – as the selection method for
state judges. 22 Under merit selection systems, a broadbased commission comprised of diverse and representative
individuals screens and evaluates candidates for judicial
office. Following a rigorous application and vetting
process, the commission nominates the most qualified
candidates to the appointing authority, generally the
governor, who makes the judicial appointment. Tennessee
joined the group of states opting for merit over politics and
adopted the Tennessee Plan, a merit-based selection system
for appellate court judges in 1971.23
20

F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning about Judicial Independence,
Institutional Changes in State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL. STUD. 431, 442
(2004) (noting that by 1930, twelve states had adopted nonpartisan
elections as their method of judicial selection).
21
Parks, supra note 5, at 632.
22
Charles Gardner Geyh, Methods of Judicial Section & Their Impact
on Judicial Independence, 2008 DAEDALUS 88-89 (2008) in Paul J. De
Muniz & Phillip Schradle, A Modest Proposal for Selection of Oregon
Judges, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1759 (2012)(Professor Geyh also refers to this
statistic in the background papers for “The Debate Over Judicial
Elections and State Court Judicial Selection,” a 2007 conference
sponsored by the National Center for State Courts and the Sandra Day
O’Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary. The background papers
are on file in the author’s archives.).
23
For all of the versions of Tennessee’s judicial selection, evaluation,
and retention statutes, other than the current version, I will cite to the
original public chapter number in order to avoid confusion. 1971 Tenn.
Pub. Acts, ch. 198 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-701). Trial
judges in Tennessee continued to be chosen in popular elections. I use
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Despite this progressive step by Tennessee’s 1971
bipartisan General Assembly,24 the Tennessee Plan became
the spoils of a highly partisan battle between a Republican
governor and a Democratic legislature in 1974, leading to
the repeal of the Plan as it applied to the Tennessee
Supreme Court.25 Over the next twenty years, judicial
reform in Tennessee would arguably fail miserably (when a
cumbersome 1500-word amendment to the judicial article
was rejected by the voters in the 1977 Limited
Constitutional Convention 26 ) and succeed beyond all
expectations when, in 1994, another bipartisan General
Assembly27 provided that all judicial vacancies would be
filled by merit-based appointments. This returned the
Tennessee Supreme Court to retention elections and
marked the first time in Tennessee’s history that the
appointment of trial judges had been removed from a
system of pure political patronage.28
Under the 1994 Tennessee Plan, the Governor was
required to fill judicial vacancies from a list of three
the phrase “the Tennessee Plan” and the phrase “Tennessee’s judicial
selection, evaluation, and retention system” to designate the manner of
judicial selection, evaluation, and retention set out in the 1971 and 1994
statutes.
24
The 87th Tennessee General Assembly consisted of 20 Democrat, 12
Republican,
and
1
American
Independent
Senators,
http://www.tn.gov/tsla/history/misc/tga-senate3.p
df, and 56 Democrats and 43 Republicans Representatives,
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/house/archives/87GA/Members/Members.ht
m.
25
Van Dervort, supra note 7, at 62; Penny J. White & Malia Reddick,
A Response to Professor Fitzpatrick: The Rest of the Story, 75 TENN. L.
REV. 501, 510-12 (2008).
26
See White & Reddick, supra note 25, at 515-19.
27
The 98th General Assembly consisted of 19 Democrat and 14
Republican Senators, http://www.tn.gov/tsla/history
y/misc/tga-senate3.pdf, and 64 Democrat and 35 Republican
Representatives, http://www.capitol.tn.gov/hou
se/archives/98GA/Members/Members.htm
28
Van Devort, supra note 7, at 64.
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nominees provided by the Judicial Selection Commission
(JSC).29 By statute, the JSC’s membership was required to
reflect diversity. 30
Trial judges appointed under the
Tennessee Plan held their seats until the next general
election, at which time they ran in popular elections. But
appellate judges appointed under the Tennessee Plan ran in
retention elections, thus returning Tennessee’s appellate
courts to a full merit-based selection and retention system.
31
In addition to adopting merit-based selection and
retention for appellate court judges, the General Assembly
added a unique dimension to the selection system, adopting
a judicial performance evaluation system that was new to
Tennessee and unique in the Nation.32
Despite the increased use of and support for meritbased judicial selection systems, critics expressed concerns
about the retention aspects of merit-based systems. In all
but a very few states,33 judges selected via a merit-based
29

The Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission consisted of 15
members, appointed by the Speaker of the House and Senate from
recommendations made by the Tennessee Bar Association, the
Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association, the District Attorneys General
Conference, the Tennessee Defense Lawyers Association, and the
Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 1994 Tenn. Pub.
Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §17-4-102).
30
Id. (including requirements that the Commission “approximate the
population of the state with respect to race and gender;” include
representation “from the dominant ethnic minority population;” that the
Speakers reject any list that did not “reflect the diversity of the state’s
population;” and requiring the nominating groups and speakers to
“intend to select a commission diverse as to race and gender”). See Van
Dervort, supra note 7, at 64-65
31
1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 174-101 & -102); Van Devort, supra note 7, at 64.
32
White & Reddick, supra note 25, at 519; 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch.
942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §17-4-101 (1994)).
33
Only Rhode Island appoints state court judges for life; judges in New
Hampshire, New Jersey, and Massachusetts serve until age 70.
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial
_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state.
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selection system were reviewed periodically by the
electorate who voted whether the judges should be retained
in office. Opponents of merit-based systems charged that
retention elections did not entice voter interest and that
those who did vote did not have sufficient information
about incumbent judges to enable them to cast informed
votes on retention.34 At its core, this criticism was based
on the presumption that party labels provided relevant
information to voters about candidates,35 a presumption that
is fallacious when applied to judges.
In order to address the criticisms and confront the
fallaciousness head on, a small minority of merit-selection
states began to experiment with methods of evaluating
judicial performance 36for the purpose of providing voters
with relevant information about judges’ performance and

34

See generally James Bopp, Jr., The Perils of Merit Selection, 46 IND.
L. REV. 87, 97 (2013).
35
See generally Scott Ashworth & Ethan Bueno de Mesquita,
Informative Party labels with Institutional and Electoral Variation, 20
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 251, 251 (2008) (citing studies
that support the proposition that in traditional elections “party labels
provide voters with information about candidates”). To prove low voter
interest, critics of merit selection rely upon ballot roll-off percentages.
Because judicial races are often at the bottom of the ballot, the
phenomenon of ballot roll off results in voters not casting a vote in
those races. The percentage of ballot roll off is calculated by
determining the number of voters who cast ballots but who did not
complete their ballots by voting in each contest. Critics cited ballot
roll-off percentages as proof of low voter interest. See Seth S.
Andersen, Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs, 34 LOY. L. REV.
1375, 1377 (2001) (discussing various complaints about retention
elections).
36
For more than a century, bar groups and associations had polled
members as a means of evaluating judicial performance, but bar poll
results were (and are) regarded largely as assessing a judge’s popularity
and not as a meaningful measurement of judicial performance. JAMES
H. GUTERMAN & ERROL E. MEDINGER, IN THE OPINION OF THE BAR: A
NATIONAL SURVEY OF BAR POLLING PRACTICES 2 (1977).
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identifying areas in which judges needed to improve.37 By
providing voters with objective, relevant information about
judges’ performance, voters could cast informed ballots.
Thus, judicial performance evaluations, though scarcely
used, were a “key component of efforts to make judicial
elections more meaningful contests.”38
As states experimented with judicial performance
evaluations for self-improvement, the American Bar
Association (ABA) drafted and adopted guidelines to
objectify judicial evaluations.
The Guidelines for
Evaluation of Judicial Performance, consists of concrete
principles and explanatory commentary concerning the
adoption and implementation of a judicial performance
system. 39 While the adoption of the ABA Guidelines
prompted more states to adopt performance guidelines for
judicial self-improvement, the number of states that utilized
judicial performance as a means of informing the electorate
about judicial qualifications remained very small.
The early pioneers in the use of judicial
performance evaluations were New Jersey, Colorado, and
Alaska, but Tennessee, which adopted its program in 1994,
was not far behind. Moreover, unlike many of the
pioneers, Tennessee’s judicial performance evaluation
program (JPE) included the dual purposes of promoting
voter awareness and self-improvement from the outset.
While other programs focused exclusively on identifying
areas for judicial self-improvement during the first decade
of the programs’ existence, Tennessee’s JPE contained a
37

Richard L. Aynes, Evaluation of Judicial Performance: A Tool for
Self-Improvement, 8 PEPP. L. REV. 255, 261-70 (1981); Penny J. White,
Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial
Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1064-66
(2002).
38
Andersen, supra note 35, at 1375.
39
ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE,
GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE (1985)
(hereinafter “GUIDELINES”).
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robust voter awareness and self-improvement component
from the very start.40
Thus, the 98th Tennessee General Assembly added
Tennessee to that very short list of states willing to devote
state resources to assure that an informed electorate made
judicial retention decisions.
The Tennessee Plan
incorporated a rigorous performance evaluation program
that had been developed and scrutinized by members of the
bench and the bar 41 and that placed Tennessee in the
forefront. With the adoption of the Tennessee Plan, the
Tennessee Municipal League, for example, proudly boasted
that Tennessee became the “only state with a judicial
evaluation program this expansive, and only one of eight
states with a program.” 42
From its inception, Tennessee’s expansive JPE
embraced multiple vital objectives: assuring a “responsive
and respected appellate judiciary,”43 providing a means of
improving the quality of justice by improving individual
40

See White, supra note 37, at 1066-67. Both a lack of resources and a
lack of support led some states to use judicial performance evaluations
exclusively for judicial self-improvement.
41
Justice Bill Koch, who was at the time a Court of Appeals Judge, and
I chaired the committee appointed by the Tennessee Supreme Court
and the Tennessee Judicial Conference to study and determine whether
to propose a judicial performance evaluation system for Tennessee’s
judges. The committee, consisting of lawyers and judges, worked for
months reviewing the few judicial performance evaluation programs in
existence, consulting with experts, and drafting proposals. To my
knowledge, the significant amount of energy, resources, and
relationship capital invested to propose and ultimately adopt
Tennessee’s JPE has not been documented. My archives (and I am sure
the archives of Justice Koch and others) contain reams of evidence
documenting the amount of work involved as well as the degree of
difficulty encountered in proposing and gaining acceptance of JPE by
Tennessee’s lawyers, judges, and legislators.
42
Tennessee Municipal League, Town and Country, July 17, 1995
(quoted in Van Dervort, supra note 7, at 63).
43
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27, § 1.01.
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judge’s judicial skills,44 and promoting “informed retention
decisions.”45 By connecting JPE with the Tennessee Plan’s
broad-based selection system and retention elections, the
General Assembly and the courts worked hand in hand to
select a qualified judiciary, to improve judicial
performance, and to “aid the public in evaluating the
performance of [incumbent appellate] judges.” 46
In
addition to acknowledging the acute importance of an
exceptional appellate judiciary, the implementation of JPE
alleviated accountability concerns voiced by some critics of
retention elections47 by providing an evaluative process
“based on a well-defined set of non-political performance
criteria.”48
Tennessee’s JPE not only met, but exceeded the
recommended standards for judicial evaluation programs.49
44

Id. at §§ 1.02 & 1.03.
Id. at § 1.04. “In addition to its primary purpose of selfimprovement, the JPEP must provide information that will enable the
Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission to perform objective
evaluations and to issue fair and accurate reports concerning each
appellate judge’s performance.”
46
1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §17-4201). The Tennessee Plan did not change the method of election for
Tennessee’s trial judges; thus, JPE’s voter awareness goal affected only
incumbent appellate judges.
47
See Bopp, supra note 34, at 97 (stating that “[t]he primary pitfall is
that merit selection lacks any strong accountability mechanism since
retention elections are a weak substitute for popular elections.”);
Andersen, supra note 35, at 1377 (noting that “[r]etention elections
provide accountability in theory, but in practice they can suffer from
the same lack of publicity and voter interest as competitive judicial
elections often do.”).
48
Andersen, supra note 35, at 1389.
49
Generally, the ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 39, are considered the
model for judicial evaluation programs. For a discussion of the
specifics of effective evaluation programs, see Andersen, supra note
35; see also Kevin M. Esterling & Kathleen M. Sampson, Judicial
Retention Evaluation Programs in Four States – A Report with
Recommendations (1998), available at http://www.Judicial
45
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The program had official status50 and was sanctioned by
both statute and Supreme Court Rule. 51 Despite this
linkage, JPE retained institutional independence from both
the legislature and the judiciary.52 The program’s welldefined goals and objectives 53 were broad and
comprehensive in scope,54 but the overarching program
objectives were complemented with precise rules and
procedures.55
Tennessee’s JPE utilized professionally-designed
survey instruments to solicit views from a variety of court
users, including jurors, lawyers, litigants, and other judges.
But evaluation also took into account non-survey
information acquired through public comments, personal
interviews, observations, and caseload and workload
selection.us/uploads/documents/Exec_Summ_Jud_Ret_Eval_4C67B5A
81A9B3.pdf.
50
Andersen, supra note 35, at 1376.
51
1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §17-4201 (1994)); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27.
52
See GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 1-2 (noting that a “judicial
evaluation program should be structured and implemented so as not to
impair the independence of the judiciary”); 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch.
942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(a)(3) (1994) (providing
that information collected for purposes of evaluating judges shall be
confidential ); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27, § 2.04 (stating that the “Judicial
Performance Evaluation Commission . . . shall be considered
independent of the Administrative Office of the Courts”); TENN. SUP.
CT. R. 27, §§ 6.02 & 6.03 (providing for limited disclosure of “[a]ll
records and information obtained and maintained by the Judicial
Performance Evaluation Commission concerning the performance of
individual judges”); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27, § 6.04 (providing that “all
information, questionnaires, notes, memoranda or data” shall be in
admissible as evidence and not discoverable in any action or by any
board or tribunal); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27, § 6.05 (providing for the
destruction of records six months after a judge’s death or retirement).
53
GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 1-1; see text accompanying notes 4348 supra.
54
Andersen, supra note 35, at 1377-79.
55
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27, §§ 4 & 5.
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statistics. 56 The program evaluated judges based upon
“clear, measurable performance standards,” 57 utilizing
questionnaires that assessed specific relevant criteria, such
as integrity, knowledge and understanding of the law,
ability to communicate, preparation and attentiveness,
service to the profession and the public, and effectiveness
in working with others.58 The final evaluation reports were
disseminated by print media 59 and, ultimately, were
available electronically,60 allowing the public easy access
to the evaluation results and assuring that the results
provided a useful and meaningful voter information tool.61
Tennessee’s JPE was administered by the Judicial
Performance Evaluation Commission (hereafter JPEC),
comprised of lawyers, judges, and lay persons appointed by
various professional organizations and office holders. 62
56

GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 4.1 – 4.3. See TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27,
§§ 5.02 & 5.04; Tennessee Appellate Judges Evaluation Reports are
presently available at http://www.ts
c.state.tn.us/boards-commissions/boards-commissions/judic
ial-performance-evaluation-commission.
57
Esterling & Sampson, supra note 49, at xix.
58
GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 3-1 – 3-8; TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27, § 3. I
have previously discussed the relationship of these performance criteria
to the qualities of good judges. See Penny J. White, Using Judicial
Performance Evaluations to Supplement Inappropriate Voter Cues and
Enhance Judicial Legitimacy, 74 MO. L. REV. 635, 657-661 (2009).
59
1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4201(c) (1994)).
60
See supra note 56.
61
As the Institute for the Advancement of the Legal System has noted
“[a] commitment to public judicial performance evaluation involves a
concomitant commitment to assuring that the results are widely known
. . . .” INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMER. LEGAL SYS.,
TRANSPARENT COURTHOUSE:
A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
10
(2006),
available
at
http://iaals.du.edu/ima
ges/wygwam/documents/publications/TCQ_Blueprint_JPE2006.pdf)
(hereafter “TRANSPARENT COURTHOUSE”).
62
GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 2-2 & Commentary; 1994 Tenn. Pub.
Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(b)(1)-(4)
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Commissioners’ terms were staggered and limited. 63
Similarly, the JPEC’s structure and composition mirrored
suggested standards.64
III. Tennessee’s Model Judicial Selection, Evaluation,
and Retention System Worked
Thus, in 1994, Tennessee had a model and
respected judicial selection, evaluation, and retention
system for its appellate court judges. More importantly, the
system worked. It produced a highly qualified, diverse
appellate bench, whose members adjudicated cases both
fairly and efficiently.
In short, the Tennessee judicial
selection, evaluation, and retention system was not broken.
A. Tennessee’s judicial selection, evaluation, and
retention system met the
goals set by the
legislature.
The respect for the Tennessee Plan was welldeserved. When the Plan was adopted, the General
Assembly outlined four specific and noble goals: selecting
the best qualified judges, bringing greater racial and gender
diversity to the bench, insulating judges from political
pressure and influence, and enhancing the prestige of and
public respect for the courts.65 Between 1994 and 2010, the
Tennessee Plan met each of these laudable goals.

(1994) (providing that the Judicial Council and the Speakers of the
House and Senate would appoint attorneys, judges, and non-attorneys
to the JPEC).
63
Andersen, supra note 35, at 1383; 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942
(codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201 (b)(7) & (8) (1994).
64
TRANSPARENT COURTHOUSE, supra note 61, at 8.
65
1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4101 to 102) (2009).
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1. The Tennessee Plan produced
qualified, diverse appellate bench.

a

highly

In a judicial selection system based on merit,
judicial vacancies are publicized. Applicants are required
to provide detailed information about their personal and
professional background, work experiences, education,
abilities, and achievements. After viewing these relevant
qualifications, a diverse selection commission nominates
the most qualified applicants to the appointing authority.
The Tennessee Plan embraced each of these important
aspects of merit selection.66
The clarity and pertinence of the selection process
attracted qualified applicants. In particular, those lacking
political connections 67 were still able to compete for a
66

See text accompanying supra notes 29-31.
I am well aware that many qualified applicants fell victim to politics
at its worst on occasion, when the JSC “stacked the deck” with its
nominees. In writing about the design and potential of the Tennessee
Plan and contrasting its value relative to the value of our current
system, I am not suggesting that the Tennessee Plan always worked
perfectly or apolitically. One example of imperfect operation occurred
in 2006. The JSC submitted a slate of three nominees to Governor Phil
Bredesen to fill a vacancy on the Tennessee Supreme Court. The slate
included Davidson County Chancellor Richard Dinkins, who is an
African American, and attorneys J. Houston Gordon and George T.
“Buck” Lewis. Chancellor Dinkins withdrew from consideration,
prompting the Governor to request a new slate of nominees reflecting
diversity, The JSC asked the Governor to clarify his rejection and
ultimately submitted a second slate, which included J. Houston Gordon
and two others. The Governor then filed a declaratory judgment action
against the JSC alleging that the second slate was invalid because it
included a previously rejected nominee. Gordon and Lewis were
allowed to intervene in the lawsuit. Following trial proceedings, and
pursuant to its reach-down prerogative, the Tennessee Supreme Court
concluded that the JSC could not include on a subsequent slate of
nominees an individual who had been included on a rejected slate.
Bredesen v. Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission, 214 S.W.3d 419
(Tenn. 2007).
67
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nomination based on their qualifications.68 Knowing that
the JSC was largely comprised of experienced lawyers who
knew the essential qualities of a good judge encouraged
qualified candidates who possessed the necessary intellect,
temperament, and judgment to serve. Additionally, those
experienced lawyer JSC members were well-positioned to
evaluate and predict suitability for the bench.
Admittedly, determining the quality of an appellate
judge is no easy task. An appellate court’s caseload is
predominantly determined by litigants and their lawyers,
not the judges. 69
But one measurement of appellate
efficiency is the length of time it takes an appellate court to
conclude a case after the case is heard. This measurement
is sometimes referred to as the case-disposition or clearance
rate. National organizations have promoted time guidelines
to encourage the expeditious disposition of cases. 70
Tennessee appellate courts have long adhered to case
processing deadlines, have a clear enforcement

68

While measuring whether merit selection systems in and of
themselves produce more qualified judges is a difficult proposition,
studies uniformly show meaningful differences between appointed and
elected judges.
69
Parties have an automatic right to appeal trial court decisions to the
Tennessee Court of Appeals and the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals. Only the Tennessee Supreme Court has “control” over the
size of its docket because its appellate jurisdiction is largely
discretionary, but even the Supreme Court is required to hear certain
kinds of cases. See generally TENN. R. APP. 9-12 (outlining the
methods of appeal in Tennessee); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206 (2014
Repl.) (establishing the Supreme Court’s mandatory review of capital
cases).
70
The American Bar Association and the National Center for State
Courts, for example, have promoted time standards for appellate courts.
See National Center for State Courts, Appellate Court Performance
Measures (2011), available at http://www.courtools.org/~/media/Mic
rosites/Files/CourTools/courtools_appellate_measure2_Time_To_Disp
osition.ashx.
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mechanism, 71 and regularly have impressive caseclearance rates.72
In addition to evaluations based on a courts’
clearance rate, some nonprofit organizations evaluate state
appellate courts based on other factors, usually reflective of
the groups’ ideology. One example is an evaluation
conducted by the Center for Public Integrity, 73 Global
Integrity,74 and Public Radio International,75 which ranked
the integrity of state institutions based upon their
transparency, accountability, and corruption risk. 76
71

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 11 (setting out mechanism for collecting court
statistics, deadlines for rendering decisions, and procedure for
prompting a dilatory judge).
72
The annual statistics for Tennessee’s appellate courts are compiled in
annual reports, which are posted on the website for the Tennessee
Administrative Office of the Courts. The most recent annual report,
covering
fiscal
year
2012-13,
may
be
viewed
at
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/fil
es/docs/annual_report_fy2013.pdf. In 2012-13, during a time of
upheaval and uncertainty about the tenure of appellate judges,
Tennessee’s appellate courts averaged a clearance rate that exceeded
100 percent.
73
The Center for Public Integrity, according to its website, is a
nonpartisan, nonprofit investigative news organization whose mission
is to “serve democracy by revealing abuses of power, corruption and
betrayal of public trust by powerful public and private institutions,
using
the
tools
of
investigative
journalism.”
http://www.publicintegrity.org/.
74
According to its website, Global Integrity “champions transparent
and accountable government around the world by producing innovative
research and technologies that inform, connect, and empower civic,
private, and public reformers seeking more open societies.”
https://www.globa
lintegrity.org/about/mission/.
75
Public Radio International is a global nonprofit media company
whose mission is to “serve audiences as a distinctive content source for
information, insights and cultural experiences essential to living in our
diverse, interconnected world.” http://www.pri.org/about-pri.
76
Tennessee’s corruption risk report card can be viewed at
http://www.stateintegrity.org/tennessee.
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Although the state of Tennessee fared poorly overall, the
score received for judicial accountability was among the
state’s highest score and ranked Tennessee favorably based
upon the transparency of judicial selection, the integrity of
the judiciary, and the accountability of judges for their
actions.77
In addition to producing a highly qualified and
effective appellate bench, the Tennessee Plan produced a
significantly more diverse appellate bench.78 The increase
in diversity under the Tennessee Plan was consistent with
the findings of national studies showing that racial and
gender diversity is more likely to occur through an
appointed system79 and that women are significantly more
likely to be appointed, rather than elected, to state supreme
courts. 80
Under the Tennessee Plan, membership on the JSC
was required to reflect the state’s diversity; the Speakers
were required to reject nomination lists that did not reflect
77

Tennessee’s judicial accountability report can be viewed at
http://www.stateintegrity.org/tennessee_survey_judicial_
accountability. At the other extreme, it may be worth noting that the
Tennessee court system has never made the list of so-called “judicial
hellholes,” catalogued by the American Tort Reform Foundation in
annual reports. According to its website, the American Tort Reform
Foundation (ATRF) is a nonprofit corporation whose primary purpose
is to “educate the general public about how the American civil justice
system operates; the role of tort law in the civil justice system; and the
impact of tort law on the private, public and business sectors of
society.” available at http://www.judicialhellholes.org/about/. The
ATRF defines judicial hellholes as “places where judges systematically
apply laws and court procedures in an unfair and unbalanced manner,
generally against defendants in civil lawsuits.” Id.
78
See TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK (1994-2014).
79
Lisa M. Holmes & Jolly A. Emrey, Court Diversification: Staffing
the State Courts of Last Resort through Interim Appointments, 27 JUST.
SYS. J. 1, 7 (2006)
80
Kathleen A. Bratton & Rorie L. Spill, Existing Diversity and Judicial
Selection: The Role of the Appointment Method in Establishing Gender
Diversity in State Supreme Courts, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 504, 504 (2002).
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diversity. 81 The presence of a diverse selection body
encouraged more diversity among applicants and ultimately
enhanced the likelihood that minority candidates and
women would be appointed.82 Although the number of
racial minorities serving as appellate judges in Tennessee
remains distressingly low, the number more than tripled
under the Tennessee Plan.83 Similarly, Tennessee’s female
appellate judges increased nearly ten-fold. 84 Thus, the
Tennessee Plan yielded the state’s most diverse appellate
judiciary, clearly advancing the legislature’s stated purpose
of bringing more racial and gender diversity to the bench.85
2. The Tennessee Plan insulated judges from
political pressure and thereby enhanced the
prestige of and public respect for the courts.
81

See supra notes 29-30.
Research supports the conclusion that demographically diverse
nominating commissions attract more diverse candidates and select
more diverse nominees. Kevin M. Esterling & Seth S. Andersen,
Diversity and the Judicial Merit Selection Process: A Statistical Report
in RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 1999 (American Judicature
Society 2000 ed.).
83
See Margaret L. Behm & Candi Henry, Judicial Selection in
Tennessee: Deciding the Decider, 1 BELMONT L. REV. 143,176 (2014)
(stating that in 23 years under the Tennessee Plan, “appointments
through April 2013 were sixty-nine percent men and thirty-one percent
women. Nine percent of those appointed were members of minority
groups.”) These totals include trial and appellate level appointments.
84
In 1992, Tennessee had two female appellate judges. Eight
additional women have been appointed to the appellate bench since
1992. See supra note 78. Prior to 1996, the Tennessee Supreme Court
had never had more than a single female member; since 2008, it has
had three female members, making it one of four states with a majority
of women on its highest court. The others three are North Carolina,
Ohio,
and
Wisconsin.
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/bench_diversity/inde
x.cfm?state).
85
1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4101 to 102) (1994).
82
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After the Tennessee Plan became fully operational
in 1998, forty-one appellate judges were evaluated and
subsequently retained in office in the years 2000, 2006,
2008, 2010, and 2012.86 During a decade in which spending
in judicial races skyrocketed and special interest groups
battered judicial candidates with negative, nasty
campaigns, 87 no Tennessee judge was targeted for
opposition or required to raise more than nominal campaign
funds. The unique evaluation component of the Tennessee
Plan provided voters with pertinent, apolitical information
about the judges, filling the vacuum often occupied by
special interest groups’ misleading campaign ads. 88
Tennessee’s appellate bench avoided the trend that plagued
so many state judiciaries and remained largely insulated
86

See generally http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/boards-commiss
ions/boards-commissions/judicial-performance-evaluationcommission. In 1998, Chief Justice Adolpho Birch, Jr., was retained on
the Tennessee Supreme Court, but the Commission’s webpage does not
include his evaluation. Although the Tennessee Plan was operational at
the time, I have been unable to determine whether the JPC evaluated or
disseminated Chief Justice Birch’s evaluation. In 2000, 5 judges were
evaluated and retained; in 2006, 27 judges were evaluated and retained;
in 2008, 5 judges were evaluated and retained; and in both 2010 and
2012, 2 judges were evaluated and retained.
87
Since 2000, the Brennan Center for Justice has produced annual
reports that catalogue the trends in judicial elections. The reports are
available
on
the
Center’s
website
at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/resources/the-new-politics-of-judicialelections/. The 2000-2009 report summarizes the trend: Campaign
fundraising more than doubled, from $83.3 million in 1990–1999 to
$206.9 million in 2000–2009. Three of the last five Supreme Court
election cycles topped $45 million. All but two of the 22 states with
contestable Supreme Court elections had their costliest-ever contests
inthe 2000–2009 decade. Available at http://www.j
usticeatstake.org/media/cms/JASNPJEDecadeONLINE_8E7FD3FEB8
3E3.pdf.
88
See White, supra note 58 (discussing how relevant evaluation
information replaces irrelevant campaign advertising as meaningful
voter cues).
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from political pressure. As studies show, a fortunate by
product of apolitical courts is enhanced public respect for
the judiciary.89
3. The Tennessee Plan gave meaningful
information to allow voters to cast informed
ballots in retention races.
Beginning in 2000, 90 the JEC evaluated every
appellate judge who sought election to fill either an
unexpired or full term.91 In evaluating each judge, the JEC
considered the application submitted by the judge to the
JSC; the judge’s self-report form and formal interview with
the JEC; the results of survey questionnaires; the judge’s
caseload and workload statistics; and public input. The
final evaluation was based on criteria pertinent to the task
of judging and included an assessment of the judge’s
integrity; knowledge and understanding of the law; ability
to communicate; preparation and attentiveness; service to
the profession; and effectiveness in working with other
judges and with court personnel. 92 The evaluation report
included a summary of the judge’s legal education,
experience, and service to the profession; the survey
results; the JEC’s impressions of the judge’s experience
and performance; the JEC’s recommendation regarding
retention; and, if desired, the judge’s written response.93
The evaluation report was published in newspapers and
89

The Brennan Center’s 2000-2009 summary report on pages 77-87
cites
numerous
studies
on
these
issues.
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNPJEDecadeONLINE_8
E7FD3FEB83E3.pdf.
90
See supra note 86.
91
The reports are available on the website of the Administrative Office
of the Courts at www.tsc.state.tn.us/s
ites/default/files/docs/judeval.pdf.
92
TENN. SUP. Ct. R. 27.
93
See supra note 86.
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made available on the Administrative Office of the Courts
website, accomplishing the legislature’s stated purpose of
promoting “informed retention decisions” and assuring a
“responsive” appellate judiciary.94
IV. The Dismantling of Tennessee’s Model Judicial
Selection, Evaluation, and Retention Systema/k/a They Broke It.
A. Introduction
Through a series of calculated legislative actions,
the Tennessee General Assembly dismantled Tennessee’s
unique judicial selection, evaluation, and retention system
and replaced the system with one that is dominated by and
dependent upon the legislature. Tennessee’s 21st century
judiciary is reminiscent of its 18th century judiciary, 95
controlled by the legislative branch and susceptible to the
corruption that accompanies the “concentrating [of all
government power] in the same hands.” 96
The
modification and repeal of statutes outlining the
mechanisms for judicial selection, evaluation, and retention
spawned the adoption of a constitutional amendment that
ultimately retains gubernatorial appointment and retention
elections for appellate judges, but critically alters the
judicial selection system and entirely removes the system
for judicial performance evaluation. By eliminating two of
the three essential components of the Tennessee Plan, the
94

See text accompanying supra notes 43, 45.
TENN. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1796) (giving legislature the power to
determine whether to create courts); TENN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1796)
(giving legislature the power to elect judges); TENN. CONST. art. IV
(giving legislature the power to impeach judges); TENN. CONST. art. VI,
§ 3 (giving legislature the power to elect judges); TENN. CONST. art. VI,
§ 6 (1834) (giving legislature the power to impeach judges).
96
See supra note 3.
95
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legislature has produced a judicial system accountable only
to politicians.
The adoption of the constitutional amendment
replacing Tennessee’s judicial selection, evaluation, and
retention system was preceded by a clever, if disingenuous
campaign. Backing the amendment was an impressive
array of former and current governors, legislators, judges,
and popular citizens. They argued that Tennesseans were
limited to two choices. They could adopt the amendment
and preserve retention elections (albeit by placing the
courts under legislative control), or they could submit the
courts to partisan elections. The far better choice –
retaining the Tennessee Plan with its unique selection and
evaluation components —was clouded with the persistent,
yet preposterous claim 97 that the Plan, adopted by the
legislature and utilized to appoint every appellate judge in
the last twenty years, was unconstitutional. 98
B. The Beginning of the End of the Tennessee Plan
That Tennessee’s unique judicial selection,
evaluation and retention system was in danger of being
dismantled became readily apparent in early 2008.
97

Courts consistently have upheld the constitutionality of the
Tennessee Plan. The predecessor to the 1994 Tennessee Plan was
upheld in State ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1973).
The 1994 Plan was upheld in State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson, 249
S.W.3d 331 (Tenn. 1996) and Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409
(Tenn. 2014). Other cases endorsing the constitutionality of the
Tennessee Plan include Hooker v. Andersen, 12 Fed. Appx. 323 (6th
Cir. 2001); Hooker v. All Members of Tenn. Supreme Court, No. 3-020787 (M.D. Tenn. July 28, 2003); Johnson v. Bredesen, 356 Fed. Appx.
781 (6th Cir. 2009); and Delaney v. Thompson, 982 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn.
1998).
98
The basis for my characterization of the constitutional challenge to
the Tennessee Plan as preposterous is detailed elsewhere and will not
be repeated here. See White & Reddick, supra note 25; see also Behm,
supra note 83.
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Although the legislature had tinkered with the size and
composition of the JSC and the JEC in 2001,99 a more
pervasive threat arose in 2008 by the operation of
Tennessee’s
Governmental
Entity
Review
Law
(“TGERL”).100 This law provides for the periodic review of
all state government entities “to ensure that regulation was
beneficial rather than detrimental to the public interest.”101
A legislative committee evaluates the “quality, efficiency,
and success of [governmental entities and] programs”102 in
light of legislative mandates and recommends continuation
of “successful and efficient entities that are beneficial to the
citizens” and elimination of inactive, duplicative, and
“ineffective, inefficient, unnecessary or undesirable
entities.”103 Following this so-called “sunset review,” the
committee proposes legislation to terminate or continue

99

In 2001, the General Assembly increased the size of the JSC from
15-17 members. 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 459 (codified at TENN.
CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(a) (2001)). More important than the increase in
size, however, was the implicit change in mindset concerning who
should vet judicial candidates. The two new members of the JSC were
required to be lawyers, but the Speakers were not required to receive
input or recommendations from bar organizations. 2001 Tenn. Pub.
Acts, ch. 459 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(b) (2001)). By
removing the organized bar, the legislature began to assert greater
control over the judicial selection process. As discussed at text
accompany infra notes 124-126, the General Assembly completed the
removal of lawyers from the selection process in 2009 when it
eliminated altogether the requirement that the Speakers appoint JSC
members from lists provided by bar organizations. 2009 Tenn. Pub.
Acts, ch. 517 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(a)&(b)
(2009)).
100
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29-101, -236 (2011 Repl.) (as amended).
101
TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-29-102(a) (2011 Repl.) (as amended).
102
TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-29-105(1) (2011 Repl.) (as amended).
103
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29-105(2)-(5) (2011 Repl.) (as amended).
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entities.104 A terminated entity has one year to wind up its
affairs, before it permanently expires.105
Both the JSC and JEC were scheduled to terminate
under the terms of the TGERL in 2008. Although the
process of sunset review was routine and ordinary, the
circumstances surrounding the sunset review and
subsequent winding-up of the affairs of the JSC and JEC
were anything but conventional.
When the General Assembly adjourned on May 21,
2008, without providing for the continued existence of the
JSC and JEC,106 the two Commissions terminated107 and
began the one-year wind-up, setting the course for both to
expire completely on June 30, 2009.108 Although this
situation was troubling, no appellate judges were on the
August 2008 ballot for retention, so the failure to provide
for the continued existence of the JSC and JEC did not
create an immediate crisis. Presumably, the General
Assembly would address the issue when it reconvened in
January 2009.
During the 2009 legislative session, numerous bills
were introduced in reaction to the scheduled expiration of
104

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29-107, -108 (2011 Repl.) (as amended).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-29-112 (2011 Repl.) (as amended). This
process is referred to both as winding up the affairs and winding down
the entity. Compare id. with Tn. Att’y Gen. Op. 09-43, 2009 WL
837837 (March 26, 2009). The term “terminate” refers to the date on
which the entity sunsets and the term “expire” refers to the date one
year later, after the entity’s wind-up year. The term “sunset” and
“terminate” are used interchangeably here. Thus, an entity terminates
(or sunsets), winds up, and then, expires.
106
A number of statutes designate the sunset date for various
governmental entities, but the legislature routinely repeals or transfers
subsections of the statutes, which has the effect of changing the date of
the entity’s termination and expiration. See generally Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 4-29-230, 238 (2011 Repl. & 2014 Supp.)
107
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29-229(a)(46) & (47) (2011 Repl.) (as
amended).
108
Id.
105

187

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 340
the JSC and the JEC. Some bills proposed partisan
elections, while others altered the existing retention system.
None of the judicial selection proposals included the unique
selection and evaluation components of the existing
Tennessee Plan. Ultimately, the 106th General Assembly
failed to adopt a new judicial selection system; however,
the overall tenor of the proposals and debate suggested that
the legislature intended to allow the permanent expiration
of the JSC and the JEC the following year.109
By early 2009 concern about the effect of the
permanent expiration of the JSC and JEC was mounting.
Leaders in the Senate and House asked the Attorney
General to offer an opinion on the legal effect of the
expiration of the JSC and JEC. That opinion, released in
late March of 2009, advised that if both Commissions
permanently expired, no appellate judges could be elected
in either 2010 (when two appellate judges were scheduled
to be on the ballot)110 or in 2014 (when all twenty-nine
appellate judges would be on the ballot seeking retention
for a new eight-year term).111 Additionally, no vacancies in
appellate judgeships occurring after July 1, 2009, the final
wind-up date for both Commissions, could be filled.112
Perhaps the Attorney General’s Opinion prompted
the legislature’s next step. A few days before adjourning
the 2009 session, the legislature passed comprehensive
legislation that altered many aspects of the Tennessee
Plan.113 In the abstract, the 2009 Act seemed peculiar, but
when viewed with the advantage of time and perspective,
the 2009 legislation was obviously the beginning of the end
109

See generally H.B. 0173, 0958, 1017, 107th Gen. Assembly, Reg.
Sess. (Tenn. 2012).
110
Chief Justice Sharon Lee and Court of Appeals Judge John W.
McClarty were both scheduled for retention votes on August 5, 2010.
111
Tn. Att’y Gen. Op. 09-43, 2009 WL 837837 (March 26, 2009).
112
Id.
113
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. §§174-101 to 108) (2009).
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of the Tennessee Plan. The new legislation signaled a
fundamental shift in the legislature’s attitude toward the
courts.
C. The 2009 Legislation
This fundamental shift was evident from the
opening sentences of the 2009 legislation. There, the
General Assembly modified its statement of legislative
purpose, likely revealing more than it intended and
exposing a new view of the role of the courts. This revision
in the underlying purpose of the Tennessee Plan now seems
prescient. 114 Whereas, the original purpose of the
Tennessee Plan was to “insulate the judges . . . from
political influence and pressure [and to] eliminate[e] the
necessity of political activities,” in order to make the courts
“nonpolitical,” 115 the General Assembly’s newly stated
purpose dismissed the importance of an apolitical judiciary.
Now, the purpose underlying judicial selection was not to
totally remove judges from politics, but only to “[b]etter”
insulate judges, to minimize, but not eliminate political
activity, and to make the courts only “less political.”116
In harmony with this more political view of judicial
selection and retention, the General Assembly also
modified the ballot language for retention elections in
2009.117 As was true in other retention states, Tennessee
voters previously responded “yes” or “no” to the question
whether a judge “should be elected and retained in office,”
but the new ballot language required voters to choose “to
114

See Appendix 1.
1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 174-101(a) (1994)).
116
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4101(a) (2009)).
117
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4114(b)(1) (2009)).
115
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retain” or “to replace” the judge.118 The JEC, renamed the
Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission (JPEC), 119
would now recommend judges for retention or replacement,
rather than recommending for or against retention.120
The 2009 legislation included many changes to the
selection process that were consistent with this jaded view
of the courts. For example, when the Tennessee Plan was
adopted, the advice and counsel of lawyers concerning
judicial selection was viewed as essential to the mission of
“finding and appointing the best qualified persons available
for service.”121 Specifically, the legislature noted that due
to their “experience and observation,” lawyers were
“familiar with the best qualities and characteristics of
judges.” 122 To capitalize on this legal expertise,
membership on the JSC and the JEC consisted largely of
lawyers, nominated by four state-wide lawyer
organizations.123 But in 2009, along with the change in the

118

2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4114(b)(1) (2009)).
119
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4115(b)(2) (2009)).
120
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4
-115(b)(1) (2009)). If a judge was not retained, the statute allowed the
governor to bypass the appointment process and fill the vacancy by
direct appointment. 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN.
CODE ANN. § 17-4-113 (2009)).
121
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4101(a) (2009)).
122
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4101(b) (2009)).
123
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4102(a)(1)-(4) (2009) (requiring nominees for the JSC to be submitted
by the Tennessee Bar Association, the Tennessee Trial Lawyers
Association, the Tennessee District Attorney General Conference, and
the Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers)); 2009 Tenn.
Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(b) (2009)
(requiring selection of commission members from lists submitted by
bar groups); 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
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name of both Commissions,124 the legislature changed the
selection process for Commission members, giving the
Speakers of the Senate and the House the exclusive power
to appoint the members of both Commissions. 125 The
previous provisions requiring the Speakers to appoint from
a list of lawyers submitted by bar organizations was
deleted.126
The 2009 legislation also omitted another
significant provision relevant to the composition of the
Commissions – the provision that required the Speakers to
reject entire lists of nominees that did not “reflect the
diversity of the state’s population.”127 Coupled with the
deletion of that diversity initiative was the relaxation of
another provision also aimed at assuring diversity. Under
the original statute creating the Tennessee Plan, the
ANN. § 17-4-201(b) (2009) (requiring that the JEC consist of members
appointed from lists submitted by the bar groups).
124
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4102(a) (2009) (changing the name of the Judicial Selection
Commission to the Judicial Nominating Commission); 2009 Tenn. Pub.
Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(b) (changing
the name of the Judicial Evaluation Commission and program to the
Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission and program).
125
See supra note 99 for details concerning an earlier change in the
provisions related to Commission members.
126
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4201(b)(6) (2009) (noting that “[i]n appointing attorneys to the
commission, the speakers shall receive, but shall not be bound by,
recommendations from any interested person or organization”).
127
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4101(b)(2) (2009)). The 1994 Act provided, “[i]f the nominees do not
reflect the diversity of the state’s population, the speaker shall reject
the entire list of a group and require the group to resubmit its
nominees.” 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-101(b)(2) (1994) (emphasis added). To effectuate this
requirement, the groups were required to “include background data”
about each nominee. 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN.
CODE ANN. § 17-4-101(c) (1994). This provision was also eliminated
in 2009.
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Speakers were required to appoint commission members
“who approximate the population of the state with respect
to race, including the dominant ethnic minority population,
and gender.”128 This provision was replaced with one that
required only that the Speakers make appointments with a
“conscious intention of selecting a body that reflects
diversity.”129 Only geographic diversity was still required.
The Speakers were required to appoint at least four
Commissioners, and were prohibited from appointing more
than seven from the same grand division of the state.130
The changes in the composition and role of the JSC,
now called the Judicial Nominating Commission (JNC),
mirrored the changes in the composition and role of the
JEC, now the JPEC. Judicial evaluation had not been a
simple sell in Tennessee. Judges were resistant to the new
idea initially, but were consoled, perhaps, by the fact that
judges, who were familiar with the tasks of judging and the
essential qualities of good judges, were involved in each
step of the process - from designing and refining the
evaluation system to actually participating in the
evaluations.
When JPE was initially adopted, the Supreme Court
retained authority over the details of the program. The
original JPC, for example, included twelve members, six of
whom were judges appointed by the Judicial Council
(JC).131 But in 2009, the same year the JC was scheduled
128

2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4101(b)(3) (2009)).
129
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4101(c) (2009)). In addition to race and gender, the Speakers were
required to make appointments with a “conscious intention of selecting
a body that” represented “rural as well as urban centers.”
130
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4102(a)(1)-(2), (4) (2009)).
131
Since its creation in 1943, the Judicial Council had made
recommendations to the General Assembly “for changes in rules,
procedures or methods of administration, or upon any other matter
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to expire, the membership of the JPEC decreased to nine
members, with the JC’s appointing authority cut in half.132
A year later, after the JC had terminated and was winding
up its affairs, the General Assembly eliminated input from
the Judicial Council, assumed the role of appointing all of
the members of the JPEC, and again, decreased the number
of judges on the JPEC, this time from five to three.133 The
2009 legislation advanced politics as the core component of
judicial selection and evaluation, greatly decreased the
opportunity for input from the legal profession, and
removed entirely diversity requirements.
Initially, perhaps because both the JSC and JEC
were replaced with different but similar Commissions that
began their operations immediately, the actual termination
of the JSC and the JEC on June 30, 2009 seemed
innocuous. Revealing in hindsight was the short life given
to both of the replacement Commissions. Both the JNC
and the JPEC were scheduled to sunset a mere two years
after their creation, on June 30, 2012.134
With the new statutory mechanism in place, two
appellate judges, who were appointed to fill unexpired
terms, filed qualifying petitions to seek retention in the
pertaining to the judicial system.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-21107(a)(2) (2014 Supp.) Each year the Judicial Council made an annual
state of the judiciary report to the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches; made recommendations about legislation affecting the
judiciary; and assisted in allocating and reallocating scarce judicial
resources. Id. at 107(a)(3)(A)&(B) (2014 Supp.) (noting Judicial
Council’s duty to report annually and to recommend “creation or
reallocation” of judicial, prosecutorial, and public defender positions).
The Judicial Council expired on June 30, 2009, and terminated
completely following its wind-up on June 30, 2010. Tenn. Code Ann. §
4-29-230(a)(32) (2011 Repl.)
132
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. §17-4201(b)(1) (2009)).
133
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4114(b)(1) (2009)).
134
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29-233(a)(15) & (16) (2011 Repl.)

193

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 346
August 5, 2010, election.135 The new JPEC evaluated the
judges and reported its findings to the general public as
required by law.136 The voters in the 2010 election applied
the new ballot language and overwhelmingly voted to
retain, rather than replace, the two appellate judges.137 The
looming crisis, foreshadowed by the Attorney General’s
2009 opinion, had been avoided for at least temporarily.
Between 2009 and 2012, the JNC nominated
candidates and the Governor filled four judicial vacancies
with three men and one woman, all of whom would join
other incumbent judges to stand for retention election in
August 2010.138
D. The End of the Tennessee Plan and the Adoption
of Amendment Two
Meanwhile, however, the General Assembly
continued to flirt with various proposals that offered
additional revisions to Tennessee’s system. A potpourri of
options were proposed, but none passed, leaving the 2009
Act virtually intact. While the JNC and JPEC had
continued to operate, both were nearing their impending
sunset dates. In 2012, days before adjournment, the General
Assembly pardoned the JPEC, extending its life for an

135

The two judges were Justice Sharon G. Lee, appointed to the
Tennessee Supreme Court in October 2008, and Judge John Westley
McClarty, appointed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals in January
2009.
136
The 2010 report is available at http://www.tsc.state.tn.us
/sites/default/files/docs/jpec_evaluations_2010.pdf.
137
The election results are available at http://www.tn.gov/s
os/election/results/2010-08/CCState%20General.pdf.
138
In 2010 Justice Sharon Lee was appointed to the Tennessee
Supreme Court; her seat on the Court of Appeals was filled by Judge
John McClarty. In 2012 Judge (now Justice) Jeffrey Bivins and Judge
Roger Page were named to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.
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additional year.139 This meant that the JPEC would expire
on June 30, 2012, and terminate completely on June 30,
2013, approximately five weeks before the 2014 election.
The legislature offered no similar reprieve for the JNC,
allowing it to expire on June 30, 2012. But before
adjournment, the legislature approved Senate Joint
Resolution (SJR) 710, filed just three weeks earlier.
SJR 710, which would come to be known as
“Amendment 2,”140 proposed an amendment to Article VI,
Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution. Article VI,
Section 2 provided for the selection of Tennessee’s
Supreme Court justices by the “qualified voters of the
State.”141 Pursuant to its legislative power, the legislature
had adopted the Tennessee Plan as the means of judicial
selection in 1994; now the legislature was proposing an
amendment that would replace Tennessee’s model
selection, evaluation, and retention system with a
gubernatorial appointment -legislative confirmation judicial
selection system.
In Tennessee, proposed constitutional amendments
must be approved by increasing majorities of both houses
in two consecutive General Assemblies before being placed
on the ballot during a gubernatorial election.142 SJR 710
swiftly passed both the House and the Senate and was
signed by both Speakers on April 30, 2012, one day before

139

TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-29-333(a)(16); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4-29334(37) (2014 Repl.).
140
This designation was as a result of its being the second of four
constitutional amendments which ultimately were placed before the
Tennessee voters in November 2014.
141
TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
142
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3; see State ex rel. Cohen v. Darnell, 885
S.W.2d 61 (Tenn. 1994) (noting that amendment procedure was added
to the 1834 Constitution and has remained essentially the same since
enactment in 1835).
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the adjournment of the 107th Session of the General
Assembly. 143
The legislature’s swift action on SJR 701 made it
clear why the JPEC was given another year of operation
and the JNC was not. The legislature intended to complete
the elimination of the Tennessee Plan. By allowing the
statutory selection mechanism to terminate, the legislature
created its own calamity. Because Tennessee had no
judicial selection or appointment mechanism after the JNC
terminated, it was unclear how judges who retired or died
after 2012 would be replaced. Additionally, the August
2014 retention election (at which time all appellate judges
would be on the ballot) was a mere two years away. Each
judge had to be evaluated by the JPEC before the election.
While the JPEC could do preliminary evaluations for the
judges standing for retention, it too was set to terminate
completely before the August 2014 election.
Even
presuming completion of the evaluation reports, no
mechanism existed for filling the seats of those judges who
were not retained.
This time it was the Governor’s office that asked
the Attorney General for advice. Did the Governor retain
authority to appoint judges now that the JNC no longer
existed to provide the list of nominees to the Governor?
Ironically, and almost certainly unintentionally, the General
Assembly had provided an easy answer in a provision of
the 2009 legislation. A “failsafe” provision, not a part of
the original Tennessee Plan but included in the 2009
revisions, gave the Governor the power of appointment
notwithstanding the demise of the JNC.144
The failsafe provision, codified in Tennessee Code
Annotated Section 17-4-113(a), was included to assure that
a judicial vacancy did not linger due to the failure of the
JNC to act in a timely manner. The provision authorized
143
144

See Appendix 1; infra note 174
Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. 13-76, 2013 WL 5669872 (Oct. 9, 2013).

196

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 349
the Governor to fill vacancies after sixty days if the JNC
failed to provide a list of nominees within that time
period. 145 Although the JNC no longer existed, the
Attorney General concluded that the failsafe provision
“evidenced a separate intent to ensure that judicial
vacancies are filled in a timely manner and recognized that
the need for a functioning judiciary carries a greater
priority than the JNC’s advisory role.”146 Thus, the statute
“empower[ed] the Governor to fill judicial vacancies in all
circumstances in which the JNC fails to act, including when
the JNC has been terminated and therefore cannot act.”147
As a result, the Governor retained the statutory authority to
fill judicial vacancies even after the JNC ceased to exist.148
Within a week of the Attorney General’s opinion
confirming the Governor’s power, the Governor signed an
Executive Order that distributed his power in a fashion
similar to what had existed prior to the JNC’s termination.
In Executive Order 34, the Governor validated the role that
lawyers had played in the judicial selection process over
the last forty years149 and emphasized the importance of the
division of power between the branches of government.150
To assist in the judicial appointment process, the Governor
appointed a new Commission, the Governor’s Commission
for Judicial Appointments (CJA), to “select” and “certify”
the names of the three persons deemed “best and most
145

TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-113(a) (2009 Repl.).
Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 13-76, 2013 WL 5669872, *3 (Oct. 9, 2013).
147
Id. at *4.
148
Id. at *5.
149
Exec. Order No. 34 (Oct. 16, 2013), available at
https://www.tn.gov/sos/pub/execorders/exec-orders-haslam
34.pdf.) (noting that “for over forty years, Governors of the State of
Tennessee have been assisted in their search for highly qualified
judicial nominees by a commission composed of distinguished
attorneys and laypersons”).
150
Id. (noting in the preamble that the Executive Order’s purpose
includes “sustain[ing] the third and equal branch of government and its
continued operation”).
146
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qualified” to fill a judicial vacancy. 151 Existing JNC
members were appointed to serve on the CJA, along with
six additional members. Executive Order 34 detailed the
process that the CJA would follow in making its
recommendations to the Governor,152 as well as the process
the Governor would follow in making the appointment.153
A subsequent Executive Order, No. 38, amended Executive
Order 34 with regard to particularized circumstances.154
Executive Order 34 is commendable in its
establishment of a transparent and orderly judicial selection
process. The process was followed in the appointment of
four appellate judges and numerous trial judges after the
expiration of the JNC. 155 But any executive order is
potentially fleeting. An executive order exists at the whim
and with the mercy of the executive. Even with its positive
aspects, Executive Order 34 left much uncertainty as to the
future of Tennessee’s judicial selection process.
When the 108th General Assembly convened in
January 2014–the first General Assembly in decades to
include a Republican supermajority– many hoped that the
legislature would debate and adopt a more permanent
selection process for Tennessee’s judges, but other than
approving the second resolution (SJR 2) necessary to place
Amendment 2 on the November 14 ballot, the legislature
took no other action related to the selection, evaluation, or

151

Id. at 4(j).
Id. at (3), (4).
153
Id. at (5).
154
Exec. Order No. 38 (June 9, 2014) (providing for appointment
without CJA nomination when trial court candidates, running for a
vacated seat, have won primary elections and have no opposition in the
general election and providing that the Governor may request the CJA
to assist in filling vacancies on the Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Board), available at http://www.tn.gov/sos/pub/execorders/
exec-orders-haslam38.pdf.
155
See Appendix 1. But see text following note 171 infra.
152
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retention of Tennessee’s judges.156 This meant that most of
the details about how Amendment 2’s so-called Founding
Father’s Plan would work remained unknown. Amendment
2 clearly provided that judges would be appointed by the
Governor, confirmed by the legislature, and retained by the
voters, 157 but the remaining details of the selection and
retention system was left entirely to legislative discretion
by the amendment’s provision that the authorized the
legislature was authorized to “prescribe [the necessary]
provisions” to carry out the amendment.158

156

Senate Joint Resolution 2. As required by Article XI, Section 3,
SJR 2 was the second resolution “entered” on the House and Senate
journals. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
157
The Amendment provided:
Judges of the Supreme Court or any
intermediate appellate court shall
be appointed for a full term or to
fill a vacancy by and at the
discretion of the governor; shall be
confirmed by the Legislature; and
thereafter, shall be elected in a
retention election by the qualified
voters of the state. Confirmation by
default occurs if the Legislature
fails to reject an appointee within
sixty calendar days of either the
date of appointment, if made during
the annual legislative session, or
the convening date of the next
annual legislative session, if made
out of session. The Legislature is
authorized to prescribe such
provisions as may be necessary to
carry out Sections two and three of
this article.
TENN. CONST. art. VI, Section 3 (2014).
158
Id.
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But when the time came for the vote on
Amendment 2, the legislature had not proscribed any
provisions. No proposals set out the specifics of the
selection and confirmation process; no legislative study
group was tasked with seeking input or vetting options.
Voters who went to the polls in November 2014 were being
asked to give the legislature a proverbial blank check.
Among the blanks that the legislature had not filled
were the particulars of the legislative confirmation process.
For example, what percentages were required for the
legislature to confirm a governor’s judicial appointment?
Would a simple majority of both houses confirm an
appointment? What process would be followed if a
nominee failed to acquire the required percentage in one
house or both houses? Similar uncertainty remained about
the public’s retention vote. Would judges be retained in
office if a majority of the voters cast “retain” votes, or
would the legislature ultimately require a higher
percentage, as some members had proposed in earlier
legislation? Although Tennessee, and most retention states,
generally required a simple majority for retention, the
amendment arguably gave the legislature the authority to
decide that issue.
What happened when a judicial vacancy occurred
during legislative recess, often encompassing two-thirds of
the year? Although the amendment imposed a time limit
on legislative confirmation, the time period began to run on
the “convening date of the next legislative session” for
recess appointments. If a vacancy occurred in May, shortly
after recess, would the legislature have until March of the
following year to confirm the appointment?
The amount of uncertainty and ambiguity that
surrounded the proposed amendment led one commentator
to conclude that Tennesseans were being asked to “buy a
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pig in a poke.” 159 But despite the many uncertainties and
the wealth of unanswered question raised by Amendment
2’s ambiguity, Tennessee presently had no mechanism for
judicial selection. Was the passage of Amendment 2 the
only way out of this calamity?
That was the clear message of many proponents.
Governors, former governors, current and former
legislators, judges, bar leaders, politicians and virtually
everyone, it seemed, undaunted by the lack of detail, joined
forces and funds to encourage the voters to approve the
amendment.160 Some Supreme Court justices joined in,
combined their voices with those who had sought to oust
them three months earlier,161 and endorsed the amendment
as the best selection and retention system for Tennessee.162
Those who supported Amendment 2 marketed the
amendment in a number of clever ways. The most modest
strategy was to characterize the amendment as simply
constitutionalizing the Tennessee Plan. 163
That
159

Frank Cagle, “Pig in a Poke: There are no Rules in Place for
Confirming Judges Under Amendment Two,” METRO PULSE (Sept. 10,
2014), available at http://www.metropulse.com/stories/pig-in-a-pokethere-are
-no-rules-in-place-for-confirming-judges-under-amendment
-two).
160
More than a million dollars was spent to advance the passage of
Amendment 2 in November 2014.
161
The concerted effort to remove three Tennessee Supreme Court
justices failed, thankfully, but not until in excess of one million dollars
was spent on advertising and marketing.
162
Johnathan O. Steen, I Say YES on 2, 2014 TENN. BAR. J. 3 (Oct.
2014) (stating that “Amendment 2 is also strongly supported by leaders
in the judiciary, including Chief Justice Sharon Lee and Justices Wade,
Clark, Bivins and Kirby, and many other appellate and trial court
judges.”); Newly Installed Tennessee Supreme Court Justice to
Campaign for Constitutional Amendment, THE REPUBLIC (Aug. 14,
2014) (referring to Justice Bivins who was not a target of the August
2014 ouster campaign).
163
Former Governor Phil Bredesen and former U.S. Senator Fred
Thompson co-wrote an editorial that stated that passing the amendment
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characterization was wrong in both of its assertions. First,
although often used as a stooge, the constitutionality of the
Tennessee Plan had been resolved repeatedly since 1994.164
Secondly, the selection process under Amendment 2 was
not comparable to the selection, evaluation, and retention
process under the Tennessee Plan. 165
Amendment 2
replaced the Tennessee Plan’s broad-based selection
process with a purely political process. It eliminated
entirely judicial performance evaluations, which were
based on objective criteria and were intended to inform the
electorate’s vote. Amendment 2 gave the legislature the
prerogative to apply its own criteria, including one based
purely on politics.166
One of the most ironic deceptions used by some
proponents was the assertion that passage of the
amendment would “keep the influence of special interest
money away from our judges and out of our state.”
Tennesseans had just witnessed the most expensive judicial
race in the state’s history waged by three justices fighting
for retention, the very type of system that the Founding
would “put an end to the questions [of constitutionality] and will help
ensure we get the most qualified, diverse, fair and impartial judges that
Tennesseans want and deserve.” Vote Yes on 2, THE TENNESSEAN
(April 29, 2014), available at http://www.tene
ssean.com/story/opinion/contributors/2014/04/29/vote-yes-best-pathjudicial-selection/8427555/.
164
See supra note 97.
165
See supra notes 27-65 and accompanying text.
166
Some organizations who supported Amendment 2 claimed that they
possessed additional information about the process the legislature
ultimately would adopt. On its website, the Tennessee Bar Association,
for example, asserted that “[a]s the Tennessee Judicial Selection
Amendment is expected to be implemented, the system will give us a
way to select the best possible candidate because the system will have
independence; provide expert guidance; be made up of a diverse group;
have transparency; be completely informed as to the qualifications of
the candidates; be deliberate; and will result in a list of the best
qualified candidates being recommended to the governor.”
http://www.tba.org/info/amendment-2-to-the-tennessee-constitution.
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Fathers’ Plan embraced.167 Those claiming that retention
elections would inoculate against expensive campaigns
waged by special interest groups were undoubtedly aware
that special interest money had infiltrated many retention
elections in recent years.168
But by far the most troubling aspects of this pro
Amendment 2 marketing message was its adoption and
assertion of an ultimatum: adopt the amendment or subject
appellate judges to expensive, contested, popular elections.
The assertion was based on the threat by some legislators to
enact popular elections in the event the amendment failed.
Their threat was premised on the same straw man, the
indefensible assertion that the Tennessee Plan was
unconstitutional. The validity of the assertion depended
completely on the willingness – and the ability – of those
legislators to make good on their threat. As commentators
noted, this strategy constructed a disingenuous choice: pass
Amendment 2 or succumb to popular judicial elections.169
Despite the absence of details and the presence of
deception, the Tennessee voters overwhelmingly approved
167

According to the Justice at Stake the amount raised and spent neared
two million dollars, with the justices raising more than one million, the
Tennessee Forum investing almost half a million, and out-of-state
groups including the Republican State Leadership and the State
Government Leadership Foundation spending another quarter of a
million dollars. http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/pr
ess-releases16824/?tv_spending_surges_past_14_million _
in_hardfought_tennessee_judicial_race&show=news&newsID=18890).
168
See supra note 89.
169
Judy Cornett, Why I Oppose Proposed Amendment 2 to the
Tennessee Constitution, Presentation to Hamilton Burnett Chapter
American Inns of Court (Aug. 18, 2014) (available in author’s office)
(noting that the “dichotomy between Amendment 2 and contested
popular elections has been used to blackmail those who oppose
contested popular elections into supporting a plan that gives the
General Assembly unprecedented power in selecting appellate judges
and contains no real safeguards against abuse of either the appointment
power or the confirmation power.”).
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Amendment 2, placing Tennessee in the majority of states
who give the legislature a veto power over judicial
appointments and with the majority of states who fail to
provide voters with meaningful information to inform their
retention votes. The following day, through another
Executive Order, the Governor reaffirmed his commitment
to a more precise judicial selection process. 170 Like the
process outlined in the two previous Executive Orders, the
judicial selection process under Executive Order 41 closely
resembles the selection process under the Tennessee
Plan.171 But despite an acceptable nomination process, the
gubernatorial appointments have not reflected the diversity
accomplished by the Tennessee Plan, and the percentage of
female judges and judges of color in Tennessee is steadily
declining.
Additionally, as is true of all executive orders,
Executive Order 41 is as easy to alter as it is to dissolve.172
It clearly does not bind future governors or the General
170

Executive Order 41 (Nov. 6, 2014), available at
http://www.tn.gov/sos/pub/execorders/exec-orders-haslam4
1.pdf. Executive Order 41 established the Governor’s Commission for
Judicial Appointments (JAC), replacing the CJA (established by
Executive Order 34). The JAC, which consists of 11 members, 8 of
whom are required to be attorneys, nominates three persons deemed
“best and most qualified” to fill judicial vacancies.
171
Under Executive Order 41, the JAC accepts applications, conducts
public interviews and hearings, and deliberates privately, before
nominating the three “best and most qualified” persons to fill judicial
vacancies.
172
The power to issue executive orders is not addressed explicitly in
either the Tennessee Constitution, statutes, or case law. Article III,
Section 10 provides that governors “shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed,” so presumably, based upon that Section and the
inherent power of the executive to enforce the law, Tennessee
governors have regularly issued executive orders. For example, the
Tennessee State Library and Archives, for example, has archived and
microfilmed hundreds of executive orders dating back to 1953. See
http://tenessee.gov/tsla/history/
state/recordgroups/findingaids/rg95.pdf.
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Assembly and, because of its transient nature, it does not
actually even bind the current governor. 173
V.

Politics First

With the passage of Amendment 2, the public
entrusted the General Assembly to complete the task of
defining the details of judicial selection in Tennessee.
Because of the general nature of Amendment 2, the passage
of Amendment 2 gave the legislature virtually unchecked
power to define the confirmation and retention process.
But, ultimately, the General Assembly failed to complete
the task and instead, became embroiled in a political
struggle that once again put a premium on political power.
Senate Bill 1 was filed for introduction on
November 5, 2014, before the 109th General Assembly
convened. Senate Bill 1174 created a 14-member “special,
continuing committee of the General Assembly, (JCC),175
which would investigate, interview, and vote on appointees,
before filing a joint resolution recommending confirmation
173

The question whether a potential candidate, for example, could seek
judicial enforcement of an executive order seems to be an open
question in Tennessee although in other jurisdictions some scholars
have suggested that a cause of action may be available to force
compliance with an executive order. See Stephen Ostrow, Enforcing
Executive Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Action Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO WASH. L. REV. 659, 664 (1987)
(citing Meat Packers Ass’n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1975)
(suggesting that a cause of action exists when the order is authorized
and evidences an intent, explicitly or implicitly, to create a private right
of action)).
174
Senate Bill 1 can be viewed at http://www.capitol.tn.gov
/Bills/109/Bill/SB0001.pdf.
175
Section 9(b) of Senate Bill 1 provided that “[t]he political
composition of the judicial confirmation committee shall reflect as
nearly as possible the same ratio of members from each of the two (2)
major political parties as the parties are represented in the respective
houses.”
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or rejection of the governor’s judicial appointee. The JCC
was required to convene “at least one” public “meeting” 176
and was allowed to conduct “additional interviews” with,
and independent investigations of, the appointee.177 The
members of the JCC, “with each house voting separately,”
would vote to determine whether the respective house
confirmed or rejected the appointee178 and then would file
a joint resolution reflecting the recommendation, which
would be voted on by the respective houses. 179
Within days of convening, the Senate passed Senate
Bill 1 on first and second reading and referred the bill to the
176

Section 10(b)(1) provided that the JCC “shall convene at least one
(1) meeting of the judicial confirmation committee.” Although
subsection (2) of Section 10(b) provided that “[a]ny citizen shall be
entitled to attend the meeting and express in writing the citizen’s
approval of, or objections to, the governor’s appointee,” nothing
specifies whether the appointee would also be in attendance. An
additional uncertainty was raised by Section 10(b)(4)(A), which
provided that “[a]fter one (1) public hearing, the judicial confirmation
committee may hold such additional interviews with the appointee as it
deems necessary . . . .” It is unclear whether this “public hearing” is the
same as or in addition to the “meeting,” which the public is entitled to
attend, referenced in Section 10(b)(1) & (2).
177
Section 10(b)(4)(A) provided that the JCC “may make independent
investigation and inquiry to determine the qualifications of the
appointee for the judicial vacancy.” See also Section
10(b)(4)(B)(providing that the JCC may request that the Tennessee
Bureau of investigation “perform appropriate financial and criminal
background investigations and inquiries of a prospective
appointee”)(emphasis added). The use of the phrase “prospective
appointee” presumably is intended to refer to the governor’s appointee,
which is the phrase used throughout the remainder of the legislation.
178
Section 10(b)(1) provided that “[t]he judicial confirmation
committee shall vote with each house voting separately and shall
determine by a majority vote of the committee members of that house
present and voting whether that house recommends confirmation or
rejection of the governor’s appointee.”
179
Section 10(c)(1) provided that a member of the JCC of each house
“shall file a joint resolution reflecting the recommendation of the
member’s house.”
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Senate Judiciary Committee. Ultimately, the Senate passed
an amended version of Senate Bill 1, which significantly
altered the confirmation process and removed any
provision for public input.180 Under the amended version,
the General Assembly was required to meet in joint session
for the purpose of voting either to confirm or reject the
appointee, who was required to receive a majority vote
from both houses to be confirmed. 181
The House version of the bill, House Bill 142,
generated a series of amendments, also impacting the
confirmation process. Multiple House amendments offered
various mechanisms for tabulating the votes of each
house,182 with the common theme being to secure House
180

The amended legislation allowed the “chair of any standing
committee of the general assembly to which a notice of appointment . .
. [was] referred” to request an investigation or, “in accordance with the
rules of the applicable house[, to] conduct a hearing, vote to
recommend confirmation or rejection of the appointee, and submit a
written report of the action taken . . . .”` Amendment 2 to Senate Bill 1,
Section 10 (b) & (c). Senate Bill 1, as amended by Senate Amendment
2, may be viewed at http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Amend/SA0
435.pdf. Amendment 2 also created a separate Trial Court Vacancy
Commission, consisting of ten legislators and one attorney, created to
submit nominees for trial court vacancies to the governor. Section 17 of
Senate Bill 1, as amended by Amendment 2.
181
Section (10)(d) of Senate Bill 1, as amended by Amendment 2,
provided that “[t]he governor’s appointee shall be confirmed if both
houses vote to confirm the appointee by a majority of all the members
to which each house is entitled . . . .”
182
House Amendment 2 to House Bill 142, referred to as House
Amendment 452, provided that the votes of each house would be
tabulated separately and that confirmation would occur if an appointee
received a majority vote from both houses. Amendment 2 may be
viewed at http://www.c
apitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Amend/HA0452.pdf. Amendments 3 and 4
(House Amendments 470 and 482) created tabulation systems by which
each house member’s vote equaled one point, while each senator’s vote
equaled three points. “A tabulation of one hundred (100) points to
“confirm” result[ed] in the appointee being confirmed by the general
assembly.
Amendment
3
can
be
viewed
at
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supremacy. The version eventually adopted by the House
did so, by providing that confirmation or rejection would be
determined by a majority vote of the general assembly
meeting in joint session. 183 Unsurprisingly, the Senate
rejected the House’s approach and the House refused to
recede.184 A report generated by the Senate Conference
Committee failed to receive a majority vote, leaving the
state with nothing but Executive Order 41 to define the
details of its judicial selection, confirmation, and retention
process.
VI. Conclusion
When the 109th General Assembly convened on
January 13, 2015, the legislators, like their frontier
ancestors, had the power to control, in large part, the
composition and, thus, the quality of Tennessee’s appellate
bench. With the adoption of Amendment 2, the public
entrusted the legislature with the most essential task of
designing a confirmation process that would assure a highquality appellate judiciary and a retention process that
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Amend/HA0470.pdf. Amendment
4 can be viewed at http://www.capitol.tn.gov/
Bills/109/Amend/HA0482.pdf.
183
The House adopted Amendments 6 and 7. Amendment 6 (House
Amendment 519) provided that “[a] majority of votes, to which the
general assembly is entitled, cast in the affirmative shall confirm the
appointee.”
Amendment
6
can
be
viewed
at
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Amen
d/HA0519.pdf. Amendment 7 (House Amendment 520) altered the
language of Senate Amendment 2. See supra note 182. By authorizing
the standing committee to which a notice of appointment has been
referred, rather than the chair of the committee, to conduct a hearing,
vote to recommend or reject, and submit a written report on the
appointee. Amendment 7 may be viewed at http://www.ca
pitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Amend/HA0520.pdf.
184
The House and Senate Conference Committee recommended that
the House Amendments 6 and 7, supra note 183, be deleted.
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would allow meaningful voter input. But rather than
complete the task, and despite the fact that a single party
controlled both houses, 185 the House and Senate engaged
in an intra-party squabble and, in the end, promoted
political dominance over public trust on a matter of
extreme importance.
If we as Tennesseans value a fair and independent
judiciary, if we truly desire to “keep the influence . . . away
from our judges and out of our state,” then we must
demand that our General Assembly take seriously the trust
we have placed in them with our adoption of Amendment
2. We must require that they adopt a confirmation process
that includes public input and maintains the judiciary as a
separate and independent branch of government as well as
a retention process that provides a meaningful basis upon
which voters may exercise their right to vote. Otherwise,
we too will suffer the tyranny that befalls those
governments in which all government power is
concentrated in the same hands.

185

In 2014, Tennessee Republicans expanded the supermajorities in
both the House and the Senate, holding a 28-5 majority in the Senate
and a 73-26 majority in the House. The supermajority was acquired in
November 2012, making the 108th General Assembly the first since the
90th General Assembly to have both houses controlled by one party.
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POLICY NOTE
THE TROUBLING CASE(S) OF NONCITIZENS:
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT THROUGH THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE EFFECT ON FAMILIES1
By: Juan C. Quevedo
I.

Introduction

Close your eyes and imagine yourself a homeless
mother, moving from one place to another every six
months. Imagine how you would feel, alone with no friends
or family to ask for help. You–in this imaginary world–are
“undocumented” to people, and no matter how much you
try, no one is reaching out to help you.2 Instead, your first
name becomes “illegal” and your last name becomes
“alien.” Worse still, the United States government is
enacting laws designed to separate you from your family,
because you are a scapegoat for both local and national
problems.
Now open your eyes and realize that your
imagination is the reality of millions of noncitizens living
in the shadows of American society. Nearly 40 million
United States residents were born abroad. 3 About 11
1

This paper was presented at the 5th National Conference of
Immigration to the U.S. South: Immigration Reform and Beyond? on
October 25, 2014 at the University of Florida.
2
Although I use the term “undocumented” in the introduction, I will
use the term “noncitizen” for the remainder of this article. The term
noncitizen includes anyone not a U.S. citizen, such as immigrants
(persons granted the right to permanently reside in the U.S.),
nonimmigrants (persons granted the right to temporarily reside in the
U.S.) and undocumented immigrants (persons that either lost their
immigration status, by overstaying their visa, or persons that entered
the U.S. without inspection).
3
United States Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/pop
ulation/foreign/files/cps2012/2012T1.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2014).
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million of them are undocumented. 4 The federal
government has greatly escalated the rate at which it
removes noncitizens from the U.S.5 For example, United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
removes about 400 thousand noncitizens per year, or about
1,000 per day.6
Despite the large number of noncitizens removed,
federal courts have held that it is not the government’s role
to remove every noncitizen. For example, in Kang v.
United States, Jinyu Kang, a citizen of China, fled to the
United States and sought asylum.7 After finding that the
record “compels the conclusion that if Kang is removed to
China it is more likely … that she will be beaten,
suffocated, deprived of sleep, shocked with electrical
current, and/or forced to stand for long periods of time,” the
court granted Kang Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)
relief.8 In doing so, the court noted that the government’s
role is to “seek justice rather than victory,” and the court
was in “distress” when the government failed to live up to
that duty in this case.9 And the problem, according to Jill
E. Family, a professor at Widener University School of
4

Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project, http://pewhispani
c.org/files/reports/133.pdf#page=24 (last visited Aug. 30, 2014).
5
Removal proceedings include deportation and exclusion. After the
enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act of 1996, both, deportation and exclusion
proceedings were combined into one unified proceeding now known as
“removal.” See IIRAIRA, Pub. L. 104-208 (1996); 8 U.S.C. §
1229(a)(2)-(3) (defining “removal proceedings” as the procedure for
determining whether a noncitizen may be excluded from the United
States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) or, whether the noncitizen may be
deported under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)).
6
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ERO Annual Report,
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero
/pdf/2013-ice-immigration-removals.pdf.
7
Kang v. United States, 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010).
8
Id.
9
Id.
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Law, is that “the government views as a victory a denial of
relief accompanied by a removal order; in other words, a
‘guilty’ verdict.’”10
Further, numerous courts of appeals have held that
“family unification is one the highest goals of American
immigration law [and policy].”11 For example, in Mufti v.
Gonzalez, Farzan Mufti, a lawful permanent resident of the
United States, attempted to cross the U.S.-Canada border
with his noncitizen wife. 12 U.S. Customs and Border
Protection detained Mr. Mufti. 13 And the immigration
court denied Mr. Mufti’s admission into the United
States.14 The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.15 In
reversing the immigration court’s decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that
“family unification [is] the cornerstone of American
immigration law and policy . . . . American immigration
law [is] based upon a desire for pursuing the time-honored
American tradition of encouraging family unity.”16
10

Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering
Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 KAN. L. REV.
541, 556 (2011) (citing the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, ICE Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Report: Protecting
National Security and Upholding Public Safety 28 (2008)).
11
Mufti v. Gonzalez, 174 F. App’x 303, 306 (6th Cir. 2006); see also
Duarte-Ceri v. Holder, 630 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing that
“[i]t is consistent with Congress’s remedial purposes . . . to interpret the
statute’s ambiguity . . . in a manner that will keep families intact.”);
Morel v. INS, 90 F.3d 833, 841 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing that
“[v]arious provisions of the INA reflect Congress’s intent to prevent
the unwarranted separation of parents from their children.”); SolisEspinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing
that “[t]he [INA] was indented to keep families together and should be
construed in favor of family units.”).
12
Id. at 304.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 304-05.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 306.
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Therefore, against the backdrop of justice and
family unity, the purpose of this paper is to outline how the
federal government has unreasonably turned the criminal
justice system into an immigration removal system by
sharing information between ICE and law enforcement
agencies (“LEAs”). Residing in America is a privilege; a
privilege extended to some, and not to others. Accordingly,
Congress originally did not extend the privilege to
noncitizens convicted of three crimes: murder, illicit
trafficking in firearms, and drug trafficking.17 The list,
however, now includes twenty-eight offenses.18 We now
have a system that is unreasonable because it removes
noncitizens that pose no danger to American society.
Congress has strayed so far from the original intent of the
U.S. removal system. The government now removes people
that have lived in the United States most of their lives, have
U.S. citizen family members, but lack a way to become
legal residents or citizens of the United States. And
although the cornerstone of American immigration law and
policy is family unification, the sharing of information
between ICE and LEAs has had an adverse effect on both
noncitizen and mix-status families.
Therefore, in this paper, I endeavor to provide a
critique on how the criminal and immigration system are
working together to remove noncitizens that pose no danger
to American society, separating families along the way.
Part I will discuss how ICE shares information with LEAs.
Part II will discuss the expansion of the “aggravated
felony” definition and the lack of clarity on determining
when a crime involves moral turpitude. Part III will
discuss the lack of proportionality in immigration law.
Finally, part IV will discuss the effects on both noncitizen
and mix-status families.
17

Cesar Cuauhtemoc & Garcia Hernandez, Creating Crimigration,
2013 BYU L. REV. 1457, 1468 (2013).
18
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U) (2014).
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II. Secure Communities
In appropriations legislation for 2008, the U.S.
Congress appropriated $200 million “to improve and
modernize efforts to identify noncitizens convicted of a
crime, sentenced to imprisonment, and who may be
[remov]able, and remove them from the U.S. once they are
judged [remov]able.”19 To accomplish the goal set out in
2008, Congress directed the secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) to develop a plan to “presents
a strategy for [ICE] to identify every criminal noncitizen, at
the prison, jail, or correctional institution in which they are
held.”20 As a result, Secure Communities (“S-COM”)–a
comprehensive plan to identify and remove criminal
noncitizens–was born.21 At its core, S-COM is a “datasharing scheme that cross references biometric data, such
as fingerprints obtained at the booking of an arrested
individual, between ICE, the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (“FBI”), states, and localities.”22
Before S-COM, many law enforcement agencies
(“LEAs”) did not determine an individual’s immigration
status because the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information
Service Division’s (“CJIS”) Integrated Automated
Identification System (“IAFIS”) 23 and ICE’s Automated
Biometric Identification System “(IDENT”) could not
19

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121
Stat. 2050-51 (2007).
20
Id.
21
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities
Quarterly Report, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy101stquarter.pdf.
22
Anil Kalhan, The Second Wave of Global Privacy Protection:
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology,
Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105 (2013).
23
This database contains records of over 100 million people. See
Cuauhtemoc, supra note 17.
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exchange data .24 For example, “when [LEAs] made an
arrest and booked a[n individual] into custody, the agency
submits the [individual]’s biographic and biometric
information to the CJIS/IAFIS to determine the
[individual’s] criminal history.”25 Then, to determine an
individual’s immigration status, the LEA had to manually
submit biographical information to ICE’s Law Enforcement
Support Center (“LESC”).26
Through S-COM, however, CJIS/IAFIS automatically
forwards both biographic and biometric information to
IDENT. ICE provides the following description of the
process:
1. When a[n individual] is arrested and booked into
custody, the arresting LEA sends the [individual’s]
fingerprints and associated biographical information
to the appropriate State Identification Bureau
(“SIB”) [(e.g., the Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation)];
2. The SIB then sends the fingerprints and associated
biographical information to CJIS/IAFIS;
3. CJIS electronically [forwards the individual’s]
biometric and biographic information to IDENT to
determine if there is a fingerprint match;27

24

“Despite having come online in 1994, the IDENT database is quite
large. By late 2013, IDENT held records on approximately 150 million
subjects and was growing at a rate of ten million entries per year.”
Cuauhtemoc, supra note 17.
25
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, supra note 12, at 2.
26
Id.
27
When used in the immigration detainer context, a ”match" usually
means an alert that a person is potentially removable from the United
States. This might be because the ICE database lists a prior
immigration law violation or because it lists the person as lacking
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4. [If there is a match] with data in IDENT, CJIS
generates and sends an Immigration Alien Query
(“IAQ”) to the LESC;
5. The LESC queries law enforcement and
immigration databases 28 to make an initial
immigration status determination and generates and
Immigration Alien Response (“IAR”) to prioritize
enforcement actions;29
6. The LESC sends the IAR to CJIS, which routes it to
the appropriate [SIB] to send to the originating
LEA. The LESC also sends the IAR to the local
ICE field office, which [lodges immigration
detainers].30 31
Therefore, S-COM “shifted to a system of universal and
automated screening such that every single person arrested
United States citizenship. In the criminal law enforcement context,
”match" usually means a prior conviction.
28
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities:
Monthly Statistics through August 31, 2014: IDENT/IAFIS
Interoperability, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/f
oia/sc-stats/nationwide_interop_stats-fy2014-to-date.pdf
(describing that the LESC queries the Student & Exchange Visitor
Information System (“SEVIS”); U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status);
and the National Crime and Information Center database.
29
Id. (describing ICE’s three tier priority system; Level 1 includes
convictions of “aggravated felonies,” or two or more crimes punishable
by more than one year, commonly known as “felonies”; Level 2
includes convictions of offenses punishable by less than one year,
commonly referred to as “misdemeanors”; and level 3 includes
convictions of all other offenses. ICE also prioritizes the removal of
individuals that entered the United States without inspection, or have
violated their visa).
30
An immigration detainer is a notice to law enforcement agencies to
hold a noncitizen for up to forty-eight hours, not including weekends or
holidays.
31
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, supra note 12, at 2.
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by a local law enforcement official anywhere in the country
[is] screened by the federal government for immigration
status and [removal] eligibility.”32 A match with data in
IDENT, however, is not required for an individual to come
to the attention of the LESC. According to Anil Kalhan,
professor of law at Drexel University School of Law, “even
where there is no match, but the individual has an unknown
or non-U.S. place of birth [IDENT] automatically flags the
[individual’s] record and notifies the LESC. . .”33
LEAs also cannot avoid sharing information with
ICE, or “choose to have the fingerprints it submits to the
[CJIS/IAFIS] processed only for criminal history checks.”34
As mentioned above, under S-COM, once a LEA forwards
the fingerprints and associated biographical information of
an individual to the appropriate SIB, the information is
automatically forwarded to IDENT. LEAs can, however,
choose not to send fingerprints to the CJIS/IAFIS. But
“from a practical standpoint, LEAs have no choice but to . .
. forward[] arrestees’ fingerprints to the [CJIS/IAFIS] in
order to obtain information that is critically important for
crime-fighting purposes.”35 In this sense, ICE “extracts
identification and criminal history information from state
and local law enforcement agencies when they routinely
transmit that information to the FBI for purposes that are
unrelated to civil immigration enforcement . . .”36

32

Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime?
Evidence from “Secure Communities,” J.L & ECON (2014).
33
Kalhan, supra note 22, at 1.
34
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Protecting the
Homeland, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communit
ies/pdf/hsac-sc-taskforce-report.pdf.
35
Kalhan, supra note 22, at n.115.
36
Id.

218

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 371
A. Problems for Noncitizens
S-COM allows LEAs to assume an indirect
immigration-policing role. S-COM empowers police “to
arrests individuals for the very purpose of booking them
and having their immigration status screened-without
regard to whether that arrest leads to any criminal
prosecution.”37 For example, “[e]vidence to date suggests
that in some jurisdictions, this is precisely what has
happened, as police officers have, disproportionally
“target[ed] Lat[in Americans] for minor violations and pretextual arrests with the actual goal of initiating immigration
checks through the S-COM system, rather than for
prosecution.”38 Even DHS’s own Office of Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties (“CRCL”) identified criminal arrests
that served as a pretext for an immigration investigation.39
S-COM also creates other problems for noncitizens
that come in contact with the criminal justice system.
Through S-COM, ICE often detects noncitizens during the
jail booking process or while awaiting trial (custody
incident to arrest).
And “[t]hese presumptively
[removable] noncitizens will face removal proceedings
regardless of the outcome of their criminal cases…”40 As a
result, noncitizens “often believe it futile and not worth the
cost to contest minor criminal charges while detained, even
if they are innocent, have strong defenses, or were arrested
through racial profiling or other constitutional rights
violations.”41
37

Id.
Id.
39
Maureen A. Sweeney, Shadow Immigration Enforcement and its
Constitutional Dangers, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 227, 251
(2014) (Discussing that because of this pretext, the CRCL prepared a
training video for local officers on how to avoid racial profiling).
40
Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in
Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751 (2013).
41
Id.
38
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S-COM, therefore, influences the plea-bargain
incentives of noncitizens that ICE has not detected but
cannot make bail; “[t]hose who cannot make bail often
must choose between any plea that offers an end to
detention [and allows them to return to their family], and
detection by ICE if they . . . defend against their charges.”42
And “[b]ecause prosecutors often make plea offers at the
defendant’s first appearance . . . , noncitizens willing to
take the deal may be able to exit the system without ICE
detection.”43 Nonetheless, accepting a plea to avoid ICE
detection may trigger removal proceedings.44
Despite the immigration consequences of accepting
a plea bargain, noncitizens do take pleas motivated by
avoiding ICE detection.
In People v. Cristache, for
example, the court found that the defendant, a noncitizen,
received effective assistance of counsel where his counsel
advised him to plead guilty rather than proceed to trial.45
The court noted that defense counsel negotiated “a
disposition [that] conditionally guaranteed that defendant
would have remained ‘out of jail’—i.e., Rikers Island—
where ICE agents routinely engage in a concerted effort to
identify criminal noncitizens for [removal].”46 In addition,
the court noted that remaining out of jail, as the plea
negotiated by counsel anticipated, reduces the risk of
removal (or the risk of detection for removal).47 Thus, the
court concluded that defense counsel “effectively placed
defendant in the best position to avoid actual [removal].”48
Noncitizen’s strategies to avoid ICE detection do
not always work. For example, some noncitizen defendants
42

Id.
Id.
44
For a discussion on how accepting a guilty plea triggers removal
proceedings see Part II.
45
People v. Cristache, 29 Misc. 3d 720 (Crim. Ct. 2010).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
43
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agree to probation to avoid time49 are still detected by ICE
because “[p]robation and parole officers at both state and
federal levels are frequently in communication with ICE.”
50
And because ICE’s priorities are subject to change, there
are often nationwide “sweeps” at state probation offices.51
In addition, probation or parole officers have the discretion
to report an individual to ICE.52
B. Other Ways Noncitizens Come In Contact With
“ICE”
Other than S-COM, there are many other ways
sharing a person’s information with ICE can trigger
removal proceedings.
For example, submitting an
application for adjustment of status may trigger removal
proceedings. Currently, “background checks (through
biometrics procedure) are concluded for almost every
immigration application.53 When a noncitizen applies for
adjustment of status, an applicant for an immigration
benefit receives notice to report to a DHS substation for
“biometrics,” which includes fingerprinting and photos, as
well as a name check.
As a result, applying for
naturalization and adjustment of status guarantees the
bringing of old convictions to light and, if applicable, the
commencement of adverse action (i.e., removal
proceedings and possible detention).54
ICE also detects noncitizens while serving a prison
sentence. When a noncitizen “is serving a prison sentence,
49

Cade, supra note 40, at 1.
MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS,
168 (Richard J. Link ed., 5th ed. 2014).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
50
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ICE will lodge a detainer,55 and often interview the person
while in custody to obtain facts and information, and later
serve a notice to appear in immigration court (“NTA”).56
This process is often done through the Criminal Alien
Program (“CAP”).57 And where ICE has not detected a
noncitizen, “[i]t is not unheard of for a prison official to
communicate with ICE if the institution is poised to release
a non-American citizen and, for whatever reason, [ICE has
not placed an immigration detainer].”58
III.

How Shared Data Affects Noncitizens

ICE receives data concerning removable
noncitizens via S-COM. But what type of data does ICE
receive, and how is this data used to determine whether a
person is eligible for removal from the United States? Title
8 of the U.S. Code subjects noncitizens to removal for
convictions of an “aggravated felony,” 59 which includes
some misdemeanors. 60 Title 8 of the U.S. Code also
subjects immigrants to removal for convictions of a “crime
of moral turpitude.”61
55

“According to 8 CFR § 287.7(d), a law enforcement agency may
hold a non-American citizen for up to 48 hours, not including
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, pursuant to an ICE detainer. By
regulation, after 48 hours, if ICE does not assume custody, the
individual should be released.”
56
KRAMER, supra note 50.
57
U.S.C. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Criminal Alien
Program, http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program (CAP “provides
ICE-wide direction and support in the biometric and biographic
identification, arrest, and removal of priority [noncitizens] who are
incarcerated within federal, state, and local prisons and jails”).
58
Id.
59
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2008).
60
United States v. Graham , 169 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that
petty theft with a one-year suspended sentence, a misdemeanor under
New York law, is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes).
61
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2008).
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A. The “Aggravated Felony”
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 added the
“aggravated felony” into the world of immigration law and
provided that a conviction of an “aggravated felony” would
result in removal proceedings.62 At that time, only three
crimes were aggravated felonies: murder, illicit trafficking
in firearms, and drug trafficking.63 The list now includes
twenty-eight offenses.64 Some even create sub categories.65
Two years after the creation of the “aggravated
felony” definition, Congress expanded the aggravated
felony definition to include “any crime of violence.”66 And
four years later, Congress added non-violent crimes such as
theft (including receipt of stolen property), trafficking in
fraudulent documents, fraud, and tax evasion to the
“aggravated felony” definition.67 Congress designed these
additions to make “a major stride toward expediting the
removal of criminal noncitizens . . . .”68
But in 1996, Congress enacted two public laws that
have gained notoriety because of the expansion of the
“aggravated felony” definition. First, Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)
of 1996 to include more non-violent crimes as aggravated
62

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70.
Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, Creating Crimigration, 2013
BYU L. REV. 1457, 1468 (2013).
64
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U) (2014).
65
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2014) (providing that the aggravated
felony deportability ground now includes “any crime of violence”).
66
18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). (defining a “crime of violence” as an offense
that includes as an element either the use or threatened use of physical
force against the person of property of another, or a felony offense that
involves the “substantial risk” of such force”).
67
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections of 1993,108 Stat.
4305, 4320-22 (1993).
68
140 Cong. Rec. H11291-01 (1994) (statement of Rep. Betty
McCollum).
63
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felonies. 69 Among those are forgery, counterfeiting,
prostitution, certain gambling offenses, vehicle trafficking,
obstruction of justice, perjury, bribery of witness, and
offenses related to skipping bail. 70 Opposing the 1996
amendment, Patsy Mink, member of the U.S. House of
Representatives for the state of the Hawaii testified: “I
regret that [the House is using the AEDPA] . . . as a vehicle
to advance anti-immigrant attitudes. This bill increases the
number of criminal activities that [trigger removal
proceedings]. Most of the additional offenses require no
link to terrorism.”71 In contrast, Lamar Smith, a member of
the U.S. House of Representatives of Texas testifies that:
“the U.S. removes too few criminal noncitizens today. The
[removal] process can be years in length. [The AEDPA]
streamlines the [removal] process by eliminating frivolous
challenges to [removal] orders; expanding the list of
aggravated felonies [that trigger removal proceedings]; and
closing the gap between the end of an noncitizen’s criminal
sentence and the date the [U.S. removes the noncitizen]
from the United States.”72
Second, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”)73
redefined the term “conviction” to mean: “where the judge
or jury has found the [noncitizen] has . . . admitted
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and the judge
has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint
on the [noncitizen]’s liberty . . ..” 74 Therefore, the
69

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, sec. 440, § 242(a)(2), 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006)).
70
8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006).
71
142 Cong. Rec. E645-04, 1996 WL 200107 (1996) (statement of
Rep. Patsy Mink).
72
142 Cong. Rec. H3605-04, 1996 WL 185581 (1996) (statement of
Rep. Lamar Smith).
73
IIRIRA Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321. 110 Stat. 3008, 3009-627.
74
Id. (codified in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A)(2014)).
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commission–rather than conviction–of such an offense is
sufficient to constitute a conviction under immigration law.
Furthermore, punishment can include Alford pleas, 75
probation, 76 house arrest, 77 community service, anger
management, drug/substance abuse programs, fines, and
restitution. 78 In addition, IIRIRA reduced the term of
imprisonment from five years to one. Therefore, crimes of
violence, theft offenses, and offenses relating to bribery for
which the term of imprisonment is at least one year
constitute “aggravated felonies.”
In practice, the “aggravated felony” removes many
noncitizens from the U.S. for crimes that are neither
“aggravated” nor “felonies.” For example, a year of
probation with a suspended sentence for pulling hair is an
aggravated felony.79 Mary Anne Gehris, who arrived to the
United States at the age of one, pulled another woman’s
hair in a quarrel over a man.80 Gehris was twenty-one
75

An “Alford plea is ‘an arrangement in which a defendant maintains
his innocence but pleads guilty for reasons of self-interest. United
States v. Taylor, 659 F.3d 339, 347 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970); Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378
F.3d 173, 181 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing that “[a]n Alford plea is a
guilty,” and thus is included as a conviction” of an “aggravated felony”
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2014).
76
Gil v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing that
“probation satisfies part (ii) [of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)], so [the
petitioner] has been ‘convicted’ even though ‘adjudication of guilt has
been withheld’”).
77
McKenzie v. Attorney General of the United States, 452 F. App’x 88
(3d Cir. 2011) (describing that petitioner was convicted of an
aggravated felony because her sentence to house arrest without
electronic monitoring constituted imprisonment under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(B) (2014).
78
De Vega v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing that
restitution constitutes punishment and thus, constitutes a “conviction”
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2014).
79
Anthony Lewis, This Got Me in Some Kind of Whirlwind, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2000 at A13.
80
Id.
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when the incident occurred.81 Later, Gehris pleaded guilty
to a charge of misdemeanor battery, and received a
suspended one-year-jail sentence.82 Thirteen years later, at
age thirty-four, Gehris sought to become a United States
citizen.83 But after honestly answering the questions on her
citizenship application, the government initiated removal
proceedings against her. 84 Under the AEDPA and
IIRAIRA, minor misdemeanors, are retroactively defined
as an “aggravated felony,” a ground for removal.85 In other
words, “Gehris is removable for having committed a
misdemeanor in 1988 that Congress redefined in 1996 as an
‘aggravated felony’ for immigration purposes.”86
Stories like Gehris’ are not uncommon. This is in
part due to the fact that some aggravated felonies include
crimes that are neither “aggravated” or “felonies” under
criminal law.87 For example, theft of a ten-dollar video
game, shoplifting fifteen dollars worth of baby clothes, and
forging a check for less that twenty dollars have all been
held as aggravated felonies.88
Lastly, aggravated felonies trigger mandatory
detention, removal proceedings without the possibility of
almost all forms of discretionary relief, including asylum,89
81

Id.
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Lea McDermid, Deportation Is Different: Noncitizens and Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 741, 742 (2001) (citing INA
101(a)(43)).
86
Id.
87
Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief And
The Lost Cause Of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 673-75
(2008).
88
Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al., as amici curiae
supporting petitioner at 8-9, Padilla v, Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473-75
(2010).
89
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B) (2009) (describing that a conviction of an
aggravated felony bars a refugee from applying for asylum); see 8
82
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the cancellation of removal,90 and it bars the immigrant’s
return to the United States for life. 91 The latter is
particularly troubling because American immigration law
has one goal: family unity.92 Yet, as in the case of Mrs.
Gheris, the U.S. removes noncitizens for minor
misdemeanors that are considered aggravated felonies
under immigration law. Worse still, after the ten year ban,
“[f]amily members who are eligible for visas must wait up
to 20 years to reunite with their family in the United
States.”93 Thus, a person can wait up to 30 years. If that

U.S.C. § 1158 (2009) (describing asylum as the process that allows
refugees to apply to live and work in the United States); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1101(A)(42) (2014) (defining refugee is any person who is
outside any country of such person's nationality and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion”); see also 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3) (2014) (describing that the
Attorney General of the United States may not remove a noncitizen if
that person is eligible for relief under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture).
90
8 U.S.C. §1229b(a)(3) (2008) (describing that the Attorney General
of the United States may cancel removal in the case of a noncitizen that
is excludable or deportable but only if that person has not been
convicted of an aggravated felony).
91
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2013) (“any [noncitizen] . . . who again
seeks admission . . . at any time in the case of an [noncitizen] convicted
of an aggravated felony is inadmissible”).
92
In support of the Immigration Act of 1990, Hamilton Fish, a member
of the U.S. House of Representatives stated that “family unification [is]
the cornerstone of American law and policy.” 136 CONG. REC. H1235803 (1990).
93
Immigration Policy Center, Focusing on the Solutions: Key
Principles
of
Comprehensive
Immigration
Reform,
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Solutions_Pa
per_032310.pdf#page=18.
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person decides to enter without inspection, that person is
subject to imprisonment of a maximum of 20 years.94
B. The Crime of Moral Turpitude
According to Juliet Stumpf, professor of law at
Lewis & Clark Law School, “[b]efore the mid-1980’s,
removal of noncitizens for criminal offenses was largely
limited to convictions for serious ‘crimes of moral
turpitude,’ drug trafficking, and certain weapons offenses.
Now a crime of moral turpitude carrying a potential
sentence of one year is a removable offense.”95
Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code
provides removal of individuals convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude. 96 Under current law, a
noncitizen convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
committed within five years (or ten years for “Green Card”
holders) after the date of admission, and who is convicted
of a crime and incarcerated at least one year, is
removable.97 Residing in the United States for five years,
however, does not prevent removal for a person convicted
of at least two crimes involving moral turpitude.98
Although section 1227(a)(2)(A) may sound
effective in theory, it is difficult to apply in practice. At the
root of the problem is the fact that determining what is a
crime of moral turpitude is no simple task, because
Congress has never defined the term “crime of moral
turpitude.”
And “[f]or more than a century, the
government has [remov]ed millions of [noncitizens for
94

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (describing that if removal was subsequent to
conviction for an aggravated felony, the maximum term of
imprisonment is 20 years).
95
Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683,
1723 (2011).
96
8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A) (2008).
97
8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2008).
98
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2008).
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convictions of] crime[s] involving moral turpitude, [and] it
has done this without any statutory definition of what
constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.” The only
guidance comes from federal court and Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decisions. For example, one
BIA decision states that a crime of moral turpitude
Refers generally to conduct
which is inherently base, vile,
or depraved, and contrary to
the rules of morality and the
duties owed between persons
or to society in general.
Moral turpitude has been
defined as an act that is per se
reprehensible
and
intrinsically wrong, or malum
in se, so it is the nature of the
act itself and not the statutory
prohibition of it which
renders a crime one of moral
turpitude.99
Therefore, because Congress has not defined what
crime of “moral turpitude” means, both, immigration and
federal courts lack objective criteria necessary to determine
what crimes involve moral turpitude. 100 This lack of
objectivity, thus, leads courts to hold that minor crimes
involve moral turpitude. For example, courts have held
that the following relatively minor offenses are crimes
involving moral turpitude for immigration purposes:
issuing bad checks, attempted bribery, disorderly conduct
(loitering for lewd soliciting), false statement (on firearm
application or passport application), forgery mail fraud,
99

In re Fualuaau, 21 I. & N. Dec. 475, 477 (BIA 1996).
McDermid, supra note 85, at 216.
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mayhem, possession of stolen mail, receiving stolen
property, and petty theft.101 Theft of services has also been
held to involve moral turpitude. For example, in Mojica v.
Reno, the court classified turnstile jumping in the New
York City subway system, a misdemeanor offense, as a
theft of services conviction, and therefore, crime involving
moral turpitude.102 Another court stated that “it is well
settled that theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, has
always been held to involve moral turpitude.”103
C. S-COM Statistics
Evidence indicates that via S-COM and the
expansion of crimes that trigger removal proceedings, ICE
has removed 375,031 noncitizens.104 A recent study by
ICE found that since the creation of S-COM, five percent,
or 2,162,636 people, of all interoperability transmission
have resulted in IDENT matches.105 Of these matches,
twenty-eight percent of them identified noncitizens charged
or convicted of an aggravated felony.106 The other seventytwo percent of the IDENT matches resulted in the
identification of noncitizens charged or convicted of a
crime other than an aggravated felony. 107 Of these
numbers, ICE removed 375,031 noncitizens from the
United States. Thirty-two percent had “aggravated felony”
101

Id. at 775.
Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
103
In re Scarpulla, 15 I. & N. Dec. 139, 140-41 (BIA 1974).
104
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities:
Monthly Statistics through August 31, 2014: IDENT/IAFIS
Interoperability, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 1, 2,
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/f
oia/sc-stats/nationwide_interop_stats-fy2014-to-date.pdf
(describing
that the LESC queries the Student & Exchange Visitor Information
System (“SEVIS”); U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
102
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convictions, or two or more crimes punishable by more
than one year.108 Twenty percent had convictions of any
felony or three or more offenses punishable by less than
one year, commonly known as misdemeanors. 109 The
remaining 48 percent had either no criminal conviction or
convictions of the lowest level misdemeanor.110
ICE’s “report containing these numbers is f[ull of]
ominous yet cryptic references to ‘convicted criminals’”111
An analysis of the convictions proves that most of the
“criminal aliens” are not exactly the “worst of the worst” or
a danger to American society.112 Furthermore, as outlined
above, even the highest priority on ICE’s list are not
necessarily violent or dangerous.
IV. Lack of Proportionality
The formal proceedings (known as “removal
proceedings”) that the United States utilizes to remove a
noncitizen from the United States or exclude him or her
from lawful admission are not proportional. According to
Juliet Stumpf, professor of law at Lewis & Clark Law
School, immigration law makes use of removal as an “onoff switch,” rather than employing a graduated sanctions
scheme found in criminal penology. 113 Therefore,
“[r]egardless of whether the violation of immigration law is
grave or slight, removal from the country is the statutory

108

Id.
Id.
110
Id.
111
Misplaced Priorities: Most Immigrants Deported by ICE in 2013
Were a Threat to No One, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER 1, (2014),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.o
rg/just-facts/misplaced-priorities-most-immigrants-deporte
d-ice-2013-were-threat-no-one.
112
Id.
113
Stumpf, supra note 95, at 1690.
109
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consequence.”114 For example, “[a] college student with a
student visa who works an hour over the maximum
mandated by law is removable from the Unites States for
violating the terms of her visa to the same extent that a
serial killer on a tourist visa is removable as an ‘aggravated
felon.’”115
In contrast, “[c]riminal punishment reflects the
principle of proportionality, such that less serious crimes
result in milder punishment and vice versa.” 116 For
example, in Weems v. United States,117 the court convicted
the defendant for falsifying a public document and
sentenced him to 15 years of “cadena temporal,” a form of
imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and
permanent civil disabilities.118 The Court, however, noted
that, “it is a precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime
should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense,”119
and held the sentence violated the Eight Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.
Removal, however, is not a form of criminal
punishment. Instead, removal constitutes a civil remedy
aimed at excluding unwanted noncitizens.120 Despite this
characterization, many immigration violations now
constitute crimes. For example, unlawfully reentering the
United States after removal carries a penalty of ten or
twenty year imprisonment.121 As a result, “[a]s recently as
2011 there were more federal criminal immigration cases . .
. than prosecutions for violent crimes, drug offenses, or

114

Id.
Id. at 1691 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) and 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2008)).
116
Id. at 1691.
117
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
118
Id. at 364.
119
Id. at 367.
120
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1950).
121
8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012).
115
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any other type of federal crime.” 122 Not surprisingly,
Immigration Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) now operates
the largest detention system in the country.123
Consequences exist for violating our immigration
laws. But other consequences are often in addition to
removal, and not alternatives. Under our immigration laws,
removal remains the baseline sanction. 124 Some of the
other sanctions available for immigration violations
include: (1) incarceration,125 (2) fines,126 and (3) bars to
reentry. 127 Like a criminal defendant on trial for his
liberty, immigrants face high stakes in removal
proceedings. According to the Supreme Court of the
United States, removal may result in the loss of “all that
122

Hernandez, supra note 17, at 1473.
Dr. Dora Schriro, Immigration Detention Overview and
Recommendation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY 1, 2 (2009), http://www.ice.gov/docl
ib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf (last visited Aug. 30,
2014).
124
See Stumpf, supra note 95, at 1691.
125
8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012) (providing that improperly entering the
United States may result in criminal fine or imprisonment for up to six
months, or both, for the first offense).
126
8 U.S.C. § 1324(c) (2012) (imposing civil penalties for fraudulent
immigration documents); 8 U.S.C. §1325(b) (2012) (imposing a civil
penalty upon a noncitizen apprehended while entering the United States
at a time or place other than as designed by immigration officers); 8
U.S.C. 1325(c) (2012) (imposing a fine of up to $ 250,000 for entering
into a sham marriage to evade immigration laws).
127
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (what year statute is being cited?)
(applying a three-year bar to reentry to a noncitizen who has accrued
more than 180 days but less than one year of unlawful presence and
who voluntarily departed prior to the commencement of removal
proceedings); 8 U.S.C. 1182 (a)(6)(G) (what year statute is being
cited?) (applying a five-year bar to reentry to a noncitizen who violates
the terms of a student visa); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (what year statute is
being cited?) (creating five-year and ten-year bars for unlawful
presence and reentry after a previous removal or departure under a
removal order).
123
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makes life worth living.”128 The Court also recognizes that
removal “may result also in loss of both property and
life.”129
In response to the harsh immigration consequences
of contact with the criminal justice system, “the Supreme
Court recognized that [removal] ‘is now virtually inevitable
for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes’–-- so
much so that a defendant’s right to the effective assistance
of counsel in a criminal case can be violated if her lawyer
fails to advise her about the likelihood that a guilty plea
could get her expelled.”130
The Padilla v. Kentucky 131 decision, wherein the
Unites States Supreme Court decided that criminal defense
attorneys must advise noncitizen clients about the
immigration consequences of accepting a guilty plea, is a
step in the right direction because convictions of either an
aggravated felony or a crime of moral turpitude subjects a
noncitizen to removal. Further, once hauled into
immigration court, noncitizens do not receive the
constitutional protections found in the criminal justice
system.132 Some absent constitutional protections include:
the right to trial by a court established under Article III of
the Constitution, 133 the right to counsel at government
expense, 134 the right to not incriminate oneself, 135 and
protection against retroactive changes in the law.136
128

Ng. Fung Ho. v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 285 (1922).
Id.
130
David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc
Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 176-77 (2012) (citing
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010)).
131
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
132
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that noncitizens
facing deportation were not entitled to the constitutional safeguards
protecting criminal defendants).
133
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (what is the date of the code edition
cited?); Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543-44.
134
Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing removal
proceedings as a labyrinth character of modern immigration law–a
129
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V.

Effect on Families

In 2011, the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on
Law and Policy (the “Institute”) conducted a study of data
provide by the federal government to the National Day
Labor Organization pursuant to a Freedom of Information
Act lawsuit.137 The study based its findings on a random
national sample of 375 individuals who S-COM identified
via IDENT.138
A. U.S. Citizens
ICE acknowledges that that there might be IDENT
matches for U.S. citizens. 139 ICE, however, has never
maze of hyper-technical statutes and regulations that engender waste,
delay, and confusion for the Government and petitioners alike).
135
U.S. CONST. amend. V; United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671
(1998) (noting that the “risk that [a resident alien’s] testimony might
subject him to deportation is not a sufficient ground for asserting [the
fifth amendment] privilege [against self-incrimination], given the civil
character of a deportation proceeding”).
136
Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 557 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that an
argument derived from the ex post facto clause is not available to
petitioner because deportation is a civil proceeding).
137
Aarti Kohli, Peter L. Markowitz & Lisa Chavez, Secure
Communities By the Numbers: An Analysis of Demographics and Due
Process, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON LAW AND
SOCIAL POLICY 1, 2 (2011), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/4-811%20Sampling%
20Stipulation.pdf.
138
Id. at 4.
139
Communities: Monthly Statistics through September 30, 2013, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 1, 58 (2013),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwi
de_interop_stats-fy2013-to-date.pdf (describing the two types of U.S.
citizens that appear in the IDENT database. The first are U.S. citizens
are have active warrants provide by CJIS, adopted children from
abroad, or have participated in DHS’s trusted traveler program. The
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published any data indicating the number or percentage of
U.S. citizens it apprehends through S-COM. According to
the Institute, U.S. citizen matches should never result in the
apprehension of those individuals because the government
cannot remove U.S. citizens.140 The Institute, however,
estimates that ICE has apprehended approximately 3,600
U.S. citizens from the beginning of the program to April
2011.141
S-COM is also responsible for removing U.S.
citizens. For example, S-COM removed Mark Lyttle to
Mexico; he was subsequently sent to Honduras, Nicaragua
and Guatemala. 142 Lyttle was serving a sentence for a
misdemeanor assault when ICE served him with a Notice to
Appear in immigration court. 143 The notice stated that
Lyttle was “not a U.S. citizen but rather a native [of]
Mexico and deemed him [removable] pursuant to 8 U.S.C §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as a noncitizen who is convicted of an
aggravated felony.”144 To Lyttle’s surprise, he was faced
with removal proceedings, despite his status as a U.S.
citizen. 145 Once in Mexico, Mexico removed Lyttle to
Honduras. Thereafter, Honduras sent Lyttle to Nicaragua
and then to Guatemala.146
Many noncitizens identified for removal also had
U.S. citizen family members. The Institute found that
thirty-nine percent of the people identified for removal had
U.S. citizen family members.147 Thirty-seven percent had a
U.S. citizen child and five percent had a U.S. citizen
second are U.S. citizens who were not U.S. citizens when prints were
collected).
140
Kohli, supra note 137, at 4.
141
Id.
142
Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp.2d 1256, 1266 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
143
Id. at 1269-70.
144
Id. at 1270.
145
Id. at 1272.
146
See id. at 1273.
147
Kohli, supra note 137, at 5.
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spouse.148 These numbers are alarming because the more
noncitizens the U.S. places in removal proceedings, the
more families encounter adverse effects. 149 Researchers
note that, “[t]he implications of growing up in an [mix
status] family span a variety of developmental contexts . . .
including psychological well-being, mental health, physical
health, education, and employment.”150 In total, S-COM
affected approximately 88,000 families with U.S. citizen
members from its inception through April 2011.151
B. Non-U.S. Citizens
Discrepancies exist between the demographics of
those detected by S-COM. For example, although research
shows that 57% of noncitizens in the U.S. are male, “93%
of the sample arrested through S-COM . . . [are] males.”152
According to Maureen A. Sweeney, professor of law at the
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law,
“[e]ven assuming that men may be more likely to commit
crime than women, this number far surpasses the 75% of
arrests tracked by the FBI nationwide that involve men.”153
Similarly, Latin Americans are disproportionately impacted
by S-COM. For example, although 77% of noncitizens are
from Latin American countries, 93% of noncitizens
identified by S-COM are Latin American.154
Families
148

Id.
See id. at 5.
150
Carola Suárez-Orozco, et al., Growing Up in the Shadows: The
Developmental Implications of Unauthorized Staus, 81 HARV. EDUC.
REV.
438,
462
(2011),
available
at
http://her.hepg.org/content/g23x203763783m75/?p=0aca47a0575b4334
aa31d64350701086&pi=2.
151
Kohli, supra note 137, at 5.
152
Sweeney, supra note 39, at 249.
153
Id.
154
Kohli, supra note 135, at 5-6.
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Removing noncitizen from the U.S. has devastating
effects on families. Removing noncitizen males, for
example, leaves single mothers struggling to make ends
meet.155 In addition, the “tenuous legal status of many
[mother]s left behind adds a double burden on these
[mother]s to provide for their families while also raising
their children.”156 And this burden often leaves women–
more so than men–in vulnerable conditions. For example,
according to American Progress, “[t]he poverty rate for
single-mother families is 40.7 percent, compared to just
24.2 percent for single-father families.”157
Removing noncitizens from the U.S. also leaves
many of their children in foster care. According to Race
Forward, approximately 5.5 million children in the U.S.
have a noncitizen parent.158 About 4.5 million of these
children are U.S. citizens.159 Although it is not clear how
many children are currently in foster care, in 2012 at least
5,100 such children lived in foster care, and more than
15,000 children could face similar circumstances by
2017.160
Although removals create many single-parent
households and leave children in foster care, an equally
likely scenario is that the U.S. citizen child or other family
member “self-deports.” This is possible because many
persons live in mix-status families. According to Dreby,
155

See Joanna Dreby, How Today’s Immigration Enforcement Policies
Impact Children, Families, and Communities: A View From the
Ground
1,
5
(2012),
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/0
8/DrebyImmigrationFamiliesFINAL.pdf.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 9-10.
158
Seth Freed Wesller, The Perilous Intersection of Immigration
Enforcement and the Child Welfare System, APPLIED RESEARCH
CENTER 1, 10 (2011), https://www.race
forward.org/research/reports/shattered-families.
159
Id. at 9.
160
Id. at 6.
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16.6 million people live with at least one noncitizen family
member in 2012.161 Therefore, many U.S. citizen children
“self-deport” to reunite with their families. According, to
the Pew Hispanic Center, about 300,000 U.S. children have
migrated to Mexico since to 2005 for this purpose.162
VI.

Conclusion

Implicit in the creation of S-COM is the belief that
noncitizens commit more crimes than native-born people.
This belief is not new; “first [it was the] Irish and Chinese
immigrants, then Italians and others from southern and
eastern Europe, and today Mexicans and others from Latin
America.”163 However, the belief that noncitizens commit
more crimes than native-born citizens is erroneous, as
“academic research generally finds that immigrants are no
more prone (and may be less prone) to engage in crime
than native-born people.” 164 Despite the evidence,
Congress cranked up the machine (“S-COM”) designed to
keep the logs (“noncitizens”) rushing along the flumes as
friction-free as possible while they hurtle toward the big
blade waiting for them at the sawmill downstream
(“immigration courts”), destroying families along the way.
Therefore, as long as ICE and LEAs continue to share data
via S-COM, crimes that are neither “aggravated” or
“felonies” will continue to trigger removal proceedings and
unreasonably separate families.
161
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ADDENDUM
After the completion of this paper, President Obama
used his executive powers to direct Jeh Johnson, director of
DHS, to end S-COM and replace it with the Priority
Enforcement Program (“PEP”).165 PEP will continue to
rely on fingerprint-based biometric data submitted during
bookings by LEAs to the FBI for criminal background
checks. 166 Due to limited resources, however, Johnson
acknowledges that ICE cannot respond to all immigration
violations or remove all noncitizens.167 For that reason,
ICE’s priorities are national security, border security, and
public safety.168 To meet those priorities, ICE will only
seek the transfer of a noncitizen in the custody of LEAs
when the noncitizen has a conviction of an offense listed in
Priority 1 (a), (c), (d), and (e) and Priority 2 (a) and (b) of
November 20, 2014.169 PEP and the new Priorities became
effective on January 5, 2015.170
But PEP’s priorities are not new.171 Indeed, PEP’s
priorities include many of S-COM’s priorities.
For
example, PEP’s Priority 1(e) describes that “[noncitizens]
convicted of an ‘aggravated felony,’ as that term is defined
in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration Nationality Act at
165
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the time of conviction,”172 are the top priority for removal.
Indeed, President Obama stated that he aims his executive
action at removing “felons, not families.” Therefore, PEP
has the potential to attract S-COM’s criticism,
misunderstanding, and litigation, by removing noncitizens
for crimes that are neither “aggravated” nor “felonies.”
PEP, however, appears to give ICE greater
prosecutorial discretion. For example, PEP requires ICE to
exercise discretion based on individual circumstances, such
as compelling and exceptional factors that clearly indicate
the noncitizen is not a threat to national security, border
security, or public safety.173 In making those judgments,
ICE should consider factors such as: extenuating
circumstances involving the offense of conviction, length
of time in the United States, and family or community ties
to the United States. 174 In addition, this list is not
dispositive or exhaustive.175 Moreover, PEP directs ICE to
exercise prosecutorial discretion based on the totality of the
circumstances.176
The discretion mentioned above applies not only to
the decision to issue, serve, file, or cancel a Notice to
Appear in immigration court, but also to a broad range of
other enforcement decisions, including deciding: whom to
stop, question, arrest, detain or release.177 Additionally,
although ICE may exercise discretion at any time, PEP
notes that discretion should be used as early as possible in
the case or proceedings.178 Furthermore, DHS will monitor
PEP at the state and local level, including through the
collection and analysis of data, to detect inappropriate use
172
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to support or engage in biased policing, and DHS will
establish measures to stop any such misuses.179
In conclusion, PEP appears to attempt to strike a
balance between noncitizens that are a threat to national
security, border security, or public safety, and humanitarian
concerns. Therefore, PEP appears to be much better than
S-COM. However, it is too soon to tell what PEP will
mean for those living in the U.S. without documentation
and their families.

179
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